# Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment > District of Columbia Court of Appeals · May 22, 1974 · 320 A.2d 282 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9694133 ## Case - **Full name:** Neil K. DIETRICH Et Al., on Behalf of Themselves and Other Residents of Their Neighborhood Organized as Concerned Kalorama Citizens, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT, Respondent, William W. Baum, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, a Corporation Sole, Intervenor; William W. BAUM, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington, a Corporation Sole, Petitioner, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BOARD OF ZONING ADJUSTMENT, Respondent - **Court:** District of Columbia Court of Appeals - **Decided:** May 22, 1974 - **Citations:** 320 A.2d 282; 74 A.L.R. 3d 1; 1974 D.C. App. LEXIS 217 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Opinion of the court by Fickling - **Judges:** Fickling, Gallagher, Harris - **Cited by:** 44 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9694133 ## Opinion text FICKLING, Associate Judge: After a remand for a fully reasoned decision based on appropriate findings of fact, 1 this case is before us to review an order of the District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment (BZA) granting the application of Archbishop William W. Baum, as a corporation sole, for a special exception to permit the establishment of Mackin High School, a private school, located at 2200 California Street, N.W. On appeal petitioners contend that: (1) the BZA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in not finding the neighborhood opposition to the Archbishop’s application to be controlling; (2) the findings and conclusions of the BZA are not supported by substantial evidence; and (3) the Archbishop has not met the parking requirement under Article 72 of the Zoning Regulations. We affirm. The property in question is situated in an area zoned R — 5-B (predominant use— medium density apartment house). A private high school may not be located in such an area as a matter of right. The BZA, however, may grant a special exception for a private high school in such an area, if all of the following conditions are met: (1) “where in the judgment of the Board such special exceptions will be in harmony with the general purpose 2 and intent of the zoning regulations and maps” (Zoning Regs. § 8207.2); (2) the exception “will not tend to affect adversely the use of neighboring property in accordance with said zoning regulations and maps” (Zoning Regs. § 8207.2); (3) the school “is so located that it is not likely to become objectionable to adjoining and nearby *284 property because of noise, traffic, number of students, or otherwise objectionable conditions” (Zoning Regs. § 3101.42(a)); and (4) there is “ample parking space, but not less than that required in Article 72 of these regulations ... to accommodate the students, teachers, and visitors likely to come to the site by automobile” (Zoning Regs. § 3101.42(b)). The building at 2200 California Street, N.W., has been owned since its construction in 1904 by the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington. Before 1961 the building had been used as St. Rose’s Technical School and later as St. Ann’s Infant and Maternity Home. As we stated in our prior opinion in this case: In 1961 the BZA granted a special exception to the Archbishop to use the premises as a “seminary for the education of young men for the priesthood” for a maximum of 120 students. This use continued until 1971 when the Archbishop decided to cease the use as a preparatory seminary and to relocate Mackin School, a regular private boys’ high school, in the building. In order to effectuate this change, the Archbishop applied to the BZA for permission to change the use of the property from a private seminary for the education of young men for the priesthood to a high school for 350 students. . . . [Dietrich v. BZA, D.C.App., 293 A.2d 470, 471 (1972) (footnote omitted).] A petition for review of the BZA’s order granting such a special exception was filed in this court and in Dietrich, supra, we vacated that order and remanded the case because the BZA failed to make express findings as to several contested issues of fact and because the BZA failed to give full reasons for its decision. In conformity with this court’s order in Dietrich, supra, a rehearing was held on August 30, 1972. Detailed findings of fact and conclusions were thereafter entered supporting the BZA’s decision granting the application to establish a private high school for 350 students with no time limitation. The BZA concluded that Mackin officials took meaningful steps to prevent the school from causing an objectionable increase in noise, traffic congestion, litter, or any other objectionable conditions in the neighborhood. The steps taken by the school include the following: In order to drive to school, students are required to obtain permission from the school officials and if such permission is obtained, they are required to park in the school lot. Students may not take food and beverages from the school cafeteria; they may not leave the school premises during the day without permission; and they may not frequent the nearby grocery store, so as to avoid the possibility of unpleasant incidents. Nighttime basketball games are scheduled at other schools. Trucks are required to make deliveries in the school parking lot. School officials strictly enforce their regulations and maintain the school premises in excellent condition. And, finally, the school makes its facilities available for use by neighborhood groups such as the police department, the Spanish-speaking people of the area, and the Sheridan-Kalorama Citizens Association. With respect to the effect Mackin has on property values, the BZA found that since Mackin moved to 2200 California Street in September 1971, the apartment occupancy in the neighborhood has remained high; that the only two real estate transactions in evidence, which occurred since September 1971, show a substantial increase in market value of neighboring property; that the structure at 2200 California Street has been used for institutional purposes for many years and, throughout the years, the property values increased substantially; and that the .school officials have taken significant steps to make Mack-in acceptable to its neighbors. For these *285 reasons the BZA concluded that the operation of Mackin is not likely to adversely affect property values. The BZA further concluded that the applicant has provided ample parking space on the premises and that the operation of Mackin “will be in harmony with the general purpose and intent of the zoning regulations and maps.” Petitioners contend that the application for a special exception should have been denied by the BZA on the ground that the majority of the residents in the neighborhood who expressed an opinion were opposed to the application. We think that the BZA correctly explained why neighborhood opposition is not a sound basis for denial of a special exception. See 3 Anderson, American Law of Zoning § 15.27 (1968). While the BZA recognized that there was significant neighborhood opposition to the application, it explained that its decision must not be controlled by a head count as in a political election. Rather, its decision is controlled by the evidence adduced as it relates to the requirements for a special exception. Since the evidence was sufficient to meet these requirements, the special exception was granted. Petitioners’ next claim — that the BZA’s conclusions are not supported by the findings or by substantial evidence — is without merit. On review of a BZA order, we must determine whether findings made “are supported by and in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the whole administrative record, Schiffmann v. ABC Board, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 235 (1973), and whether the conclusions of the Board flow rationally from these findings, Stewart v. BZA, D.C.App., 305 A.2d 516 (1973).” Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. BZA, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 314, 319 (1973). We have examined each finding of the BZA and have found that they are all supported by probative and substantial evidence on the record and that the conclusions of the BZA flow rationally from these findings. We consider next Mackin’s parking requirement. The Zoning Commission has adopted regulations which set the minimum parking requiremeilt for a private high school. There must be “ample parking space but not less than that required in Article 72” of the Zoning Regulations (Zoning Regs. § 3101.42(b)). Article 72, Section 7202.1 of the Zoning Regulations provides in pertinent part: Amount of Parking Uses Space Required High school and accessory uses: All districts. Two for each three teachers, plus one for each 20 classroom seats OR one for each ten auditorium seats whichever Is greater The BZA interprets the “high school and accessory use” provision of Section 7202.1 to require two alternatives: the first is that which precedes the “OR,” and the second is that which follows the “OR.” The BZA reasons that the word “OR” was intentionally capitalized by the Zoning Commission to serve as a dividing line between the alternatives. Thus, under the BZA’s interpretation, the number of parking spaces required is either “two for each three teachers plus one for each 20 classroom seats” or “one for each ten auditorium seats” — whichever alternative is greater. On the other hand, petitioners do not think the “OR” is the dividing line between the alternatives, but rather interpret the above regulation to require either “two [spaces] for each three teachers plus one for each 20 classroom seats” or “two [spaces] for each three teachers” and “one for each ten auditorium seats” — -whichever alternative is greater. *286 Under the BZA’s interpretation, a minimum . of 33 parking spaces is required. 3 Since the school premises has at least 39 parking spaces, the BZA concluded that the parking requirements of Article 72 were met. In contrast petitioners, applying their interpretation to this regulation, compute the minimum number of required parking spaces to he 43. 4 Because the school has parking spaces for 39 cars, they argue the parking requirements of Article 72 have not been met. When we review the BZA’s construction of regulations which were adopted by the Zoning Commission, the BZA’s interpretation is controlling unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation. Taylor v. BZA, D.C.App., 308 A.2d 230 (1973). We think it was reasonable for the BZA to read the “OR” as the dividing line between the alternatives. Consequently, we cannot say the BZA’s interpretation of the “high school and accessory use” provision of Section 7202.1 was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. Petitioners further contend that the school gymnasium does not come under the “high school and accessory use” provision of Section 7202.1, but instead is a “place of public assemblage” as that term is used in Section 7202.1. 5 Consequently,! they argue that there is the additional parking requirement of one space for each ten gymnasium seats or 36 spaces for the 360 gymnasium seats, which the Archbishop cannot meet. The BZA rejected this contention, reasoning as follows: Although there are specific types of places listed under the heading “Places of Public Assemblage,” a school gymnasium is not among those listed. In addition, the term accessory use is defined as “a use customarily incidental and subordinate to the principal use and located on the same lot therewith.” (Zoning Regs., Art. 12.) And in the instant case the school gymnasium is an accessory use as that term is defined. *287 Similarly we cannot say the BZA’s interpretation of the Commission’s regulations was plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulations. Lastly, we do not consider the new issues raised by petitioners on appeal concerning the parking requirement since “[a] reviewing court usurps the agency’s function when it sets aside the administrative determination upon a ground not theretofore presented and deprives the Commission of an opportunity to consider the matter, make its ruling, and state the reasons for its action.” Unemployment Compensation Commission v. Aragan, 329 U.S. 143, 155 , 67 S.Ct. 245, 251 , 91 L.Ed. 136 (1946) (footnote omitted); accord, J. D. Neumann Properties, Inc. v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals & Review, D.C.App., 268 A.2d 605 (1970). Indeed, this proposition is embodied in the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act; in reviewing the BZA’s decision, we must look to the exclusive record or those portions of it that are designated by the parties. D.C. Code 1973, § 1-1510. Since we affirm the BZA’s order, we need not reach the issues raised by the Archbishop as petitioner in the companion case, Baum v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, No. 7164. The Archbishop concedes that the issues in the companion case are presented for review only if this court decides to reverse or modify the order of the BZA. Affirmed. . Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 293 A.2d 470 (1972). . D.C.Code 1973, § 5-414, provides that the purposes of the Zoning Regulations are: Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the street, to secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers, to promote health and the general welfare, to provide adequate light and air, to prevent the undue concentration of population and the overcrowding of land, and to promote such distribution of population and of the uses of land as would tend to create conditions favorable to health, safety, transportation, prosperity, protection of property, civic activity, and recreational, educational, and cultural opportunities, and as would tend to further economy and efficiency in the supply of public services. Such regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, of the character of the respective districts and their suitability for the uses provided in the regulations, and with a view to encouraging stability of districts and of land values therein. . There are 22 teachers, 350 classroom seats, and 278 auditorium seats. When computing the parking requirement, fractions under % space are disregarded but fractions of % space or more require one space. (Zoning Regs. § 7207.15.) The BZA computed the parking requirement as follows: Alternative 1 = 2 for each 3 teachers plus 1 for each 20 classroom seats = % of 22 + y2(j of 350 = 15 + 18 = 33 Alternative 2 = 1 for each 10 auditorium seats = %0 of 278 = 28 Since alternative 1 is the greater, a minimum number of 33 spaces is required. . Petitioners computed the parking requirement as follows: Alternative 1 = 2 for each 3 teachers plus 1 for each 20 classroom seats = % of 22 + y20 of 350 = 15 + 18 = 33 Alternative 2 = 2 for each 3 teachers plus 1 for each 10 auditorium seats = 15 + 28 = 43 Since alternative 2 is the greater, a minimum number of 43 spaces is required. . Amount of Parking Space Uses _Required_ PLACES OF PUBLIC ASSEMBLAGE EXCEPT HOTELS Churches: All districts . No requirement Arena, armory, assembly hall, auditorium, community center, concert hall, convention hall, dance hall, funeral parlor, ice or roller skating rink, public hall, stadium, or theatre: C-4 . No requirement All other districts .... One for each ten seats of occupancy capacity for the first 10,000 seats, plus one for each 20 seats above the first 10,000, provided that where seats are not fixed, each seven square feet of gross floor area usable for seating shall be considered one seat --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9694133. Public record. Not legal advice.