# Commonwealth v. Patterson > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 20, 1980 · 488 Pa. 227 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704668 ## Case - **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania v. Winfield C. PATTERSON, Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** March 20, 1980 - **Citations:** 488 Pa. 227; 412 A.2d 481; 1980 Pa. LEXIS 526 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Roberts - **Judges:** Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, Kauffman - **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704668 ## Opinion text ROBERTS, Justice, dissenting. I dissent. Unlike the majority, I am convinced that police subjected appellant to custodial interrogation without first administering warnings required under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). On the afternoon that the bodies of the victims were discovered, police went to the house where an older daughter of one of the victims lived. Upon arrival, they “invited” the daughter and three others, appellant, appellant’s girlfriend Sharlinda Stroman, and William Blannon, to police headquarters to be interviewed regarding their knowledge of the victims. Police provided the transportation. Before they left, however, the owner of the home told police that appellant and Blannon “know more about it because they were around there over the weekend.” Upon arriving at police headquarters that evening, police, without first advising appellant of his rights, asked appellant questions concerning his knowledge of the victims. Police sought appellant’s consent to a polygraph examination. 1 Police then told appellant he was “free to leave” and offered him a ride home in a police car. At the time of this “offer,” however, police still were questioning appellant’s girlfriend Stroman. Because appellant decided to wait for Stroman, he declined the “offer.” Police questioned appellant’s girlfriend Stroman throughout the night. In the meantime, appellant spent the night at police headquarters in a locked waiting room. Blannon, also questioned throughout the night, eventually confessed. The first thing the next morning, at 7:00 a. m., police further questioned appellant, again without first administering Miranda warnings, purportedly to “reconcile discrepancies” between statements given by Blannon and Stroman. Police claim that *238 after this second round of questioning they “noticed” discrepancies in the statements of Blannon, appellant, and Stroman. It was only before a third round of questioning, conducted four hours after the second round began, that police advised appellant of his rights under Miranda . It is well-settled Pennsylvania law that “the test of custodial interrogation is whether the individual being interrogated reasonably believes his freedom of action is being restricted.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 473 Pa. 562, 570 , 375 A.2d 1260, 1264 (1977). At the very least, it must be concluded that appellant could reasonably believe his freedom of action was restricted at the time of the second round of questioning. Police resumed their questioning of appellant the first thing in the morning after, the night before, they had already questioned appellant, had already asked appellant to take a polygraph examination, and had continued to question his girlfriend Stroman throughout the night. In harmony with established Pennsylvania law, this Court should hold that because Miranda warnings were not properly given, the inculpatory statement police took from appellant must be suppressed and appellant must be awarded a new trial. 2 The majority concludes appellant was never in “custody” for purposes of Miranda until the police finally chose to give appellant warnings at commencement of the third round of questioning. The majority is impressed by the officers’ assurance that appellant was “free to leave,” their “offer” to appellant of a ride home in a police car, their claim that the second round of questioning was designed only to “reconcile discrepancies” between statements given by Blannon and appellant’s girlfriend, and .the assertion that appellant was not a suspect until police “noted” discrepancies in his state *239 ments after the second round of questioning. The majority’s reliance on these self-serving statements, however, is entirely misplaced. For the alleged purposes of the police are not controlling under Pennsylvania’s established test of “custodial interrogation.” What matters instead is the perception of the suspect at the time of interrogation. As this Court unanimously stated in Commonwealth v. Brown, 473 Pa. 562 , 375 A.2d 1260 (1977), “custodial interrogation does not require that the police make a formal arrest, nor that the police intend to make an arrest.” Brown, 473 Pa. at 570 , 375 A.2d at 1264 . The majority’s analysis to the contrary thus is entirely inappropriate. I dissent and would reverse judgment of sentence. . No test was administered because appellant had been smoking marijuana all day before police transported him to police headquarters. . In my view, this record certainly suggests that, from the time police first arrived at the home where the older daughter of one of the victims lived and where appellant was visiting, appellant could reasonably believe his freedom of action was being restricted. It was the police who suggested that appellant and his companions go to police headquarters to talk about the victims. Police took appellant and the companions to police headquarters in police cars. And, the owner of the house implicated Blannon and appellant in the killings. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704668. Public record. Not legal advice.