# Stanley v. Hancock County Commissioners

> Supreme Judicial Court of Maine · December 23, 2004 · 864 A.2d 169

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691903

## Case

- **Full name:** Ronald STANLEY v. HANCOCK COUNTY COMMISSIONERS
- **Court:** Supreme Judicial Court of Maine
- **Decided:** December 23, 2004
- **Citations:** 864 A.2d 169; 22 I.E.R. Cas. (BNA) 462; 2004 ME 157; 2004 Me. LEXIS 189
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Saufley
- **Judges:** Saufley, Clifford, Rudman, Dana, Alexander, Calkins, Levy
- **Cited by:** 117 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691903

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that nonmoving party may generate factual dispute about pretext by denying moving party’s assertions and supporting denials “with record citations to circumstantial evidence that the ... nondiscriminatory explanation was unworthy of credence”
- stating that a defendant is entitled to rely on circumstantial evidence of pretext in making out a prima facie case for a WPA claim
- recognizing that “self-serving” statements and circumstantial evidence can be used to establish or dispute a material fact
- holding that a party’s failure to properly controvert statements of material fact results in admission of those facts

## Opinion text

SAUFLEY, C.J.,
with whom CLIFFORD, J., joins, concurring.
[¶ 31] I join the majority opinion of the Court in both analysis and conclusion and write separately in concurrence to address the focal point of both the majority and dissenting opinions.
[¶ 32] Simply put, it is the responsibility of the parties to admit, deny, or qualify the facts set forth in a statement of material facts by reference to each numbered paragraph, and to provide appropriate record citations for each denial or qualification. In this case, Stanley did not do so. The dissent points to the morass created by both parties’ multiple and, at times, lengthy statements of fact and determines that Stanley should not be held to the requirement of the rule. The trial court, in a thorough and well-reasoned review, and the majority of this Court say that he should.
[¶ 33] The summary judgment rules are straightforward and intended to allow an immediate identification of legitimate factual disputes. It is the parties, not the judge, who have the responsibility to respond to their opponents’ statements of fact directly, in an organized manner, and with record support. This allocation of responsibility is reasonable and, contrary to the conclusion of the dissent, does not signal a return to common law pleading or the end of jury trials.
[¶ 34] Thus, I concur in the opinion of the Court.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691903. Public record. Not legal advice.