# State v. Edwards

> Supreme Court of Missouri · August 26, 2003 · 116 S.W.3d 511

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9684428

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Kimber EDWARDS, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Missouri
- **Decided:** August 26, 2003
- **Citations:** 116 S.W.3d 511; 2003 Mo. LEXIS 125; 2003 WL 22006845
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Teitelman
- **Judges:** Laura Denvir Stith
- **Cited by:** 207 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9684428

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that the “statement that, in evaluating the legitimacy of the prosecutor’s explanation, the court should consider whether (1) the explanation is race-neutral, (2) related to the case to be tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate, is of continued…
- holding that no manifest injustice resulted although the prosecutor did misstate the law at one point because the correct standard of proof was restated multiple other times during voir dire and in argument, and the jury was properly instructed
- affirming a conviction where the trial court consulted with both parties’ counsel outside the presence of the jury, and sanctioned a line of questioning which allowed police testimony that generally referenced third party out-of-court statements to explain their discovery of a…
- holding that existence of similarly situated veniremembers of a different race that were not stricken is indicative of pretext

## Opinion text

RICHARD B. TEITELMAN, Judge,
concurring.
I concur. I write separately to emphasize the importance of careful judicial scrutiny of Batson claims and cases involving cumulative trial errors.
As the principal opinion notes, courts should review more carefully peremptory strikes based upon occupation because, in the vast majority of cases, a prospective juror’s employment has nothing to do with his or her ability to faMy weigh the evidence and arrive at a just decision. For the same reason, courts should also review more closely attempts to justify peremptory strikes based upon vague references to a venireperson’s attire, demeanor, and similar attributes. These attributes are largely irrelevant to one’s ability to serve as a juror and expose venirepersons to peremptory strikes for no real reason except for their race. As Justice Marshall predicted in Batson, if these and similar justifications are routinely deemed sufficient, then the protections afforded by Batson will be rendered illusory. See Smulls v. State, 71 S.W.3d 138, 159 (Mo. banc 2002) (J. Wolff concurring) (citing *551 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 , 106 S.Ct. 1712 , 90 L.Ed.2d 69 (1986)(J. Marshall, concurring)). However guilty a defendant may be, the law requires that a conviction only be obtained through a fair trial. The right to sit before a jury of one’s peers, chosen not because of race, but because of their standing as citizens doing their civic duty, is essential to a fair trial.
Additionally, courts should remain cognizant of the possible prejudicial impact of cumulative errors. A new trial can be ordered due to cumulative error, even without deciding if any individual error constitutes grounds for reversal. See Crawford ex rel. Crawford v. Shop ’N Save Warehouse Foods, Inc., 91 S.W.3d 646, 652 (Mo.App.2002); State v. Cole, 867 S.W.2d 685, 687 (Mo.App.1993); Faught v. Washam, 329 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Mo.1959); but see State v. Gardner, 8 S.W.3d 66, 74 (Mo. banc 1999); State v. Gray, 887 S.W.2d 369, 390 (Mo. banc 1994).
The trial errors limiting Edwards’ voir dire and refusing to give a no-adverse-inference instruction during the penalty phase are troublesome. The law requires that the no-adverse-inference instruction should have been given, and it would have been a simple matter to so instruct the jury and emphasize the importance of not considering Edwards’ decision not to testify in the penalty phase. The objective in a criminal trial is to provide a fair trial and let the jury decide guilt or innocence without subtly stacking the deck against the defendant. Although the errors in this case do not warrant reversal, courts should be mindful of the effect of errors that, while harmless when taken alone, have the cumulative effect of prejudicing the defendant.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9684428. Public record. Not legal advice.