# Rochinsky v. State of NJ, Dept. of Transp. > Supreme Court of New Jersey · May 23, 1988 · 110 N.J. 399 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695629 ## Case - **Full name:** Alexander Rochinsky and Mary Rochinsky, His Wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. State of New Jersey, Department of Transportation, Defendant-Appellant, and County of Essex and Town of Nutley, Defendants - **Court:** Supreme Court of New Jersey - **Decided:** May 23, 1988 - **Citations:** 110 N.J. 399; 541 A.2d 1029; 1988 N.J. LEXIS 40 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Clifford - **Judges:** Handler, Clifford - **Cited by:** 93 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695629 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating the duty to warn A-2414-18T4 15 under N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 in the context of a snowstorm "concerns only extraordinary conditions that are qualitatively different from those conditions that would be 'reasonably apparent to' or 'anticipated by' a careful motorist driving in a… - holding that common law immunity for snow removal survived TCA; noting that that immunity developed "[i]n the midst of [a] gradual erosion of judicial tolerance for the doctrine of sovereign immunity" but was reflective of "the unique challenge snow removal poses for public en… - holding that there may be an exception to the common law immunity where the conduct of the public entity was “unrelated to snow-removal activity” and amounted to “palpably unreasonable failure to warn of a dangerous condition” ## Opinion text CLIFFORD, Justice, dissenting in part. Part III of the majority opinion, with its grant of leave to plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, loses me. It is nothing *431 short of a rescue job, a heroic effort to salvage plaintiffs’ case by allowing them to start all ovér again, by way of amended complaint, a case now four years old arising out of a February 1983 occurrence. The resort to N.J.S.A. 59:4-4 is nothing less than an invention of the Court. That section of the Tort Claims Act is nowhere adverted to at any stage of the proceedings— not at trial, not in the Appellate Division, not in this Court. The briefs may be searched in vain for any citation to that statute. The Court therefore lends its authority to making an entirely new case for plaintiffs. That may be good for them but it is manifestly unfair to defendant Department of Transportation, to say nothing of the trial judge. I do not perceive my obligation to see that justice is done as constituting a roving commission to inject whenever needed a transfusion of life-giving serum into an expired case. For the reasons stated in Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion I would reverse and remand to the Law Division for reinstatement of the judgment in favor of defendant Department of Transportation. Justices POLLOCK and GARIBALDI join in this opinion. For affirmance as to part II —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justice HANDLER—2. For reversal as to part II—Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK, O’HERN, GARIBALDI and STEIN—5. For remand and amending complaint as to part III —Chief Justice WILENTZ and Justices HANDLER, O’HEARN and STEIN—4. For remand and reinstatement of judgment as to part III —Justices CLIFFORD, POLLOCK and GARIBALDI—3. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695629. Public record. Not legal advice.