# Armstrong v. State

> Supreme Court of Alabama · March 13, 1975 · 294 Ala. 100

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9688650

## Case

- **Full name:** In Re W. C. ARMSTRONG, Jr. v. STATE of Alabama. Ex Parte W. C. Armstrong, Jr.
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Alabama
- **Decided:** March 13, 1975
- **Citations:** 294 Ala. 100; 312 So. 2d 620; 1975 Ala. LEXIS 1152
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Jones
- **Judges:** Heflin, Merrill, Bloodworth, Faulkner, Jones, Shores, Embry, Maddox, Almon
- **Cited by:** 370 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9688650

## Opinion text

JONES, Justice
(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I concur in Part I.
Because of that portion of the opinion dealing with the uncorroborated testimony question (Part II), with which I cannot agree, I am constrained to address myself to this issue.
Assume, for example (which is more . factual than hypothetical), that the only violation of the conditions of probation is the alleged robbery of the drugstore. At the revocation hearing, the only evidence adduced is that of a confessed accomplice who says, “I robbed the store but he knew about it and helped in planning the act.” The defendant’s probation is revoked. He is never brought to trial for robbery for the obvious reason that the state cannot obtain a conviction. Without this charge, the defendant could still be on probation for the prior conviction. He is now, in effect, serving time for the commission of an offense for which he could not be tried and convicted. The same policy reason for not permitting a conviction on the testimony of an accomplice, unless corroborated, equally obtains here. Its reliability is not increased by the nature of the hearing, whether to determine if his probation will be revoked or his guilt or innocence of the offense. The “corroboration” rule is not a mere rule of evidence, but a substantive rule going to the burden of proof — an essential element of the offense, legislatively mandated by Tit. 15, § 307, Alabama Code.
This does not mean, of course, that the trial judge is held to the more strict standard of “convinced beyond a reasonable doubt,” the “hearsay” rule, and other procedural and substantive rights of the defendant which would govern in a jury trial of the alleged offense. But, in my opinion, it ought to mean that where a criminal violation is the basis for revocation of proba *108 tion, there should be sufficient proof of each of the elements of the offense to reasonably satisfy the trial court that the defendant has in fact committed the offense, and thus violated the terms of his probation. Otherwise, we are right back to przGagnon and Morrissey, saying, as we did then, that because probation is a matter of grace in the first place, it can be revoked at will; so why the necessity for any degree of proof with respect to the violation charged?
To be sure, many states and the federal system do not have the “uncorroborated testimony of an accomplice” rule, but we do, and for good reason. It is the wisdom of this rule that such testimony, by its very nature, is so unreliable as to require corroboration to convict for a felony. Because of the lack of the full panoply of constitutional rights at a revocation hearing (e. g., trial by jury), there is even more reason to preserve and apply this rule.
Therefore, I concur in Part I and dissent with respect to Part II.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9688650. Public record. Not legal advice.