# Commonwealth v. Walls > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · July 17, 2007 · 592 Pa. 557 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9694643 ## Case - **Full name:** COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Appellant, v. William Theodore WALLS, Appellee - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** July 17, 2007 - **Citations:** 592 Pa. 557; 926 A.2d 957; 2007 Pa. LEXIS 1431 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Baer - **Judges:** Baer, Baldwin, Cappy, Castille, Eakin, Former, Newman, Saylor - **Cited by:** 906 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9694643 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that “the precise age of the victim, i.e., the fact that the victim was only seven- years-old at the time of the sexual abuse, was not an element of rape or IDSI of a victim less than thirteen years old and could justify an above-guideline sentence. … Additionally, [th… - explaining that sentence may be vacated as "unreasonable" if "the sentence was imposed without express or implicit consideration by the sentencing court of the general standards applicable to sentencing found in Section 9721, i.e., the protection of the public; the gravity of … - stating that sentencing court could consider the precise age of the victim because it was not an element of rape and IDSI of a victim less than thirteen years of age and the court considered the victim’s specific age in conjunction with the grandparent/abuser’s breach of grand… - stating that “[a]n abuse of discretion may not be found merely because an appellate court might have reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or such lack of support so as to be clearly err… - stating that “[w]here [a PSI] exist[s], we shall continue to presume that the sentencing judge was aware of the relevant information regarding the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along with mitigating statutory factors” (citation omitted) ## Opinion text *576 Justice BAER, concurring. As I conclude that the Superior Court erred, I join the Majority. However, I write separately to express my concern regarding the Majority’s decision to “decline to fashion any concrete rules as to the unreasonableness inquiry for a sentence that falls outside of applicable guidelines.” Majority Op. at 568, 926 A.2d at 964. I fear that the decision will be interpreted to provide near limitless discretion for trial courts in the sentencing context. The Majority’s decision may indeed negate the intended effect of the guidelines, which, as the Majority acknowledges, “were designed to bring greater rationality and consistency to sentences and to eliminate unwarranted disparity in sentencing.” Majority Op. at 565 n. 3, 926 A.2d at 961-62 n. 3. While I fully agree that the sentencing guidelines are merely guidelines, rather than requirements, the General Assembly’s enactments nonetheless require trial courts to provide reasons in support of any deviation from the guidelines, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), and require appellate courts to vacate sentences deemed unreasonable, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781. These provisions require an appellate court to determine whether the reasons given by a trial court provide a reasonable rationale for deviating from the guidelines. An appellate court should vacate a sentence where the trial court provides no basis, or an unreasonable basis, for the deviation. Accordingly, I join in the decision of the Majority to remand the matter to the Superior Court for reexamination of the judgment of sentence. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9694643. Public record. Not legal advice.