# Haumersen v. Ford Motor Co.

> Supreme Court of Iowa · August 31, 1977 · 257 N.W.2d 7

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692514

## Case

- **Full name:** David J. HAUMERSEN, Administrator of the Estate of Charles D. Haumersen, Deceased, and David J. Haumersen, Natural Father of Charles D. Haumersen, Deceased, Appellees, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** August 31, 1977
- **Citations:** 257 N.W.2d 7; 1977 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 1118
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by LeGRAND
- **Judges:** Moore, Legrand, Mason, Uhlenhopp
- **Cited by:** 63 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692514

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining rationale for sanctions under discovery rules

## Opinion text

LeGRAND, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent from Division I and from the result because I believe the testimony of John Talbott, plaintiff’s expert, should have been rejected.
Although plaintiff argues that this issue was not properly preserved, I find otherwise. It is true defendant raised no objection to the admission of Talbott’s preliminary statements concerning his examination of the car and what he found therefrom. However, when he was asked to venture his ultimate opinion from these foundational facts, timely and adequate objection was made.
After reciting the familiar rules relating to the admission or rejection of expert testimony, the majority concludes Talbott’s opinion was properly received, although “it reached the outer limits” of trial court discretion. I think it went one step beyond, and I would accordingly reverse.
I do not quarrel with Mr. Talbott’s credentials as an expert, but it is not enough that a witness qualify as an expert. The facts in the particular case must furnish sound basis for the opinion he gives. There is no such basis in this case.
We are told by Mr. Talbott that eighteen months and 12,000 miles after this accident an examination of defendant’s vehicle disclosed persuasive evidence of what had happened a year-and-a-half earlier. In no other setting would such a claim be given even passing credence. Yet the majority holds such “expert” opinion to be admissible. This record contains no reliable evidence to justify that conclusion. The circumstances upon which he relies are too remote when related to the time this accident occurred and to the condition of the car as it then was. His opinion is pure speculation and conjecture. Important legal rights should not be determined by such tenuous testimony. See Hedges v. Conder, 166 N.W.2d 844, 856-858 (Iowa 1969); Tiemeyer v. McIntosh, 176 N.W.2d 819, 824-826 (Iowa 1970).
I repeat what I said in my dissent in Adams v. Deur, 173 N.W.2d 100, 116 (Iowa 1969) — an expert should not be permitted to testify to unlikely and extravagant opinions simply because he claims he can do so.
MASON, J., joins this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692514. Public record. Not legal advice.