# Mudd v. Hoffman Homes for Youth, Inc. > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · May 6, 1988 · 374 Pa. Super. 522 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692942 ## Case - **Full name:** Margaret A. MUDD, Appellant, v. HOFFMAN HOMES FOR YOUTH, INC. and Gerald W. Hagmayer - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** May 6, 1988 - **Citations:** 374 Pa. Super. 522; 543 A.2d 1092; 1988 Pa. Super. LEXIS 1358 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Cercone - **Judges:** Wieand, Tamilia, Cercone - **Cited by:** 40 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692942 ## Opinion text CERCONE, Judge, concurring and dissenting: I cannot accept the view set forth in the majority’s decision that this court is incapable of affording relief to a responsible employee for an arbitrary and retaliatory discharge from employment when that employee sought to perform a basic duty implicit in her office as a social worker at the Hoffman Homes for Youth. I therefore dissent. For more than nine years appellant Margaret Mudd was employed by Hoffman Homes as a social worker. On February 1, 1982 she was informed by the agency’s executive director Gerald Hagmayer that he would fire her unless she voluntarily resigned. Mudd did not resign and, subsequently, she was given notice of termination on March 1, 1982, to be effective April 30, 1982. The majority now holds, while admitting a public policy interest in prohibiting activity involving illegal drugs and controlled substances, that the mere fact that Hoffman Homes alleged “a plausible and legitimate reason for appellant’s termination, i.e. the preservation of normal management operating procedures” is sufficient to uphold the lower court’s grant of appellees’ preliminary objections. I am unable to agree that the appellees’ claimed interest in “normal operating procedures” is of sufficient weight to supersede what I perceive to be facts which raise a clear mandate of public policy interest. In an amended complaint, dismissed by the order now on appeal, Mudd alleged in paragraph 9: *533 When Mrs. Mudd learned about this drug-related incident, she became very alarmed that an act of child abuse had occurred at HHY. [emphasis added] At paragraph 13, she alleged: When Mrs. Mudd contacted the HHY Board of Directors, she did so in fulfillment of her moral and professional duties as a social worker and in accordance with the legal duties imposed upon her by the Pennsylvania Child Protective Services Law, Act of November 26, 1975, P.L. 438, No. 124, § 1, 11 P.S. 2201 et seq. By setting forth these concerns, Mudd was pleading the public policy issues which she would later be required to prove at trial. The majority concludes that because appellant did not state relevant federal and state laws regarding illegal drugs it would not address their possible application. I find no authority which requires a party to plead relevant statutory authority, in a complaint, to raise an issue of public policy and, therefore, I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that this aspect of the public policy debate should be disregarded. As to Mudd’s claim of duty pursuant to the Child Protective Services Law, the majority frames the public policy issue in terms of Mudd’s failure to abide by internal operating procedures rather than reviewing the public policy issue in terms of the alleged child abuse. In Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Company, Inc., 281 Pa.Super. 560 , 422 A.2d 611 (1980), a panel of this Court was called upon to review an action for wrongful discharge and stated: It is enough to note that in appraising the propriety of the lower court’s order dismissing appellant’s claims, we must weigh several factors, balancing against appellant’s interest in making a living, his employer’s interest in running its business, its motive in discharging appellant and its manner of effecting the discharge, and any social interests or public policies that may be implicated in the discharge. *534 Id., 281 Pa.Superior Ct. at 577, 422 A.2d at 620 . In order to “overcome the employer’s interest in running a business, the employee must show a violation of a clearly mandated public policy which ‘strikes at the heart of a citizen’s social right, duties, and responsibilities.’ ” Turner v. Letterkenny Federal Credit Union, 351 Pa.Super. 51, 55 , 505 A.2d 259, 261 (1985) (quoting Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 721 F.2d 894, 899 (3d Cir.1983)). The more important the public policy implicated in the discharge, the more difficult it will be for the discharging employer to assert a sufficient separate and legitimate business reason to justify the discharge. As was stated in Cisco v. United Parcel Services, Inc., 328 Pa.Super. 300 , 476 A.2d 1340 (1984), “The sources of public policy [which may limit the employer’s right of discharge] include legislation; administrative rules, regulation, or decision; and judicial decision.” Id., 328 Pa.Superior Ct. at 306, 476 A.2d at 1343 (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 72 , 417 A.2d 505, 512 (1980)). Accord Hunter v. Port Authority of Allegheny County, 277 Pa.Super. 4 , 419 A.2d 631 (1980) (as a result of the public policy against unnecessarily stigmatizing former offenders, Criminal History Record Information Act, 18 Pa.C. S.A. § 9125(b), a public employer could not deny a former offender employment on the. basis of a prior conviction for which the offender had been pardoned, unless the conviction was reasonably related to fitness to perform the job sought); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.Super. 28 , 386 A.2d 119 (1978) (due to the importance of trial by jury in our legal system, an employer could not discharge an employee because the employee accepted service on a jury) (citing cases from sister states); Molush v. Orkin Exterminating Co., Inc., 547 F.Supp. 54 (E.D.Pa.1982) (former employee who alleged that he underwent a polygraph examination, pleaded valid cause of action for tortious discharge under public policy embodied in Pennsylvania anti-polygraph statute, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7321). *535 The precise extent to which the employer’s interest in running his business is limited by considerations of public policy cannot be stated but must be worked out on a case-by-case basis. In the case sub judice, the majority has merely looked to the fact that the pleadings show the employer had a plausibly legitimate reason for the discharge without weighing that interest against the public policy considerations at stake. I would find that appellant’s allegation of suspected child abuse raises, per se, public policy implications which must be explored beyond the pleading stage. My primary concern in this case is that we have not heard Ms. Mudd’s testimony nor reviewed and considered her evidence. In this situation, we cannot conduct the required balancing test on the basis of the pleadings only. 1 Further, I would find that the Child Protective Services Law provides evidence of legislative intent to protect individuals who fulfill their obligation to take steps necessary to prevent the continuance of suspected child abuse. Section 4 of the Child Protective Services Law provides in pertinent part: (a) Any persons who, in the course of their employment, occupation, or practice of their profession come into contact with children shall report or cause a report to be made in accordance with section 6 [11 P.S. § 2206] when they have reason to believe, on the basis of their medical, professional or other training and experience, that a child coming before them in their professional or official capacity is an abused child. *536 (b) Whenever any [social worker] is required to report ... in his capacity as a member of the staff of a ... public or private institution, school, facility, or agency, he shall immediately notify the person in charge of such institution, school, facility or agency, or the designated agent of the person in charge. ... (d) Any person who, under this section, is required to report or cause a report of suspected child abuse to be made and who, in good faith, makes or causes said report to be made and who, as a result thereof, is discharged from his employment or in any other manner is discriminated against with respect to compensation, hire, tenure, terms, conditions or privileges of employment, may file a cause of action in the court of common pleas of the county in which the alleged unlawful discharge or discrimination occurred for appropriate relief. ... 11 P.S. § 2204. While it appears that this Act may have relieved Ms. Mudd of any legal obligation to take further action after informing Hagmayer of her concerns, it does not restrict her from making her complaint or allegation at a higher level. At the pretrial stage, there is neither evidence of an internal policy outlining complaint procedures nor evidence that Ms. Mudd’s complaints caused substantial disruption to the operating procedures of Hoffman Homes. The firing of a social worker who acts in good faith to fulfill her ethical and professional obligations raises a question of great public import. Contrary to the majority’s assertion, society’s interest in protecting the children placed in the protective custody of a public or private agency manifestly presents a mandate to the court to allow Ms. Mudd to proceed past the pleading stage. I write with full recognition of the weight the courts of this Commonwealth have accorded to an employer’s interest in controlling its workforce. However, in balancing that interest against society’s interest in doing its utmost to protect our precious future citizens I can reach no other *537 conclusion than that this Court should, at the least, recognize a cause of action based on the allegations contained in appellant’s complaint. Undoubtedly we will be asked to review this case again after a record has been made. That would be the proper time to balance the competing interests in question here. In my judgment, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Adams County should be reversed and this case remanded for trial on all claims. . In Rinehimer v. Luzerne County Community College, 372 Pa.Super. 480 , 539 A.2d 1298 (1988), this court sustained the trial court’s denial of plaintiffs petition to remove nonsuit after plaintiff had an opportunity to present all its proferred evidence in its case in chief. In Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 281 Pa.Super. 560 , 422 A.2d 611 (1980), this court affirmed the grant of summary judgment motion, in defendant’s favor, following a review of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file and supporting affidavits which supported the determination that there were no issues of material fact. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692942. Public record. Not legal advice.