# Scheidemantle v. Senka

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · February 19, 1988 · 371 Pa. Super. 500

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696887

## Case

- **Full name:** Marlene M. SCHEIDEMANTLE, Appellant at 1642, v. George J. SENKA, Appellant at 1643
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** February 19, 1988
- **Citations:** 371 Pa. Super. 500; 538 A.2d 552; 1988 Pa. Super. LEXIS 658
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Brosky
- **Judges:** Brosky, Tamilia, Kelly
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696887

## Opinion text

BROSKY, Judge,
concurring:
I agree with Judge Tamilia that this appeal must be quashed as untimely. However, having reached this result, I believe we should refrain from further commentary on the case. Additional commentary could prove misleading to those concerned while lacking appropriate authority. Specifically speaking, I believe this to be the case with regard to the characterization of the lower court’s findings in the majority opinion.
The majority opinion, at page 555, states: “the trial court went on to find that Lynn does not possess the aptitude to successfully complete the course of studies she has chosen to pursue.” I am not convinced, upon reviewing the record, that the trial court made such a finding as to Lynn’s aptitude. The trial court states among its conclusions:
2. Lynn failed to prepare herself for a college academic education. Her S.A.T. scores establish that she may not successfully pursue such a career.
*508 3. Lynn is an attractive, articulate and apparently capable young woman who may succeed in doing what she now wants to do if that continues to be her state of mind.
(Emphasis added). Although the trial court expresses doubt as to the likelihood that Lynn will be successful in earning a degree, the court does not find that she is incapable of earning a degree.
Aptitude is tantamount to capability or capacity. Although this may sound like an overly technical distinction, I believe it is an important one. Even individuals with the highest of aptitudes sometimes fail to earn a degree. The reason they fail to successfully complete the course of study may be attributable to many factors, but all that can be said about their superior aptitude is that it makes them more likely to succeed than those with less aptitude. Conversely, even individuals with lesser aptitudes may indeed graduate, and the likelihood of this event increases as they come closer to completion of the course of study. I find this important because, inasmuch as I read the trial court’s decision to refuse educational support as one based greatly upon the uncertainty of Lynn’s eventual success, and a belief that a parent should not be ordered to help finance a risky, frivolous or imprudent venture, I would not wish to see the door closed upon a future attempt of Lynn’s to demonstrate a greater likelihood of success which might then warrant an award of support, even for the course of study she is currently pursuing. Perhaps Lynn lacked sufficient motivation in high school to reach her potential, or, perhaps, her first two years of collegiate study have helped to remedy some of her academic deficiencies, or perhaps she is simply a “late bloomer.” We are mindful that the great scientist, Einstein, who gave us the formula for the theory of relativity, had flunked mathematics in his youthful school years. However, if the trial court’s determination is construed as one that Lynn does not possess the aptitude to complete the course of study she is currently pursuing, it could work against her in a future effort to *509 obtain support, in this field of endeavor or another, for although one may petition again for support based upon a new set of, or a change in, circumstances, one may not relitigate a previously decided fact or issue in the new proceedings. Chrzanowski v. Chrzanowski, 325 Pa.Super. 298 , 472 A.2d 1128 (1984), Dunbar v. Dunbar, 291 Pa.Super. 224 , 435 A.2d 879 (1981). Consequently, for the reasons stated above, I concur in the result reached by the majority.
KELLY, J., joins in this opinion.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696887. Public record. Not legal advice.