# In Re Appeal of Borough of Churchill

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 23, 1990 · 525 Pa. 80

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9693274

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re Appeal of the BOROUGH OF CHURCHILL and the Churchill Area School District (Now Known as Woodland Hills School District) From the Action of the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, on Property Situate in the Borough of Churchill and Owned by Westinghouse Electric Corporation. Appeal of WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION. (Two Cases) in Re Appeal of WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION From Assessment by the Board of Property Assessment, Appeals and Review of Allegheny County Upon Real Property Located in the Borough of Churchill, Pennsylvania, Block and Lot No. 370-N-350 Known as the Research and Development Center of Westinghouse Electric Corporation
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** May 23, 1990
- **Citations:** 525 Pa. 80; 575 A.2d 550; 1990 Pa. LEXIS 118
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Zappala
- **Judges:** Nix, Larsen, Flaherty, McDermott, Zappala, Papadakos, Cappy
- **Cited by:** 94 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9693274

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that trial courts have the ability to enact local rules adopting a post-trial statutory appeal practice and procedure so long as the rules do not conflict with or violate the Constitutions or laws of the United States or the Commonwealth or our state-wide rules
- explaining that the rules laid down by individual judges are not subject to Pa.R.C.P. 239
- holding that a trial court has authority to regulate post-trial motions practice

## Opinion text

ZAPPALA, Justice,
concurring and dissenting.
I concur with the majority’s decision to reverse and remand this matter to the Commonwealth Court for consid *92 eration of the merits of this appeal because the Appellant should not be penalized for proceeding in accordance with the trial court’s instructions concerning the procedure for review of a decision in tax assessment cases. Rather than leaving it to an individual trial judge’s discretion as to whether the filing of exceptions in statutory appeals will be permitted, however, I would hold that the procedure of filing exceptions does not apply to those appeals. This would ensure that the practice is uniform throughout the Commonwealth and would avoid the confusion that we were attempting to resolve.
I am not persuaded that our prior decisions in Lehigh and Wilkes-Barre Coal Company’s Assessment Appeal, 225 Pa. 272 , 74 A. 65 (1909), Thompson’s Appeal, 271 Pa. 225 , 114 A. 774 (1921), and Chester Holding Corp. Appeal, 390 Pa. 152 , 134 A.2d 668 (1957) are of any precedential value in deciding the issue of whether exceptions may be filed in assessment cases. In Lehigh, the issue was whether the lower court, sitting en banc, had erred in refusing to consider the exceptions filed from the trial’s court’s decision. The en banc court had refused to hear the exceptions on the ground that there had been no valid trial or proceeding by the board of revision. The dispute centered' only oh the deficiencies in the proceeding before review was sought in common pleas court. The en banc court had concluded that the assessment and records in the office of the county commissioners were so irregular that an appeal would not lie to the common pleas court. We held that the appeal in the proceeding was taken properly and that the lower court had a duty to review the issues raised. The question of the proper procedure in the appeal before the common please court was not in issue.
In Thompson’s Appeal, an appeal was taken from the board of revision’s tax valuations to the court of common pleas. It was the practice for the. entire court of three judges to hear all of the cases. After all of the evidence was submitted, one of the judges was designated as a reviewing judge to analyze the evidence and make findings *93 of fact. The reviewing judge did so and nisi decrees were then filed. Exceptions were filed to the three judge court, a majority of which disagreed with the findings of the reviewing judge. The unsuccessful party then argued on appeal that the reviewing judge’s findings should be treated as though made by a master or auditor, and should not be set aside unless obvious error was committed or where the entire evidence preponderated against such finding. It was in this context that we addressed the purpose of filing exceptions from the reviewing judge’s decision to the court sitting en banc. The issue we resolved in that case was the proper scope of review of the decision of a majority of judges sitting en banc, all of whom had heard the evidence and participated in the hearing, after action was taken by the reviewing judge. Again, the issue of the proper procedure for taking an appeal from the common pleas court decision in tax assessment cases was not raised.
Finally, in Chester Holding Corporation Appeal, the issue raised was whether a real estate assessment appeal to the common pleas court could properly be heard by a single judge. We found that the appellant’s contention that an order entered by a single judge who heard the assessment appeal was not a final order was without merit.
The issue presented in this case was not addressed by this Court in the three cases relied upon by the majority. Although the lower courts have spoken on this issue, this case presents us with our first opportunity to squarely resolve the issue. I believe the better approach would be to establish one procedure, rather than to defer to a trial judge’s discretion. This would eliminate the unfairness inherent in a procedure that treats litigants differently depending upon the judge who is assigned to hear the matter. Even through the elimination of the exceptions procedure, a trial judge would still have the authority to entertain a petition for reconsideration to correct any errors in the proceeding or in his decision.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9693274. Public record. Not legal advice.