# Madison Construction Co. v. Harleysville Mutual Insurance > Supreme Court of Pennsylvania · July 27, 1999 · 557 Pa. 595 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692065 ## Case - **Full name:** MADISON CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, Appellant, v. the HARLEYSVILLE MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, Nicholas Ezzi, Brian Murtaugh, Kelran Associates, Inc., and Euclid Chemical Company, Appellees - **Court:** Supreme Court of Pennsylvania - **Decided:** July 27, 1999 - **Citations:** 557 Pa. 595; 735 A.2d 100; 1999 Pa. LEXIS 2139 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Newman - **Judges:** Flaherty, C.J., and Zappala, Cappy, Castille, Nigro, Newman and Saylor - **Cited by:** 518 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692065 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - finding fumes from concrete treatment to be a pollutant, and explaining “[t]he pertinent inquiry is not, as Madison contends, whether the policy’s definition of ‘pollutant’ is so broad that virtually any substance ... could be said to come within its ambit. Rather, guided by t… - concluding that pollution exclusion operated to deny coverage under subcontractor’s comprehensive general liability policy even though additional negligence claims, including negligent maintenance of construction site, were raised in the complaint; because all of these claims … - stating that the ambiguity question is not “to be resolved in a vacuum” but “[r]ather contractual terms are ambiguous if they are subject to more than one reasonable interpretation when applied to a particular set of facts” (citations omitted) - holding that we must interpret words in an insurance contract according to their “natural, plain, and ordinary sense” and we may rely on dictionary definitions to do so - finding that-a floor coating, which was a pollutant when applied to the surface of concrete, was dispersed when fumes from the coating evaporated into air above and around the concrete ## Opinion text *617 NEWMAN, Justice, dissenting. I respectfully dissent because I do not believe that the trial court developed a sufficient record upon which to determine the applicability of the pollution exclusion to the allegations set forth in Mr. Ezzi’s Complaint. I am concerned that the trial court determined that Euco Floor Coat is not a pollutant without addressing the critical issue of the exact chemical composition of the product used at the Boeing/Vertol Helicopters facility and whether the fumes emitted from that product are a pollutant. As the Majority notes: Included in the record is the Material Safety Data report prepared by Euclid Chemical Company for the product or products known by the trade names Floor Coat, Super Floor Coat, Rez-Seal, Pilocure, Super Pilocure and Eucocare. The report notes that ‘[tjhese products may contain approximately 3-4% Xylene ..., 2-3% Cumene ... 40% Trimethylbenze [sic] ... which are considered toxic chemicals, and 0.2 to 0.3 Styrene ..., which is a suspected carcinogen.’ Majority Opinion at 107 (emphasis added). Without a factual determination of the composition of the specific product at issue, I do not believe that the trial court could have reliably held that either the product or its fumes are pollutants. Accordingly, the grant of summary judgment in favor of Madison Construction based upon the physical properties of Euco Floor Coat is inappropriate. Therefore, I would vacate the Orders of the Superior Court and trial court, and remand with instructions to consider the issues set forth in this Opinion. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9692065. Public record. Not legal advice.