# Shambach v. Bickhart

> Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · March 26, 2004 · 577 Pa. 384

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692236

## Case

- **Full name:** Gregory L. SHAMBACH, Petitioner/Appellant, v. Richard W. BICKHART, Respondent/Appellee. in Re Pennsylvania General Election for Snyder County Commissioner, November 4, 2003. Appeal of Gregory L. Shambach of Recount and Certification of Election Returns
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
- **Decided:** March 26, 2004
- **Citations:** 577 Pa. 384; 845 A.2d 793; 2004 Pa. LEXIS 659
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Cappy
- **Judges:** Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman, Saylor, Eakin, Baer
- **Cited by:** 34 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692236

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding the Election Code’s provision that an elector may write in the name of a person not already on the ballot was directory; therefore, write-in votes for a person already on the ballot should be counted – particularly as the Election Code did not specify that such votes s…
- explaining that stare decisis has "special force" in matters of statutory, as opposed to constitutional, construction (quoting Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 172-73, 109 S.Ct. 2363, 2370, 105 L.Ed.2d 132 (1989))
- declining to invalidate a write-in vote cast for a candidate who was named on the ballot proper, observing that ballots containing mere minor irregularities should only be stricken for compelling reasons

## Opinion text

Chief Justice CAPPY,
Dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Like Justice Castille and Justice Eakin, I believe that the majority opinion essentially fails to engage in the analysis that this court has no choice but to make in resolving this case—that of statutory construction under Pennsylvania’s Statutory Act of 1972. 1 Pa.C.S. § .1501 et seq. When such an analysis of 25 P.S. § 3031.12(b)(3) is faithfully made, the outcome can only be that the ten write-in votes in question are invalid and must be struck. Simply put, the majority ignores that the words of 25 P.S. § 3031.12(b)(3) are “clear and free from all ambiguity” and therefore, cannot be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit the Election Code reflects. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(b).
I recognize that the analysis I would follow and the result I would reach in the present appeal is contrary to this court’s decision in Appeal of James, 377 Pa. 405 , 105 A.2d 64 (1954). Although we have repeatedly acknowledged that the doctrine of stare decisis is a wise course of judicial action, Fadgen v. Lenkner, 469 Pa. 272 , 365 A.2d 147, 152 (1976), we have also *407 stated that we will disregard the doctrine when faced with a prior holding that we are unable to support. See Ayala v. Philadelphia Bd. of Pub. Educ. 453 Pa. 584 , 305 A.2d 877, 888-89 (1973). I believe that the decision in James, in failing to be grounded in statutory construction, was wrongly decided, and should be overruled. Therefore, I would not follow James in this case. 1
For these reasons, I respectfully dissent, and would affirm the Order of the Commonwealth Court.
. The majority relies on 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4), which provides "[tjhat when a court of last resort has construed the language used in a statute, the General Assembly in subsequent statutes on the same subject matter intends the same construction to be placed upon such language----”, to presume that the General Assembly intended 25 P.S. § 3031.12(b)(3) to be interpreted in the same way the court interpreted 25 P.S. § 2963(e) in James. (Majority Opinion at 801-02.). I disagree.
Under the clear terms of § 1922(4), use of the presumption depends on "a court of last resort ha[ving] construed the language used in a statute.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(4). In my view, the court in James did not construe the language of the statute before it, as § 1922(4) requires. Therefore, I believe that the presumption cannot be used in the present case.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692236. Public record. Not legal advice.