# Stimmler v. Chestnut Hill Hospital > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · September 30, 2009 · 602 Pa. 539 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695003 ## Case - **Full name:** Ann STIMMLER, Appellant v. CHESTNUT HILL HOSPITAL; M. Brown, M.D.; William O’Connell, M.D.; Samuel Walterson, M.D.; Walter Matteucci, M.D.; B. Smith, M.D.; M.S. Jayashekara Murthy, M.D.; Bangolor Surey, M.D.; And Richard Padula, M.D., Appellees - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** September 30, 2009 - **Citations:** 602 Pa. 539; 981 A.2d 145; 2009 Pa. LEXIS 2037 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Saylor - **Judges:** Castille, Saylor, Eakin, Baer, Todd, McCaffery, Greenspan - **Cited by:** 67 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695003 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that the argument section of appellant’s brief should contain citations to the record and legal authority, as well as analysis and application to the facts, to guide this court in its review of the issue - stating that argument portion of brief must -7- J-S05028-15 contain “sufficient citation to the record . . . .” - stating that argument portion of brief must contain “sufficient citation to the record . . . .” - noting, “We[, ie., our Supreme Court,] will not make the initial determination of whether summary judgment is appropriate for any individual physician defendant; rather, such matters properly rest initially with the trial court, which can evaluate, under the theories of neglig… - noting further “Rule 4014 is designed to expedite the production and authentication of evidence that is not controverted by the litigants.” ## Opinion text Justice SAYLOR, concurring. I have substantial reservations about the majority’s treatment of deemed admissions under Rule of Civil Procedure 4014. Initially, the majority indicates that our Order allowing the appeal was not intended to encompass the issue of whether the relevant facts were appropriately deemed admitted under Rule 4014. See Majority Opinion, at 550-53, 981 A.2d *567 at 152-53. Later in the opinion, however, the majority offers a lengthy footnote criticizing the Superior Court for acting “quick on the trigger” in recognizing the admissions were deemed. See Majority Opinion, at 564-65 n. 18, 981 A.2d at 160 n. 18. To the extent the discussion is appropriately in the case, I differ with the majority’s treatment of the Superior Court’s approach. Rule 4014 provides that matters of which an admission is requested are “admitted[, subject to limited exceptions not relevant here,] unless, within thirty days after service of the request, ... the party to whom the request is directed serves upon the party requesting the admission an answer verified by the party or an objection, signed by the party or by the party’s attorney.” Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 4014(b). Furthermore, the Rules stress that “[a]ny matter admitted under this rule is conclusively established unless the court on motion permits withdrawal or amendment of the admission.” Pa.R.Civ.P. No. 4014(d). Here, their straightforward operation resulted in the deemed admission found by the Superior Court, as it appears to be essentially undisputed that Appellant did not serve the timely, verified response required to avoid the deemed admission. The majority faults the Superior Court for failing to recognize that the trial court had before it a record that contained Appellant’s response (which Appellant attached to its memorandum opposing summary judgment). See Majority Opinion, at 564-65 n. 18, 981 A.2d at 160 n. 18. This circumstance, however, is irrelevant under the rules, which recognize the deemed admission upon the expiration of the period allowed for response and place the burden squarely on the admitting party to move affirmatively for relief from the admission. While the majority is correct that our rules are to be liberally interpreted in the interests of justice, I cannot fault the Superior Court for understanding they cannot be ignored. Here, Appellant’s counsel appears, in the first instance, to have attached an inaccurate certificate of service to the request for admissions. Instead of moving for relief under Rule 4014(d) once it was understood that there may have been a mistake, at the very least, in the dating of the certificate (as *568 well as in failing to include the required verification), counsel merely advanced the erroneous legal position that the matters admitted by operation of the Rules could not be taken as admitted at the summary judgment stage. See Memorandum of Law In Support of Plaintiffs Response In Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment of Defendant Richard T. Padula, M.D., R.R. at 428 (“Plainiff s response to Defendant’s Request for Admission may have been delayed in being sent to Defendant, however, a Motion for Summary Judgment is not the proper medium to challenge such a submission.”). I cannot agree with the majority that either the trial court or the Superior Court was obliged to step into counsel’s shoes to make the necessary motion. There are countless instances in the law where attorneys’ or their clients’ own derelictions have affected the availability of relief in the judicial forum. The orderly administration of justice, quite simply, cannot proceed without some structure. Regarding the summary judgment decision, I agree with the majority’s conclusion that it is not sufficiently clear, on this record, that other instances of catheterization could have accounted for Ms. Stimmler’s injury to support the award of summary judgment. In the present landscape, I do not reach a final conclusion concerning the effect of Appellant’s deemed admission that Appellant “has no information from any source” that the catheter in her body “is not from one of the other catheters she has had placed in her medical history,” particularly in light of the representations that Appellant’s expert reports (which obviously represented this form of information) were provided to Appellees prior to the date the deemed admissions became effective. Rather, since such matter was not considered by either the Superior Court or the trial court, I would leave it for resolution on the remand, together with all other outstanding and further matters the parties have pursued or may pursue. Chief Justice CASTILLE joins this concurring opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9695003. Public record. Not legal advice.