# Lieberman v. Abat's Auto Tag Service, Inc. > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · August 2, 1985 · 344 Pa. Super. 350 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9701157 ## Case - **Full name:** Louis LIEBERMAN, Appellant, v. ABAT’S AUTO TAG SERVICE, INCORPORATED - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** August 2, 1985 - **Citations:** 344 Pa. Super. 350; 496 A.2d 831; 1985 Pa. Super. LEXIS 7767 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Spaeth - **Judges:** Spaeth, President Judge, and Johnson and Shoyer - **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9701157 ## Opinion text SPAETH, President Judge, concurring: I agree with the majority that appellant has no cause of action, but on different reasoning. It is, of course, axiomatic that to state a cause of action in negligence, the plaintiff must plead and prove four ele *354 ments: a duty owed to him; the defendant’s breach of that duty; an injury suffered; and a particular causal relationship — generally described as “proximate cause”— between the injury and the breach of duty. Prosser and Keeton, The Law of Torts, § 30 at 164-65 (5th ed. 1984). It is also axiomatic that all four elements are interrelated. This is especially true of the elements of “duty” and “proximate cause.” As Prosser and Keeton explain the relationship: It is quite possible to state every question which arises in connection with “proximate cause” in the form of a single question: was the defendant under a duty to protect the plaintiff against the event which did in fact occur? Such a form of statement does not, of course, provide any answer to the question, or solve anything whatever; but it may be helpful since “duty” — also a legal conclusion— is perhaps less likely than “proximate cause” to be interpreted as if it were a policy-free factfinding. Thus, “duty” may serve to direct attention to the policy issues which determine the extent of the original obligation and of its continuance, rather than to the mechanical sequence of events which goes to make up causation in fact. The question whether there is a duty has most often seemed helpful in cases where the only issue is in reality whether the defendant stands in any such relation to the plaintiff as to create any legally recognized obligation of conduct for the plaintiff’s benefit. Or, reverting again to the starting point, whether the interests of the plaintiff are entitled to legal protection at the defendant’s hands against the invasion which has in fact occurred. Or, again reverting, whether the conduct is the “proximate cause” of the result. The circumlocution is unavoidable, since all of these questions are, in reality, one and the same. Id. at § 42 at 274. (footnotes omitted). The injury for which a particular defendant will be held legally responsible is in turn dependent upon the relationship between that injury and the breach of duty, for a particular defendant is not responsible for all injuries suf *355 fered by a particular plaintiff, but only for those “proximately caused” by that defendant, or, stated otherwise, only for those that are within the scope of the duty defendant owes to plaintiff. Thus, “[negligent conduct in itself is not such an interference with the interests of the world at large that there is any right to complain of it, or to be free from it, except in the case of some individual whose interests have suffered.” Id. § 30 at 165. See also Troutman v. Tabb, 285 Pa.Super. 353, 359 , 427 A.2d 673, 677 (1981) (“... in a negligence action proof of damage is an essential element.”) This analysis makes clear, I believe, why we ought not hold appellee legally responsible: appellant suffered no injury within the scope of the duty owed to him by appellee. Appellee was an authorized issuing agent of temporary automobile registration cards and plates. As such, his duty was defined by statute and implementing regulations. Section 1305 of the Vehicle Code, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1305 provides: § 1310. Temporary registration cards (a) General rule. — The department shall provide temporary registration cards for use pending issuance or transfer of permanent registration cards. Temporary registration cards may be delivered to designated agents who shall have the authority to issue them in accordance with regulations promulgated by the department. The regulations implementing this section in turn provide, in part: (c) Issuance of temporary registration cards in connection with transfer of registration. Every issuing agent shall, upon request, issue a temporary registration card to the owner or lessee of a vehicle who has made proper application for transfer of registration on an application for certificate of title or other appropriate Departmental form. (d) Duty to examine documents. The duty to examine documents shall include the following. *356 (1) Before issuing a temporary registration card, the issuing agent shall examine all documents necessary to the transaction. (2) No temporary registration card shall be issued unless the following items are found to be in order: (i) Insurance information. (A) Except as provided in clause (B) or (C), check to determine that the vehicle is insured by examining one of the following documents covering the subject vehicle, the vehicle traded for the subject vehicle or another vehicle owned by the applicant: (I) An identification card as required in 31 Pa. Code Chapter 67, Subchapter B (relating to evidence of financial responsibility). (II) The declaration page of an insurance policy. (III) A valid binder of insurance. (IV) A copy of an application to the Pennsylvania Automobile Insurance Plan. (B) If none of the documents in clause (A) is available, verification that the vehicle is properly insured may be obtained by contacting the applicant’s insurance agent. 67 Pa.Admin. Code § 43.5. These provisions form the basis of “a statutory duty ... to ascertain that the applicant for temporary registration cards and plates has the required No-Fault insurance.” Lyngarkos v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, et al., 57 Pa.Commw.Ct. 121, 126 , 426 A.2d 1195, 1198 (1981). In Lyngarkos the Commonwealth Court held that a breach by an issuing agent may give rise to a cause of action for negligence. That will occur, however, only when the plaintiff can plead and prove all elements of a negligence cause of action, including harm or injury attributable to the defendant’s breach of duty. Here, therefore, appellant had to plead and prove that the injury he suffered was within the scope of appellee’s duty to him. The scope of appellee’s duty, that is,’ the extent of the consequences of breach for which we may hold appellee legally responsible, *357 is defined by the legislature’s purpose in imposing the duty of inspection upon appellee. That purpose was to further the policy of the No-Fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.101-701, to establish “a Statewide system of prompt and adequate basic loss benefits for motor vehicle accident victims----” 40 P.S. § 1009.102(b). In imposing this duty, as the majority notes, the legislature “meant to protect all motorist[s] by insuring that they will have recourse to the comprehensive, expeditious and equitable No-Fault insurance coverage required of all motorists.” Lyngarkos v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, et al., supra at 126, 426 A.2d at 1198 . Thus, appellee’s duty to appellant extended to, but not beyond, a responsibility to ensure that appellant had a source available to compensate him for vehicle-caused injuries up to the levels provided for basic loss benefits under the No-Fault Act. See 40 P.S. § 1009.202. Here, even if one assumes that appellee breached its duty as an issuing agent by negligently issuing temporary cards and plates to the uninsured motorist who in turn injured appellant, still, appellant suffered no damage from the breach. This is true because, through the Assigned Claims Plan, the legislature has provided an alternative means by which an uninsured victim of an uninsured motorist has access to basic loss benefits. 1 See 40 P.S. § 1009.108; *358 Tubner v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance Co., 496 Pa. 215, 218 , 436 A.2d 621, 622 (1981) (“[u]nder Section 108(b), insurers are assigned to compensate motor vehicle accident victims for whom insurance is not carried as if a policy of basic loss insurance had been issued[.]”) Appellee’s negligence, therefore, if it was such, was injuria absque damno, “a wrong done, but from which no loss or damage results, and which, therefore, will not sustain an action.” Black’s Law Dictionary, 924 (4th ed. rev. 1968). I therefore concur in the order affirming the order of the trial court. . Appellant was injured on April 2, 1981. Section 1009.106(c) of the No-Fault Act, 40 P.S. § 1009.106(c) provides: (c) Time limitations on actions to recover benefits.— (1) If no-fault benefits have not been paid for loss arising otherwise than from death, an action therefor may be commenced not later than two years after the victim suffers the loss and either knows, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that the loss was caused by the accident, or not later than four years after the accident, whichever is earlier. If no-fault benefits have been paid for loss arising otherwise than from death, an action for further benefits, other than survivor’s benefits, by either the same or another claimant; may be commenced not later than two years after the last payment of benefits, and 40 P.S. § 1009.108(c) in turn provides: (c) Time for presenting claims under assigned claims plan.— (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, an individual authorized to obtain basic loss benefits through the *358 assigned claims plan shall notify the assigned claims bureau of his claim within the time that would have been allowed pursuant to section 106(c) of this act for commencing an action for basic loss benefits against any obligor, other than an assigned claims bureau, in any case in which identifiable no-fault insurance coverage was in effect and applicable to the claim, [footnote omitted] Whether or not an action under the Assigned Claims Plan is now untimely, however, does not affect the scope of the duty owed to appellant at the time the injury occurred. There is no claim that appellant was not then entitled to coverage through the Assigned Claims Plan. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9701157. Public record. Not legal advice.