# Matthews v. Konieczny > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · June 2, 1987 · 515 Pa. 106 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704816 ## Case - **Full name:** James J. MATTHEWS, Jr., and Isabelle R. Matthews, Administrator of the Estate of James Thomas Matthews, Deceased, v. John KONIECZNY and J-B Beverage Distributor, Inc. and Paul and Gloria Berkowitz. Appeal of John KONIECZNY; Christina MANCUSO, a Minor by Her Parent and Natural Guardian, Louise SMITH, Individually and in Her Own Right, Appellants, v. Richard Dennis BRADSHAW, and Gary D. Ford, and Davis Ford, and Friels, Inc., D/B/A Friel’s Beverage, Appellees - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** June 2, 1987 - **Citations:** 515 Pa. 106; 527 A.2d 508; 1987 Pa. LEXIS 718 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Zappala - **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Zappala, Papadakos - **Cited by:** 33 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704816 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding Dram Shop Act liability “is not absolute and/or irrebuttable” and defendants “can, where applicable, attempt to establish the comparative negligence of the actor(s) involved.” ## Opinion text ZAPPALA, Justice, dissenting. The majority’s analysis rests heavily upon the perceived public policy to protect minors and the public from the potentially deleterious effects of alcohol. Initiating its analysis with this broad statement of policy, rather than the language of the Liquor Code’s provision governing the liability of licensees, assures the result that the majority seeks. While it may appear expedient to expand the liability of licensees by judicial decision beyond that imposed by the Liquor Code, it is unwise. The majority concedes that not interpreting § 4-497 to impose civil liability upon licensees for any injuries arising *130 from a sale of alcohol to minors would create the anomalous situation whereby licensees’ liability would be more narrowly circumscribed than that of a social host. This argument is not compelling. The civil liability of a licensee is not commensurate with that of a social host because the latter is a judicially-created cause of action. The majority improperly overlays the social policy argument which prevailed in Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157 , 470 A.2d 515 (1983) onto the Liquor Code’s specific limitation of civil liability of licensees. Although the legislature may not have kept pace with the judiciary’s view of public policy, as the majority clearly wishes, it is not the Court’s prerogative to compel compliance with its view. Section 4-497 limits the liability of licensees to third persons to those instances where (1) the injury occurs away from the licensed premises, and (2) the customer was visibly intoxicated while being sold or furnished with alcohol. I do not agree with the majority that “customer” should be defined as one who has a legal capacity to engage in the purchase of alcohol. The common usage of “customer” describes one who is a buyer, purchaser, or patron. “Requisite legal capacity” has been grafted onto the plain meaning of the term by the majority. The flaw in this interpretation is demonstrated by following the majority’s own analysis. The majority first states that licensees have absolute immunity from liability in instances where the licensee has taken good faith efforts to verify a prospective customer’s age pursuant to 47 P.S. § 4-495(e). The majority then holds that a licensee is liable to third parties for injuries sustained as a result of the service of alcohol to a minor and that § 4-497 is inapplicable because a minor is not a “legal” customer. Finally, the majority states that its holding is not intended to affect the statutory immunity contained in 47 P.S. § 4-495(e). The majority disregards the fact that the execution of a signed statement by an underage customer does not convert the minor into a person having “a capacity to regularly engage in transactions” involving aleo *131 hol. It cannot logically follow then from the majority’s own premises that a licensee will be immune from liability to third persons if the customer is not 21 years of age. Nor do I agree with Justice Hutchinson that the interpretation of customer to include purchasers who are minors would render meaningless the provision of 47 P.S. § 4-495(e). Section 4-495(e) provides that The signed statement in the possession of a licensee of an employe of a State Liquor Store may be offered as a defense in all civil or criminal prosecutions for serving a minor, and no penalty shall be imposed if the Liquor Control Board or the courts are satisfied that the licensee or State Liquor Store employe acted in good faith. I would interpret the language of this section to provide a defense only in criminal prosecutions for serving a minor or civil “prosecutions” such as license suspension proceedings. I do not believe this section was intended to provide a defense in tort actions and would not interpret “civil prosecutions” so expansively as to include actions brought by third parties who are injured by underage drinkers. Even if § 4-495(e) were to be interpreted to provide a statutory immunity to licensees in tort actions, this would not necessarily reduce § 4-497 to mere surplusage. The provision of § 4-495 could be construed to provide a licensee with an absolute defense only to negligence actions brought by the minor himself who had purchased the alcohol. All actions by third persons would then be governed by § 4-497. Under either the majority’s interpretation of the effect of § 4-495 or my narrower interpretation, both the provisions of § 4-495 and 4-497 could be given effect. For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the decisions of the Superior Court. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704816. Public record. Not legal advice.