# Wilson v. State > Court of Appeals of Maryland · July 20, 2009 · 409 Md. 415 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691872 ## Case - **Full name:** Francis Eugene WILSON, Jr. v. STATE of Maryland - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Maryland - **Decided:** July 20, 2009 - **Citations:** 409 Md. 415; 975 A.2d 877; 2009 Md. LEXIS 277 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Harrell - **Judges:** Raker, Harrell - **Cited by:** 31 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691872 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - holding that an assessment of the reasonableness of an officer’s actions is dependent on the level of the intrusion, and that a Terry stop is less intrusive than a formal custodial arrest - reversing the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals, in part, because the evidence regarding the officers decision to “place [the] petitioner in handcuffs and to transport him to the hospital in his police cruiser[,] was not carefully tailored to the underlying justificatio… - explaining that the community caretaking function of law enforcement officers is “an umbrella that encompasses . . . the automobile impoundment/inventory doctrine” - recognizing that the community caretaking doctrine functions as an exception and enunciating a test for its application - recognizing that the community caretaking function as an exception and enunciating a test for its application ## Opinion text Dissenting Opinion by HARRELL, J„ which CATHELL, J., joins. I dissent. The Majority opinion is fine until its very end (Maj. op. at 442-43, 975 A.2d 893 ) when it misapplies its careful analysis and recitation of the community care-taking function as it should be applied in Maryland. The Majority holds that Officer Zimmerer violated Wilson’s Fourth Amendment rights when he handcuffed Wilson and transported him to the hospital. Maj. op at 442, 975 A.2d 892 . Calling it “unreasonable” (i.e., not narrowly tailored) to handcuff Wilson in order to place him in the cruiser for such transport, the Majority finds it important to its conclusion that it discerns no reason in the record for why an ambulance was not summonsed for the purpose. Maj. op. at 441-42, 975 A.2d 892 . The Majority’s reasoning overrides the latitude that ought to be granted to law enforcement officers to make discretionary calls as to what additional public services may be necessary under varying circumstances. The record tells me that, other than some scraped knuckles on his hands and his general catatonic behavior, Wilson’s observed condition may not have commanded an ambulance and an EMT. In any event, what *444 makes the Majority imagine that, under these circumstances, Wilson’s liberty would not have been restricted by restraints had he been transported by ambulance? Transport by police vehicle seems eminently reasonable, appropriate to the occasion, and fiscally sound. To call Officer Zimmerer’s exercise of judgment here unreasonable and unconstitutional is wrong. As Chief Judge Krauser stated for the Court of Special Appeals in its opinion in this matter: [Although the officer thought that [Wilson] might “possibly [be] under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance,” he testified that he stopped [him] and later transported him to the hospital out of concern for [Wilson’s] safety and the safety of others, and not to detect or investigate any criminal conduct by [Wilson]. The officer stated that he got out of his vehicle to follow [Wilson] because he “wanted to make sure that [Wilson] was okay”; that, in light of [Wilson’s] condition, he decided to take him to the hospital; that he handcuffed [him] not to consummate an arrest but in accordance with department policy; and that he could not be sure of what was wrong with [Wilson], * * 4: In the instant case, Officer Zimmerer’s initial attempt to place handcuffs on [Wilson] did not amount to an arrest. Zimmerer did not detain [Wilson] “for the purpose of prosecuting him for a crime.” He detained him for the purpose of taking him to the hospital. He also never told [Wilson] that he was under arrest, nor did he believe that [Wilson] was under arrest until after he resisted attempts to handcuff him. In fact, the officer told [Wilson] that he was taking him not to a police station, but to the hospital and further explained that he was being handcuffed so that he could be placed into the police cruiser and transported there. When asked by the State why he handcuffed [Wilson], Officer Zimmerer replied, “It’s departmental policy that everybody be handcuffed prior to being ... put in the *445 vehicle,” and that “[s]econd of all, I didn’t know what was wrong with him. Like I said, 1 believed he was possibly under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance.” When the Sate inquired as to whether [Wilson] was arrested at this point, the officer said, “no.” Thus, [Wilson] was handcuffed in accordance with department policy and “to protect the officer,” because he did not know “what was wrong with” [him]. The officer’s attempt to handcuff was only transformed into an arrest, according to Officer Zimmerer, when [Wilson] assaulted Officer Zimmerer in resisting that procedure. 176 Md.App. 7, 20-21 , 932 A.2d 739, 746-47 (2007). The Court of Special Appeals got it right, in my view. Accordingly, J would affirm its judgment that Wilson’s motion to suppress was denied correctly by the Circuit Court for Washington County. Judge CATHELL has authorized me to state that he joins in this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691872. Public record. Not legal advice.