# State v. Steelman

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · October 23, 2002 · 93 S.W.3d 102

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692417

## Case

- **Full name:** The STATE of Texas v. Leo STEELMAN and Ian Steelman, Appellees
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** October 23, 2002
- **Citations:** 93 S.W.3d 102; 2002 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 206; 2002 WL 31398545
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Johnson
- **Judges:** Holcomb, Keasler, Meyers, Price, Johnson, Cochran, Keller, Hervey
- **Cited by:** 350 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692417

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that State, in its appeal from trial court’s ruling on motion to suppress, cannot rely on theory that was not presented to trial court
- holding anonymous tip, that someone at the residence was dealing drugs, did not amount to anything; the tip was never substantiated, and none of the occupants were ever charged with drug dealing
- holding State forfeited attenuation-of-taint argument on appeal where it failed to present that argument to trial court
- noting that “the officers in this case had no idea who [inside the house] was smoking or possessing marijuana, and they certainly had no particular reason to believe that [appellant] was smoking or possessing marijuana”
- holding the mere odor of marijuana, standing alone, emitting from a residence does not give officers probable cause to believe Appellant was in 2 possession of marijuana in their presence

## Opinion text

JOHNSON, J.,
filed a concurring opinion.
The United States Supreme Court has recently unanimously reaffirmed the principle that “police officers need either a warrant or probable cause plus exigent circumstances in order to make a lawful entry into a home.” Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 , 122 S.Ct. 2458 , 153 L.Ed.2d 599 (2002) Quoting Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 , 100 S.Ct. 1371 , 63 L.Ed.2d 639 (1980), Kirk reiterated that “because ‘the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house ... [, ajbsent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed without a warrant.’ ” Id. (Internal deletion in original.) Tex.Code Crim. Proc., Art. 14.05 provides that “an officer making an arrest without a warrant may not enter a residence to make the arrest unless: 1) a person who resides in the residence consents to the entry; or 2) exigent circumstances require that the officer making the arrest enter the residence without the consent of a resident or without a warrant.” (Emphasis added.)
In this case, neither appellee nor any other resident consented to the officers’ entry into the residence. By clear United States constitutional and Texas statutory authority, the warrantless entry into the residence was illegal unless there was probable cause plus exigent circumstances. As the majority concludes, the trial court could have reasonably concluded that the *110 arresting officers did not have probable cause to believe that appellees had committed an offense in their presence. The probable-cause determination made by the trial court was fact-intensive and dependent upon witness credibility and demean- or, and the trial court was certainly in the best position to evaluate those facts and make the determination.
As Judge Cochran points out, the sky will not fall as a result of this Court’s decision in the instant case. Our opinion today simply reinforces what most police officers in Texas assuredly already know— that they need a warrant, consent, or probable cause plus exigent circumstances to lawfully enter a person’s home to make an arrest.
I join the majority opinion of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692417. Public record. Not legal advice.