# Roberts-Douglas v. Meares > District of Columbia Court of Appeals · November 3, 1992 · 624 A.2d 405 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697868 ## Case - **Full name:** Shirley ROBERTS-DOUGLAS, Et Al., Appellants, v. John L. MEARES, Et Al., Appellees; EVANGEL TEMPLE, INC., Et Al., Appellants, v. Shirley ROBERTS-DOUGLAS, Et Al., Appellees - **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals - **Decided:** November 3, 1992 - **Citations:** 624 A.2d 405; 1992 D.C. App. LEXIS 279; 1992 WL 474649 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Wagner - **Judges:** Terry, Schwelb, Wagner - **Cited by:** 32 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - **Yellow flag:** Modified by Roberts-Douglas v. Meares, 1993 D.C. App. LEXIS 105 (1993). - Negative treatments: 1 - Distinguished by: 0 - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697868 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - explaining that the term “confidential relationship” “embraces ‘both technical fiduciary relations and those informal relations which exist when one man trusts and relies upon another’ ” - noting that a “person who stands in a relation of spiritual confidence to another” can create “a relation which naturally creates influence over the mind,” fostering an influential relationship even stronger than that of attorney- client, guardian-ward, or parent-child relatio… - describing the “Evangel Temple” in the District of Columbia as “governed by a Presbytery composed of ministers” that “holds title to all church property” - describing a confidential relationship as “a condition of psychological dependency” ## Opinion text WAGNER, Associate Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part: I join the decision of the court except for disposition of the discovery issue and reversal of judgment for appellees on the fraud count. In my opinion, the trial court did not abuse its broad discretion in denying, in part, appellant’s motion to compel discovery. Moreover, the discovery order was not a substantial reason for appellants’ inability to proceed with their claims. See White v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 432 A.2d 726, 729 (D.C.1981) (improper discovery ruling reversible error where it is a substantial reason for a party’s inability to proceed); see also Bell v. Swift & Co., 283 F.2d 407, 409 (5th Cir.1960) (showing of substantial prejudice required to reverse for improper discovery ruling). Appellees argue, persuasively in my view, that it was appellants’ failure to avail themselves of the discovery allowed which precluded them from determining whether appellees obtained church members’ contributions by fraud and used them for purposes other than those intended. The trial court has “ ‘broad discretion’ in its handling of discovery, and its decision to allow or deny discovery is reviewable only for an abuse of discretion.” Bruñe v. I.R.S., 274 U.S.App.D.C. 89, 93 , 861 F.2d 1284, 1288 (1988); White, supra, 432 A.2d at 729 . Unquestionably, in making its ruling, the trial court must operate under the principles that the scope of discovery under Super.Ct.Civ.R. 26(b)(1) is broad and that interpretation of the rule is accorded liberal treatment. Dunn v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 232 A.2d 293, 295 (D.C.1967). However, the bounds of discovery are not without limits. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507-08 , 67 S.Ct. 385, 392 , 91 L.Ed. 451 (1947); 4 Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.56[1], at 26-96 (2d ed. 1991). The information sought under Rule 26(b)(1) is limited to matters which are relevant to the subject matter of the suit. See Hickman, supra, 329 U.S. at 508 , 67 S.Ct. at 392 . This has been interpreted to mean that discovery requests must have some bearing on the real or “core” issues in the case. Clyburn v. News World Communications, Inc., 117 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C.1987); Sharon v. Time, Inc., 103 F.R.D. 86, 95 (S.D.N.Y.1984). 1 The boundaries of relevance depend upon the contours of the particular action. 4 Moore’s Federal Practice § 26.-56[1], at 26-97. The trial court’s ruling on any individual discovery request must also be viewed in the context of the objections raised and other discovery granted. Viewed in that context, in my opinion, the trial did not abuse its discretion in entering an order compelling only some of the requested discovery prior to the filing of the second amended complaint. A review of appellants’ second amended complaint, appellees’ answer, and the elements required to establish fraud reveals the core issues in this case. 2 Appellants, *429 former members of appellees’ church, alleged that appellees, through fraud and misrepresentation, induced them to pledge large sums of money for the construction of church facilities, for other charitable purposes, “and for the personal benefit of [appellees]” by engaging in fraudulent and coercive fund-raising methods. Specifically, appellants alleged that appellees fraudulently misrepresented: (1) the financial circumstances of the Temple and the earnings of its officials; (2) the extent of Bishop Meares’ contributions (for which he was reimbursed from church funds); (3) the real purpose of the proposed new church facility in Prince George’s County; (4) that contributions were for the Temple, although the property is owned and controlled by Bishop Meares and his family; and (5) that contributions were used for the poor and underprivileged or would be used for church buildings and to purchase a parking lot adjoining the Temple. 3 Appellants sought return of their contributions with interest and punitive damages. Ap-pellees answered that appellants contributed voluntarily and that their fund-raising activities are protected by the First Amendment. To establish a claim of fraud, appellants had to allege and prove that appellees made: “(1) a false representation, (2) concerning a material fact, (3) ... with knowledge of its falsity, (4) with the intent to deceive, and (5) upon which [appellants relied].” Higgs v. Higgs, 472 A.2d 875, 876 (D.C.1984). The real issues involved in the fraud count involve these elements and the allegations relied upon by appellants to support them. Considering the issues, the proof must focus upon whether the money was obtained by false representations of material fact, including whether funds were used for a purpose other than promised or intended. Information pertaining to the church’s receipt and disposition of the contributions is clearly relevant to these issues, and the trial court ordered all such information and more to be produced as requested by appellants. The trial court ordered responses to questions requiring appellees to disclose the number of members of the Temple; the number who had made pledges to the building fund and related facilities; and the total amount of money pledged and the amount collected. The court also ordered appellees to identify and disclose financial records reflecting the receipt and expenditure of church funds; the bank or banks and other financial institutions used as a depository for the funds; the amount remaining on deposit and the location of banks in which funds are deposited; the amount of each expenditure from the fund and the purpose for the expenditure; the financial records reflecting the receipt and expenditure of church funds; all financial statements of the Temple for the years 1970 to present; and all documents to or from contributors requesting return of any part of their contributions. This broad discovery covered all financial information related to the fraud claim in my opinion. Appellants point out that the relevancy of the financial records is demonstrated by the statement made by the trial court in dismissing the fraud claim. What the trial judge observed was: there is no evidence before me of any kind that one penny of the money that was solicited for this project or indeed for the earlier projects about which the plaintiff’s [sic] complained went for purposes other than those which they were *430 solicited. It’s possible that it did not but plaintiffs [sic] bear the burden of proving that claim by clear and convincing evidence.... [T]here is not any evidence at all of any kind before me that this money has been misspent or misappropriated by any of the defendant’s [sic] in this action. Since appellees were ordered to respond to questions and to produce books and records reflecting every receipt and expenditure of all church funds and all information about its assets for many years, appellants’ inability to show that their contributions were spent for purposes other than those intended cannot be reasonably attributable to the denial of the motion to compel with respect to other information sought. Appellants’ failure to avail themselves of the broad discovery granted, while not a consideration in the court’s discovery order, is a significant factor in determining whether the trial court’s order was a substantial reason for appellants’ inability to prove their fraud claim, see White, supra, 432 A.2d at 729 , and resulted in substantial prejudice requiring reversal. See Bell, supra, 283 F.2d at 409 . In my view, the court’s discovery order was not a substantial reason for appellants’ inability to proceed, and reversal is not warranted on that ground. An examination of the information which appellants contend was withheld improperly confirms this conclusion. Appellants’ claim of error is limited to the trial court’s denial of their requests for: (a) information concerning appellees’ business interest; (b) whether money raised for the building fund or the Temple was sent outside of the District of Columbia, United States and Prince George’s County; (c) salaries and fringe benefits provided to the church leadership since 1975; and (d) the individual net worth of each defendant since 1975. The items in categories (b) and (c) overlap or are covered by the material which the court ordered to be disclosed. The disclosure of the books and records reflecting every receipt and expenditure of the church would show necessarily the disposition of the building fund and the salaries and benefits of church leaders. Accordingly, I discern no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s denial of the additional requests nor prejudice to appellants’ claim by reason of the ruling. In my view, the material in categories (a) and (d), at least prior to the establishment of liability, is not reasonably relevant to the core issues of the claimed fraud or to a sensible investigation of those issues through discovery. 4 The gravamen of appellants’ fraud claim was essentially as the trial court described it, related to appel-lees’ alleged misrepresentation of the purpose for the contributions and diversion of the funds collected. I do not understand appellants to disagree with this characterization of the issues. In my view, neither appellees’ personal business interest nor their personal net worth since 1975 was necessary to develop these core issues as disclosed by the record when the court ruled on the motion to compel. 5 For the foregoing reasons, I perceive no abuse of discretion in the court’s ruling on the motion and no substantial prejudice to appellants’ development of the fraud count by reason of the trial court’s order which requires reversal of the judgment on that count. Accordingly, I respectfully dissent from that aspect of the court’s decision. . In interpreting local rules which are identical to the federal rules, we may look to the decisions of federal courts interpreting the rule as " ‘persuasive authority’.” Cohen v. Owens & Co., Inc., 464 A.2d 904, 906 n. 3 (D.C.1983) (quoting Vale Properties, Ltd. v. Canterbury Tales, Inc., 431 A.2d 11 , 13 n. 3 (D.C.1981)). . The trial court entered its order compelling discovery on November 2, 1987. On November 25, 1987, the trial court ordered all plaintiffs to file a second amended complaint "pleading all *429 allegations [of fraud] with specificity as required by Civil Rule 9(b) of [the Superior Court].” Some of the same allegations are set forth in both complaints. Considering the trial court’s ruling in light of either complaint, I find no abuse of discretion. . There are other allegations of fraudulent and false representations which do not relate to the financial disclosure issue before the court (e.g. representations that members would be rewarded for contributions or cursed by God if they failed to honor their pledges). Appellants also alleged that appellees urged the contributors to reject the "Spirit of Mammon, meaning false God of riches and avarice,” and appellants also asserted that ”[a]t the same time defendants themselves are living in fine homes, fully furnished.” However, in my opinion, this allegation that appellees did not practice what they preached is not a core issue to the fraud count which entitles appellants to disclosure of all personal financial information of appellees. . There is no dispute that the financial status of the defendants is relevant to the claim of punitive damages. See Robinson v. Sarisky, 535 A.2d 901, 907 (D.C.1988) (relative worth of a defendant relevant to the amount of punitive damages). However, the trial court can properly order that disclosure be deferred until after prima facie proof of liability for such damages has been established. Hudak v. Fox, 215 N.J.Super. 233 , 521 A.2d 889, 890 (A.D.1987); Belinski v. Goodman, 139 N.J.Super. 351 , 354 A.2d 92, 95 (A.D.1976); see also Hecht v. Pro-Football, Inc., 46 F.R.D. 605, 607 (D.D.C.1969). . Apparently, appellees did not renew their requests to compel discovery. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697868. Public record. Not legal advice.