# Dunker v. Brown County Board of Education

> South Dakota Supreme Court · April 15, 1963 · 80 S.D. 193

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696908

## Case

- **Full name:** DUNKER Et Al., Appellants v. BROWN COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Respondent
- **Court:** South Dakota Supreme Court
- **Decided:** April 15, 1963
- **Citations:** 80 S.D. 193; 121 N.W.2d 10; 1963 S.D. LEXIS 21
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Hanson
- **Judges:** Rentto, Roberts, Homeyer, Hanson, Biegelmeier
- **Cited by:** 43 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696908

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding exercise of delegated legislative authority by administrative board is “not subject to the due process clause”

## Opinion text

HANSON, P. J„
(dissenting). I am unable to concur.
The scope of judicial review over administrative action is not involved. No party raised the question in the trial court or in this court. It is a constitutional, rather than a jurisdictional, question which has been injected into the case by the majority of this court and by them determined without benefit of a hearing, briefs or oral argument. As such it may be considered dictum. Munns v. Stenman, 152 Cal.App.2d 543 , 314 P.2d 67 . Furthermore, the extent of this far reaching dictum is not indicated for the edification and future guidance of the bench and bar. Except for the case of Snow v. South Shore Ind. Sch. Dist., 66 S.D. 379 , 283 N.W. 530 , which is expressly overruled, the majority sweeps with a wide broom in also overruling any and all other cases in. conflict therewith. However, none of the other cases are mentioned. This is somewhat paradoxical. For example the case^ of Snow v. South Shore was recently cited by this court and quoted with approval in Glenham Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Walworth County Bd. of Ed., 78 S.D. 63 , 98 N.W.2d 348 , which case, in turn, is quoted with approval of the majority opinion. Also see Ellis v. Herrick Ind. Sch. Dist., 71 S.D. 7 , 20 N.W.2d 516 ; Arnold v. Hubbard, 63 S.D. 454 , 260 N.W. 621 ; Olson v. Pulaski Common Sch. Dist., 77 S.D. 416 , 92 N.W.2d 678 ; Larsen v. Seneca Ind. Sch. Dist., 50 S.D. 444 , 210 N.W. 661 ; Brown v. Schenk, 54 S.D. 146 , 222 N.W. 690 ; Wentz v. Bowdle Ind. Sch. Dist., 58 S.D. 538 , 237 N.W. 763 ; Krueger v. Ind. Sch. Dist. of Groton, 61 S.D. 82 , 246 N.W. 246 ; Camp Crook Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Shevling, 65 S.D. 14 , 270 N.W. 518 ; Williams v. Stanley Co. Board of Equalization, 69 *206 S.D. 118 , 7 N.W.2d 148 , and countless others. What effect the majority opinion has on these cases is left to speculation and conjecture.
Likewise, no one is contending that the legislature by virtue of a de novo review statute may validly authorize a circuit court to substitute its judgment for the discretionary judgment of an administrative board on questions of legislative policy. In this regard, it may be conceded that SDC 15.0233, providing for de novo trials on appeal from school board matters, in a proper case, could be interpreted to mean that such statute by virtue of constitutional limitations allows only a limited judicial review of administrative action. 4 Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.10, p. 184. It may also be conceded that the scope of review by the courts in these matters should not extend beyond questions as to whether the county board of education acted within its constitutional or statutory powers, whether its determination is supported by substantial evidence, and whether the board's determination is reasonable and not arbitrary. Application of Dakota Transportation, Inc., 67 S.D. 221 , 291 N.W. 589 . Nevertheless, in the light of the above limited and unquestionably constitutional review the purported school reorganization in this case cannot reasonably be sustained.
Ours is a government of laws and not of men. This is a fundamental concept of our form of government. In essence, it means that personal and property rights must be determined according to stated and defined rules of law rather than by the unbridled whim and fancy of administrative officials and agencies. Accordingly, the legislature cannot constitutionally delegate unrestrained power and unlimited discretionary authority. To do so would constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power. "In order to avoid an unlawful delegation of power, the legislative authority must declare the policy or purpose of the law and, as a general rule, must also fix the legal principles which are to control in given cases by setting up standards or guides to indicate the extent, and prescribe the limits, of the discretion which may be exercised under the statute or ordinance by the administrative agency. * * *" 1 Am.Jur.2d, Administrative Law, § 113, p. 913. Our school reorganization act does not violate this *207 fundamental principle. The legislature has established definite standards and requirements for school reorganization and, on review, it is the function and duty of the courts to determine whether those legislative standards, requirements, and limitations liave been met.
To determine this question a supplemental statement of facts is required. In this regard the record shows that the Brown County Board of Education employed Dr. Clifford P. Hooper, an expert in public school administration to survey the educational needs of Brown County and to help prepare a feasible Master Plan of School Reorganization. After numerous surveys and considerable study a Master Plan was prepared and approved by the Board. It divided Brown County into four districts, the largest one being the Aberdeen district with a total assessed valuation of 46 million dollars. Warner was included. In conjunction with the Master Plan the Board prepared an informational pamphlet entitled "Planning Schools for Brown County." 15,000 copies were printed and circulated among the residents of Brown County- It contained recommendations considered necessary to overcome existing deficiencies and set forth standards required to place the county school system on a sound educational and financial basis. One of those minimum needs was expressed as follows: ,
"(g) * * * if school districts are to be capable of sustaining at least a defensible minimum program of education and build needed school buildings, it is essential to incorporate concentrations of local wealth in the same unit with concentrations of children. An assessed valuation of at least $5,000,000 is a reasonable minimum standard for administrative units in Brown County."
After the Master Plan was adopted the Brown County Board of Education gave their preliminary approval to a substitute plan of reorganization for the Aberdeen District which proposed to create Warner District No. 230. The proposed Warner District contemplated a consolidation of 26 districts having a total assessed valuation of 6.7 million dollars. An election on the substitute plan was held on February 23, 1961 in the 26 affected districts. 12 voted in favor and 13 against. One of the districts voting in *208 favor of the plan was not contiguous to the other 12. On February 27, 1961 the Board evidently considered the substitute plan was still feasible, excluding the disapproving districts, and authorized the creation of Warner District out of the 12 contiguous districts voting in favor of the plan. It is the status of this substitute district created by the Board out of the proposed substitute plan of reorganization for the Aberdeen District which is in question.
On March 15, 1961 the County Board voted to reconsider the feasibility of the Warner District. At its next regular meeting in April the Board corrected and clarified the minutes of the March 15th meeting as follows:
"* * * moyon †0 reconsider the feasibility of the Warner Proposed District * * * means that the said area reverts back to its original state, where there existed thirteen districts for and thirteen districts against, and that it is now awaiting a further decision by the Brown County Board of Education to declare it a feasible or a non-feasible district. In further correction a statement should have been included advising the County Superintendent of Schools that she should advise the persons involved that the election for school officers of the new Warner Proposed District be can-celled."
The Board did not thereafter reconsider or determine the feasibility of the Warner District and has never finally approved the same.
In my opinion the County Board of Education clearly had power and authority to reconsider the feasibility of the proposed Warner District. See Schull Construction Co. v. Board of Regents of Ed., 79 S.D. 487 , 113 N.W.2d 663 . In the absence of such determination and final approval by the Board the proposed Warner School District could not legally be established.
Reorganization of school districts in this state may be accomplished in one of two ways; (1) by action of the electors, or (2) by action of the County Board of Education. Differing statutory requirements and procedures apply to each method.
*209 The effective creation of the substitute Warner District required final favorable action and approval by the Brown County Board of Education — not the electors. School districts of this nature go into effect "upon the decision of the county board that the plan is still feasible." SDC 1960 Supp. 15.2015. Therefore, the order of the Superintendent of Schools purporting to establish the Warner School District had no force and effect whatsoever and should not have been issued. According to SDC 1960 Supp. 15.2015 the County Superintendent is authorized to issue an order creating a new school district only when "the electors of each district approve the reorganization." This is reasonable and logical. If the electors in all the affected districts vote in favor of a proposed school district no discretionary power remains to be exercised. The only action necessary for the creation of the new district is a perfunctory order of the County Superintendent of Schools to carry out the will of the electors after the votes have been canvassed. However, in the election on the proposed Warner District 13 of the affected districts disapproved the plan. Therefore, the creation of the new district depended entirely upon the final discretionary decision of the Brown County Board of Education that the plan was still feasible. The final creation and establishment of the new district by said Board was accordingly governed by SDC 1960 Supp. 15.2005(6) which provides as follows:
"All school district reorganization shall take effect and the new school district shall become operative on the first day of July following the date of the final approval action by the county board of education * *
A final determination of feasibility by the board of education is a condition precedent to the creation of a school district of this nature. This condition has not been complied with and the purported creation of the Warner School District by the unauthorized order of the County Superintendent of Schools is an absolute nullity.
The record amply reflects reasons why the Board wanted to reconsider the feasibility of the Warner School District. This Board had previously informed the voters and taxpayers of Brown County that no reorganized school district should contain *210 less than $5 million assessed valuation. It had just refused to approve the proposed Westport-Bamard District with an assessed valuation of 4 million dollars because it was too ‘small. Also the Board's own experts, Drs. Hooper and Huls, testified the new Warner District was not economically feasible and the undisputed evidence shows the proposed District could not maintain an accredited school conforming to current minimum requirements without an annual deficit of over $25,000 from taxable income on maximum mill levies. Furthermore, such deficits do not include the additional cost of constructing new classrooms needed and necessary upon establishment of the district. Therefore, it would appear without question that the new district fails to comply with the mandatory minimum requirement of reorganization set forth in SDC 1960 Supp. 15.2007(3) to the effect that each school district shall contain sufficient taxable valuation to support an educational program meeting current minimum requirements for accreditation.
Consequently, it is my opinion that the purported creation of Warner School District No. 230 does not conform to the spirit or comply with the specific statutory requirements of school reorganization for districts of this nature.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696908. Public record. Not legal advice.
