# Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Casety

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · June 30, 1986 · 511 Pa. 177

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697189

## Case

- **Full name:** OFFICE OF DISCIPLINARY COUNSEL, Petitioner, v. Harold Edwin CASETY, Jr., Respondent
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** June 30, 1986
- **Citations:** 511 Pa. 177; 512 A.2d 607; 1986 Pa. LEXIS 824
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Zappala
- **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Papadakos, Zappala, Hutchinson
- **Cited by:** 26 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697189

## Opinion text

ZAPPALA, Justice,
dissenting.
Because the majority has placed great emphasis upon the failure of the attorney to report his conviction under Pa.R. D.E. 214(a) in reaching its conclusion that disbarment is appropriate, I must dissent. I would issue a five-year suspension corresponding to the recommendation of the hearing committee and the minority members of the Disciplinary Board. The five-year suspension would be made *186 retroactive to July 13,1984, the effective date of the interim suspension of Harold Casety, Jr. by this Court.
I must also dissent from the majority’s retroactive application of Pa.R.D.E. 214(a). The majority acknowledges that the rule did not become effective until April 12, 1983. Harold Casety, Jr. was sentenced prior to the effective date of the rule. Although the rule specifically states that the conviction must be reported within twenty days of the date of sentencing, the majority interprets the rule as imposing a continuing obligation on attorneys to make such a report.
I do not agree with the majority’s interpretation. If the rule had been intended to impose a reporting requirement upon an attorney who had been sentenced prior to its enactment, the rule would have stated that an attorney who had been sentenced previously shall report the conviction within twenty days of the effective date of the rule. Although such an addition to the rule may have been desirable, the rule does not provide for the circumstance. I believe that the majority’s finding that Casety violated this rule is contrary to the unambiguous language of the rule itself.
HUTCHINSON, J., joins in this dissenting opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9697189. Public record. Not legal advice.