# Commonwealth v. Hall

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · August 18, 2003 · 574 Pa. 233

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696227

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee v. Reginald Anthony HALL, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** August 18, 2003
- **Citations:** 574 Pa. 233; 830 A.2d 537; 2003 Pa. LEXIS 1437
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Newman
- **Judges:** Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin
- **Cited by:** 105 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696227

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that “in the case of mere permissive inferences, the constitutional challenge cannot be raised in the abstract; the defendant must demonstrate that the inference as applied to him violated his rights of due process.” (citation omitted)
- stating that “in instances where there is conflicting testimony, it is for the jury to determine the weight to be given the testimony. The credibility of a witness is a question for the fact-finder.” (citation omitted)
- holding defendant’s own testimony that shooting was accidental was ineffective, because there was adequate circumstantial evidence to prove he pointed gun in direction of victim and discharged it
- explaining that, to be guilty of criminal attempt, a defendant's con scious objective must be to cause the result necessary to the substantive crime
- holding defendant’s own testimony that shooting was accidental was ineffective because there was adequate circumstantial evidence to prove he pointed gun in direction of victim and discharged it

## Opinion text

Justice NEWMAN
dissenting.
The Majority concludes that there was sufficient evidence produced to convict Reginald Anthony Hall (Hall) of attempting to injure an officer of the law and that the jury instruction at issue did not impermissibly relieve the Commonwealth of its burden to prove each and every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Because the only fact at issue in this case, the intent to commit aggravated assault, may have been resolved on the basis of a presumption, I must respectfully dissent. 1
Hall was charged with aggravated assault after discharging a gun near the intersection of Flagler and Grant Streets in McKeesport, Pennsylvania. Among those present at the time were Susan Sullivan, on whose car Hall was riding, and Sergeant Mark Haltzman of the McKeesport Police Department (Officer Haltzman). Hall admitted to carrying an unlicensed firearm and firing it at Ivan Wocoward. Hall stated that the gun discharged accidentally when he was fleeing the *256 scene and that he did not fire at the officer. Ms. Sullivan did not see Hall fire at the officer and heard the gun discharge when Hall was near the fence. Officer Haltzman testified that he saw Hall jump from the hood of the car, but that he did not actually see Hall fire shots at him; that the gun was aimed in his general direction; and that he did not see the gun or Hall fire the gun while Hall was running for the fence. The trial judge instructed the jury that:
If you find that the Defendant used a firearm in the commission of either of the counts of aggravated assault and that he had no license to carry that firearm, you may regard that as an item of circumstantial evidence from which you may, if you choose, infer that the Defendant intended to commit the crime.
Subsequently, Hall was convicted of aggravated assault. It is clear that, pursuant to Pennsylvania law, intent to commit the crime is a necessary factual finding for a conviction for aggravated assault. Indeed, in this particular case, it was the lone element of the offense at issue in Hall’s trial.
Initially, I note that 18 Pa.C.S. § 6104 is not a statute defining a crime, but is a statute concerning evidentiary proof of a crime. Generally speaking, a presumption is an evidentiary device that enables the trier of fact to determine the existence of an element of the crime from the presence of one or more evidentiary facts. Establishment of presumptions favorable to the Commonwealth in criminal cases raises delicate issues of due process through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The threshold inquiry in ascertaining the constitutional analysis applicable to this kind of jury instruction is to determine the nature of the presumption it describes. That determination requires careful attention to the words actually spoken to the jury, for whether a defendant has been accorded his constitutional rights depends upon the way in which a reasonable juror could have interpreted the instruction. Here, the issue is whether, in a case in which intent is an element of the crime charged, the Commonwealth is relieved of its burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt when the jury is instructed that it may presume intent to commit aggravated assault from the fact *257 that the defendant had an unlicensed firearm in his possession.
In Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 , 63 S.Ct. 1241 , 87 L.Ed. 1519 (1943), the United States Supreme Court held that “the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments set limits upon the power of Congress or that of a state legislature to make the proof of one fact or group of facts evidence of the existence of the ultimate fact on which guilt is predicated.” The Court held that a “statutory presumption cannot be sustained if there is no rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed!;]” that is, if the presumption is not closely related and does not logically flow from the fact that is proved. In the instant matter, the fact proved was that Hall owned the firearm and did not possess a license to carry it. Yet, not all owners of firearms are required to obtain a weapons license. Rifles and shotguns used in hunting may be carried without a license (although the hunter requires a license to kill), nor is the starter firing a gun that starts a race required to have a license. Guns of any type that are in transit from point A to point B whether destined for a dealer or a hobbyist or an individual do not require that licenses be obtained by those briefly in possession. Section 6106, 18 Pa.C.S. § 6106, enumerates thirteen different categories of individuals who are not required to have a license to carry a gun. Hence, it does not follow that failure to hold a valid license to carry a concealed weapon leads inexorably to a presumption, even a permissive one, that the gun owner intended to commit aggravated assault.
A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he “attempts to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury to any [police officer] ... while in the performance of [his] duty----” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(2). The officer involved was not injured and, thus, the Commonwealth was required to prove that Hall intentionally attempted to injure the officer, as articulated by the Majority. 18 Pa.C.S. § 901(a). 2 Hall testified at trial that the handgun was his, *258 that he had no permit, and that he fired shots at another individual. Nevertheless, he denied firing the gun at the officer, alleging instead that the gun went off accidentally while he was fleeing. Therefore, the entire case hinged on the ability of the Commonwealth to establish Hall’s intent to commit aggravated assault.
The Commonwealth asserts that the instruction prescribed a permissive inference, i.e., that it allowed but did not require the jury to draw conclusions about the defendant’s intent from his actions. However, the United States Supreme Court has indicated that “[a] defendant’s state of mind or intent is an element of a criminal offense that cannot be taken from the trier of fact through reliance on a legal presumption of wrongdoing. ...” Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510, 523 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 , 61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979). It has also held that presumptions “invade [the] fact finding function, which in a criminal case the law assigns solely to the jury.” Id. I am convinced that a reasonable juror in this case could have been misled by the instruction given and could have believed that, if it found that Hall did not possess a license for his firearm, it should find that he had the intent to commit the crime. A reasonable jury could well have interpreted this presumption as a direction by the court to find intent once convinced of the facts triggering the presumption.
We recently had occasion to discuss the impropriety of a mandatory presumption in Commonwealth v. Kelly, 555 Pa. 382 , 724 A.2d 909 (1999), 3 also authored by Mr. Justice Castille. That case concerned a constitutional challenge to 18 *259 Pa.C.S. § 6104, where the trial judge charged the jury that, if the defendant was adjudged by them to be carrying a firearm without a permit, they must find that the defendant intended to commit aggravated assault. Although this case concerns a permissive rather than a mandatory presumption of intent, much of what was said in Kelly is relevant here.
In Kelly , this Court reviewed an instruction to the jury based on 18 Pa.C.S. § 6104 and concluded that the jury instruction in that case created a mandatory presumption that violated due process. The language of Section 6104 has not changed, but in the instant matter, the trial judge gave the jury a similar instruction that permitted, but not required, them to consider the carrying of an unlicensed firearm as evidence of intent.
I believe that the current Majority Opinion is inconsistent with the rationale we expressed in Kelly . The effect of the holding in Kelly is that there is no reasonable relationship between carrying an unlicensed weapon and the intent to commit aggravated assault. In Kelly , this Court said:
Simply put, the issue of whether one happened to be carrying an unlicensed firearm has little probative value with respect to the ultimate issue of whether one possessed the requisite intent to be convicted of a crime stemming from an act of violence that the person committed.
If the fact of carrying an unlicensed firearm is probative at all, it certainly does not rise to the level of sustaining the Commonwealth’s burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused acted deliberately.
We need not decide today just how lacking in probative value we believe the fact of carrying an unlicensed firearm is with regard to proving intent; it is enough to say that it is sufficiently lacking as to have resulted in a due process violation when it formed, by itself, the basis of a mandatory presumption of intent, as it did with respect to the instruction at issue.
Kelly, 724 A.2d at 918 (emphasis added and in original). If there was no reasonable relationship between the act of *260 carrying an unlicensed firearm and the elements of aggravated assault in Kelly to warrant a presumption of guilt, there is also no relationship between the act of carrying an unlicensed firearm and the elements of aggravated assault to warrant even the permissive instruction in the instant matter.
Although in the instant matter the jury was instructed that the accused was presumed innocent until proven guilty, and that the Commonwealth had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that Petitioner intended to fire the weapon at Officer Haltzman, this cannot be held to overcome the prejudice that is inherent when the jury was instructed that it could consider the possession of an unlicensed firearm as presumptive evidence of that intent. As stated by Mr. Justice Brennan in Sandstrom :
It follows that the trial court may not withdraw or prejudice the issue by instruction that the law raises a presumption of intent from an act.... [A] presumption which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. A presumption which would permit but not require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the jury-should reach of its own volition. A presumption which would permit the jury to make an assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. In either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime.
Sandstrom, 442 U.S. at 522 , 99 S.Ct. 2450 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 274-75 , 72 S.Ct. 240 , 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952)).
I believe that the Majority has espoused a position that is inconsistent with the rationale of Kelly . This is especially so where this Court, in Kelly , stated, “We need not decide today just how lacking in probative value we believe the fact of carrying an unlicensed firearm is with regard to proving intent ...” to commit aggravated assault. Accordingly, I *261 would find that the jury instruction in the instant matter, which is based on Section 6104, violated Hall’s due process rights.
. While the Majority concludes that there was sufficient evidence to support a finding of guilt, because I believe that the jury instruction violated Hall's due process rights and that he is entitled to a new trial, I do not address the sufficiency issue.
. 1) A person acts intentionally with respect to a material element of an offense when:
*258 í{: sfi
(i) if the element involves the nature of his conduct or a result thereof, it is his conscious object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result; and
(ii) if the element involves the attendant circumstances, he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
18 Pa.C.S. § 302(b)(1).
. I am aware that the Appellant in Commonwealth v. Grant, 572 Pa. 48 , 813 A.2d 726, 731 , (2002), raised this precise issue. However, this Court declined to address the issue because the Appellant in that case failed to develop his constitutional argument.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9696227. Public record. Not legal advice.