# Commonwealth v. Wheeler

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · April 21, 1988 · 518 Pa. 103

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695610

## Case

- **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellee, v. Ronald WHEELER, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** April 21, 1988
- **Citations:** 518 Pa. 103; 541 A.2d 730; 1988 Pa. LEXIS 108
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Papadakos
- **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Hutchinson, Papadakos, Zappalá, Former
- **Cited by:** 5 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695610

## Opinion text

PAPADAKOS, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I join with the majority in affirming Appellant’s conviction of murder of the first degree, but dissent from the vacating of the death sentence. In reliance upon a discredited Goins decision, the majority continues to apply a legislative “intent” which the legislature has disavowed.
The issue is the correct meaning of aggravating circumstance 9, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9), which reads, “the defendant has a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person.” In Commonwealth v. Goins, 508 Pa. 270 , 495 A.2d 527 (1985), the majority determined that the legislature intended that there be “more than one prior violent-felony convictions.”
*117 In Commonwealth v. Goins, supra, the defendant had been convicted of murder of the first degree for claw hammering to death his wife. At the penalty stage, following this conviction, the Commonwealth introduced evidence that the defendant had previously been convicted of murder of the second degree (the present equivalent of third degree murder). In fact, this prior conviction was stipulated to. Being faced with two felony killings, the jury determined that defendant had a significant history of felony convictions involving the use or threat of violence to the person, found the existence of aggravating circumstance 9 (42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(9)) and determined that the sentence of death be imposed upon the defendant.
The majority found "... it to have been the manifest intent of the General Assembly to include as an aggravating circumstance more than one prior violent-felony conviction, ...” (emphasis added) in establishing a “significant history.” Thus, the majority ignored the defendant’s killing of his wife and exercised legislative prerogatives by adding the word “prior” to aggravating circumstance 9. 1 Since defendant had only one violent-felony conviction prior to the time of the first degree murder conviction in issue, the majority concluded that the element of “convictions” appearing in aggravating circumstance 9 was not met and thus vacated the sentence of death and remanded for the imposition of a life sentence.
This determination by the majority in Goins did not create “law” needed to fill a void left by the legislative enactment. Rather, it was an erroneous interpretation of the law as enacted by the legislature. Before the ink was dry on the Goins decision, the legislature amended the list of aggravating circumstances to correct the error of Goins . It set forth in no uncertain terms, that the current murder of the first degree conviction shall be included with any other murder conviction to form an aggravating circumstance (42 Pa.C.S. § 9711(d)(ll)).
*118 I believe the legislature has corrected the misinterpretation of the Goins decision and that we should overrule Goins and affirm the sentence of death.
. The same majority has again amended the statute by adding the word "pending” in aggravating circumstance 5. See, Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 516 Pa. 441 , 532 A.2d 813 (1987).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695610. Public record. Not legal advice.