# Weiner v. Dial

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · June 29, 1983 · 653 S.W.2d 786

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9685011

## Case

- **Full name:** David R. WEINER, Petitioner, v. Preston DIAL, Jr., Judge, Respondent
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** June 29, 1983
- **Citations:** 653 S.W.2d 786; 1983 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1102
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Teague
- **Judges:** Campbell, Onion, Teague, Clinton, McCormick, Miller
- **Cited by:** 24 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9685011

## Opinion text

TEAGUE, Judge,
concurring.
I reluctantly concur because I am unable to find anything in the law which provides that counsel appointed to represent an indigent defendant for trial purposes must perform what Judge Clinton refers to in his dissenting opinion as “ ‘ancillary matters’ that are in the interest of, and may rebound to the benefit of, his client,” such as handling a bail habeas corpus appeal case. Without expectation of being compensated for work to be performed, a court appointed attorney should never be required to do more than what the order appointing him expressly calls for, although “going beyond the call of duty” is certainly to be lauded. Simply because an attorney has been appointed to defend an indigent defendant does not mean that he has adopted such client for all purposes and must perform any ancillary matter which may be related to the case to which he has been appointed.
However, I do find fault with the action of the trial judge in expressly refusing to appoint counsel to handle the indigent defendant’s bail habeas corpus appeal, because such action unquestionably brings into focus a spectre from the past history of criminal jurisprudence; invidious and unnecessary discrimination through failure to treat all citizens equally. In other words, had the defendant in this cause been sufficiently and materialistically endowed, he would have had no problem in pursuing a bail habeas corpus appeal. In this instance, the indigent defendant received a tolerably fair appeal only because court appointed attorney, Hon. David R. Weiner, went that extra distance for his client. Today, unfortunately, we must tell Mr. Weiner that he will not be compensated for part of the work he has performed for his indigent client because there is nothing in our law providing for compensation for handling, without an express court order calling for such, a bail habeas corpus appeal case, even though he was appointed to represent the indigent defendant for trial purposes.
I hope that such is the exception. If, however, trial courts of this State are treating defendants who desire to appeal a denial of bail case differently, then I fear it will not be long before this Court or some Federal Court receives a timely complaint by an indigent defendant that he is being discriminated against, simply because of his status as an indigent. I believe I can safely predict that such person will receive relief from our courts. Perhaps, then, by bringing this cause to this Court, and causing such exception to be displayed for the Bench and Bar to see, Mr. Weiner has made a vital and necessary contribution to the criminal jurisprudence of this State.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9685011. Public record. Not legal advice.