# Commonwealth v. Gallagher

> Superior Court of Pennsylvania · March 30, 2005 · 2005 Pa. Super. 116

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697637

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Terrence GALLAGHER, Appellant
- **Court:** Superior Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 30, 2005
- **Citations:** 2005 Pa. Super. 116; 874 A.2d 49; 2005 Pa. Super. LEXIS 433
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stevens
- **Judges:** Stevens, Bender, Montemuro
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697637

## Opinion text

STEVENS, J.,
Dissenting.:
¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the trial court’s judgment of sentence on Appellant’s conviction for luring a child into a motor vehicle.
¶ 2 The offense of luring a child into a motor vehicle is defined in 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2910, which provides that: “A person who lures a child into a motor vehicle without the consent, express or implied, of the child’s parent or guardian, unless the circumstances reasonably indicate the child is in need of assistance, commits a misdemeanor of the first degree.” 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2910. In Commonwealth v. Figueroa, 436 Pa.Super. 569 , 648 A.2d 555 (1994), this Court, in analyzing § 2910, stated that:
*66 [CJriminal intent or guilty knowledge is an essential element of a criminal offense, though the legislature may define a crime so that proof of criminal intent or guilty knowledge is unnecessary. In such case, the culpability or mens rea is established by proof that the person acted intentionally, knowingly or recklessly.
The gravamen of the present crime is luring a child into a motor vehicle. We have stated above that inviting the children into [an individual’s] car with a promise of a ride to school or the bus stop ... is sufficient to meet the prohibition of the statute. This knowing conduct we believe meets the requirement of culpability. That there may have been no intent to harm is not relevant since this is not a requirement of the act.
Id. at 557-558.
¶ 3 As noted by the majority, in interpreting § 2910, the Figueroa Court imputed strict liability -with respect to the intent to harm. I would also impute strict liability to the age element in that the statute at issue does not specifically provide a mistake of age defense. In order to give full effect to the intention of the Legislature, I would find that luring a child into a motor vehicle is a strict liability offense, which may be committed regardless of a defendant’s motive, and that the Act does not require a showing of intent to harm. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment of sentence.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697637. Public record. Not legal advice.