# In Re Lamberis

> Illinois Supreme Court · December 17, 1982 · 93 Ill. 2d 222

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704041

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re ANTHONY BYRON LAMBERIS, Attorney, Respondent
- **Court:** Illinois Supreme Court
- **Decided:** December 17, 1982
- **Citations:** 93 Ill. 2d 222; 66 Ill. Dec. 623; 443 N.E.2d 549; 1982 Ill. LEXIS 380
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Underwood
- **Judges:** Simon, Underwood, Moran
- **Cited by:** 25 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704041

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that plagiarism by an attorney in a masters of law thesis violated Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(a)(4)
- recognizing that “[h]onesty is . . . fundamental to the functioning of the legal profession”
- finding plagiarism constitutes deceit under Illinois Code of Professional Responsibility

## Opinion text

JUSTICE UNDERWOOD, dissenting:
Although I agree with the majority’s conclusion that respondent’s conduct warrants discipline, the censure imposed seems to me an inadequate response to the deliberate and deceitful nature of respondent’s conduct.
While no two disciplinary cases are completely alike, “predictability and fairness require a degree of consistency in the selection of sanctions for similar types of misconduct.” (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 275 . See In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill. 2d 7 .) Respondent’s action constituted a purposeful violation of the bar’s fundamental obligation of honesty, and cannot, in my judgment, be equated with the negligent commingling and conversion for which we censured the respondent in In re McLennon (1982), 93 Ill. 2d 215 . Rather, the character of respondent’s misconduct more closely resembles a fraudulent misrepresentation which has customarily received a more severe sanction. See In re Nowak (1976), 62 Ill. 2d 279 ; In re March (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 382 ; In re Sherre (1977), 68 Ill. 2d 56 .
As noted by the majority, the reasons for which we impose discipline are “to maintain the integrity of the legal profession, to protect the administration of justice from reproach, and to safeguard the public.” (In re LaPinska (1978), 72 Ill. 2d 461, 473 .) I think it clear that respondent’s intentional deceitfulness tends to bring the legal profession into disrepute and, although not perpetrated in the context of an attorney-client relationship, indirectly threatens the administration of justice by undermining public confidence in the integrity of officers of the court. In re March (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 382, 391 ; In re Abbamonto (1960), 19 Ill. 2d 93, 98 .
Because of the calculated nature of respondent’s misconduct some suspension seems to me necessary. Since the length of a suspension should bear a close relationship to the harm or risk of harm caused (In re Saladino (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 263, 276 ), and since respondent’s misconduct did not directly affect any other person, I would think a three-month suspension appropriate.
JUSTICE MORAN joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9704041. Public record. Not legal advice.