# Commonwealth v. Light > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · October 16, 1974 · 458 Pa. 328 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692571 ## Case - **Full name:** Commonwealth v. Light, Appellant - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** October 16, 1974 - **Citations:** 458 Pa. 328; 326 A.2d 288; 1974 Pa. LEXIS 726 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Manderino - **Judges:** Pomeboy, Jones, Eagen, O'Brien, Roberts, Pomeroy, Manderino, Nix - **Cited by:** 57 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692571 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that psychiatric testimony is admissible to the defendant’s “honest, bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger” but not relevant to whether that “belief [is] reasonable in light of the facts as they appeared to him” - finding that psychiatric testimony was admissible to show whether defendant acted out of an honest, bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger at time he killed victim for purposes of establishing defense of self-defense - finding that psychiatric testimony was admissible to show whether defendant acted outof an honest, bona fide belief that he was i11 imminent danger at time he killed victim for purposes of establishing defense of self-defense ## Opinion text Dissenting Opinion by Mr. Justice Manderino: I agree with the opinion of the Court that it was error for the trial judge to exclude the psychiatrist’s testimony. However, I cannot agree that such error was harmless. I therefore dissent. Mr. Justice Pomeroy’s opinion notes that to sustain a defense of self-defense, the defendant must prove that the slayer “reasonably believed that he was in imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony____” (Emphasis in the court’s opinion.) This language paraphrases Murray v. Commonwealth, 79 Pa. 311, 317 (1875), where our Court said: “It is not necessary that a man shall be in actual imminent peril of life, or great *340 bodily harm, before he may slay his assailant. It is sufficient if in good faith he has a reasonable belief, founded upon the facts as they appeared to Mm at the time, that he is in such imminent peril, even though it should afterwards appear that he was mistaken.” (Emphasis added.) Mr. Justice Pomeeoy-’s opinion points out that a two part test is involved: (1) “the defendant in fact must have acted out of an honest, bona fide belief that he was in imminent danger,” and (2) “the belief must be reasonable in light of the facts as they appear to him” (Emphasis added.) Mr. Justice Pomeeoy-’s opinion then labels the first part of the test as “entirely subjective,” and the second part as “clearly objective.” Having labeled the second part of the test as “clearly objective,” it is easy to conclude that any testimony to be given by a psychiatrist would be irrelevant (and therefore harmless error if excluded) as to the objective question of whether defendant’s belief was reasonable. As the opinion states: “it would be of no help in determining whether that belief was reasonable in light of all the circumstances.” The error in this logic lies in the label. Far from being “clearly objective,” the second part of the test involves both objective and subjective considerations. To determine the reasonableness of defendant’s belief that he was in imminent danger of death or serious bodily harm, the jury must consider all the circumstances as perceived by the defendant. The question of the defendant’s perception of the circumstances immediately preceding the killing is subjective, and psychiatric testimony as to the defendant’s state of mind at the time is clearly relevant. It is easy to imagine situations where two different people could, because of differences in their subjective states of mind, “reasonably” react in totally different ways to the same stimulus. For example, one who, confronted on a sidewalk by a growling *341 dog, reacts in terror because of a subjective fear of animals, is no less reasonable (based on the facts as he perceives them) in Ms belief that the dog is about to attack than another who, because of years of training as a veterinarian and experience in handling dogs, sees that (based on the facts as he perceives them) there is no danger. It is for the jury to decide whether the defendant’s belief was reasonable. Such a determination must be based on the facts and circumstances as the defendant perceived them. TMs they were unable to do because psycMatric testimony concerning the defendant’s state of mind and its effect on Ms perception of the facts and circumstances that immediately preceded the shooting was withheld from the jury. Such error was not harmless. Whether an error is of constitutional dimensions or not, the only proper test for determining whether the error is harmless should be the test announced in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 , 17 L. Ed. 2d 705 , 87 S. Ct. 824 (1967). We certainly cannot say that the error in the instant case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Furthermore, even if we apply, arguendo, the test used by the Court in its opinion here, we cannot say that the jury would have reached the same conclusion had they been given the benefit of testimony as to the defendant’s subjective perception of the facts and circumstances leading up to the shooting. I would therefore reverse and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. Mr. Justice Roberts and Mr. Justice Nix join in tliis dissenting opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692571. Public record. Not legal advice.