# State v. Truesdell

> Supreme Court of Iowa · May 12, 2004 · 679 N.W.2d 611

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9688228

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Kirby Joe TRUESDELL, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** May 12, 2004
- **Citations:** 679 N.W.2d 611; 2004 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 160; 2004 WL 1057826
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Carter
- **Judges:** Cady, Carter, Larson
- **Cited by:** 179 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9688228

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that the possession of a large quantity of cold relief medicine, “without additional evidence, either direct or circumstantial, is insufficient proof of intent to manufacture under the statute. There was no additional evidence in this case”
- explaining “a person is ‘under the influence’ when the consumption of alcohol affects the person’s reasoning or mental ability, impairs a person’s judgment, visibly excites a person’s emotions, or causes a person to lose control of bodily actions”
- finding witnesses’ and police officers’ reports regarding defendant’s erratic driving and behavior supported a finding that he was under the influence of alcohol when he operated his vehicle
- finding sufficient evidence for OWI conviction when defendant had acted abnormally, driven erratically, acknowledged consuming alcohol, and exhibited numerous signs of intoxication

## Opinion text

CARTER, Justice
(dissenting).
I dissent.
I do not perceive a sufficient distinction between the facts of this case and the facts of State v. Heuser, 661 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2003), to warrant a different result. In Heuser we held that intent to manufacture could be inferred from the possession of an unusually large amount of pseu-doephedrine by one who also possessed lithium batteries that might be of use in the manufacturing process. Much emphasis was placed on the surreptitious manner in which these substances were acquired.
Guilty knowledge is equally inferable in the present case from the fact that the pseudoephedrine was brazenly ripped off in the store and quickly removed from the premises by a speeding automobile. The scenarios in the two cases are equally probative of intent to manufacture a prohibited controlled substance.
The alternative scenario, which the majority proposes as being equally probative, i.e., that the precursor was to be used by another in the manufacturing process, would have been equally plausible in the Heuser case. I would affirm the judgment of the district court.
LARSON, J., joins this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9688228. Public record. Not legal advice.