# Offerdahl v. University of Minnesota Hospitals & Clinics

> Supreme Court of Minnesota · July 22, 1988 · 426 N.W.2d 425

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691359

## Case

- **Full name:** Rosemary Sherlock OFFERDAHL, Et Al., Respondents, v. UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA HOSPITALS AND CLINICS, Petitioners, Appellants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Minnesota
- **Decided:** July 22, 1988
- **Citations:** 426 N.W.2d 425; 1988 Minn. LEXIS 162; 1988 WL 74450
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Wahl
- **Judges:** Popovich, Wahl, Yetka
- **Cited by:** 329 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691359

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that the single act exception applies when plaintiff’s claim rests solely upon the University’s negligence in failing to disclose the risks and the manufacturer’s recommendations associated with insertion of an IUD
- concluding that where defendants failed to disclose risks associated with insertion of intrauterine device, claim accrued when plaintiff was hospitalized with disease caused by device

## Opinion text

WAHL, Justice
(concurring in part; dissenting in part).
I respectfully dissent from the holding of the majority opinion that Offerdahl’s claim is barred under the “single act exception” to the “termination of treatment rule.” In my view, the “single act exception” is inapplicable to the facts of this case. For that reason I would reach the issue and concur in the holding that, where a patient seeks medical treatment from a clinic as a whole, the treatment of the clinic as a whole is relevant for purposes of determining when the treatment terminated and the beginning of the statute of limitations period.
The general rule in medical malpractice cases is that the treatment “should be considered as a whole, and, if there occurred therein malpractice the statute of limitations begins to run when the treatment ceases.” Schmitt v. Esser, 178 Minn. 82, 86 , 226 N.W. 196, 197 (1929). Today, the majority departs from this long-standing rule by holding that Offerdahl’s claim accrued, not when treatment ended, but when the “single act” of negligence and alleged damage occurred.
The majority attempts to draw support for its holding from our decisions in Swang v. Hauser, 288 Minn. 306 , 180 N.W.2d 187 (1970), and Murray v. Fox, 300 Minn. 373 , 220 N.W.2d 356 (1974). This reliance upon Swang and Murray is misplaced. Those decisions are distinguishable from the present case in that the previous cases involved a single act of surgery which was “complete at that precise time, for no con *430 tinued course of treatment could either cure or relieve it.” Swang, 288 Minn. at 309 , 180 N.W.2d at 190 ; see Murray, 300 Minn. at 376 , 220 N.W.2d at 358 . Thus, the claims stemming from unauthorized or unnecessary surgery, arose from easily identifiable single events. The single act exception should be limited to such cases.
Offerdahl’s treatment, in contrast to the treatment giving rise to the causes of action in Swang and Murray , consisted of more than merely a single act. Her treatment contemplated, and in fact resulted in, ongoing contraceptive and gynecological care. Moreover, the damage resulting from the alleged negligence manifested itself over a period of time. Under these circumstances the termination of treatment rule applies.
This case is analogous to Bush v. Cress, 178 Minn. 482 , 227 N.W. 432 (1929), where the plaintiff employed the defendant physician to “attend her in childbirth.” 227 N.W. at 432 . We held that plaintiff's claim, brought more than two years after the birth of the child, was not barred on the pleadings, as the complaint alleged the physician had treated plaintiff for conditions related to the childbirth within two years of the commencement of the lawsuit. Id. at 432.
Offerdahl sought treatment at the university for prevention of pregnancy. This treatment did not merely involve insertion of the Copper-7 IUD but also contemplated periodic follow-up visits for gynecological care. As noted by the court of appeals, the treatment Offerdahl received after the IUD was removed was necessary to relieve symptoms of Pelvic Inflammatory Disease, a condition she alleges was caused or aggravated by the presence of the Copper-7. Because the treatment for PID was the direct result of treatment for prevention of pregnancy, both treatments are relevant in determining the date upon which the statute of limitations began to run. I would affirm the decision of the court of appeals and remand this case for determination of the date of Offerdahl’s last treatment for PID at the university.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9691359. Public record. Not legal advice.