# Cox v. Director of Revenue

> Supreme Court of Missouri · March 4, 2003 · 98 S.W.3d 548

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9684330

## Case

- **Full name:** Steven R. COX, Respondent, v. DIRECTOR OF REVENUE, Appellant
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Missouri
- **Decided:** March 4, 2003
- **Citations:** 98 S.W.3d 548; 2003 Mo. LEXIS 32; 2003 WL 723288
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Wolff
- **Judges:** Duane Benton
- **Cited by:** 65 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9684330

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that although “actual physical control” used to be included as a means of committing driving while intoxicated in Missouri, the legislature has removed this phrase from the DWI statute, leaving only “driving” and “operating” as ways to commit the offense
- concluding that driver’s license was appropriately suspended for operating a vehicle where an individual was sitting behind the steering wheel in a parking lot with the key in the ignition and with the engine running
- holding that police had probable cause to believe that defendant was operating his vehicle where defendant was found sleeping in the driver’s seat of his car with the key in the ignition and the engine running
- holding that "cases interpreting the pre 1996 law[, such as Block and Liebhart,] should not be relied upon to define ‘operating’ because they do not separately define that term”
- discussing the definition of “driving” as used in Chapter 577 of the Missouri Revised Statutes and holding the term encompasses both the concept of “driving” and “operating” a motor vehicle

## Opinion text

MICHAEL A. WOLFF, Judge,
dissenting.
This is a close case and I appreciate the principal opinion’s attempt to clarify the law as to what it means to operate a vehicle. But, on balance, I agree with Judge White’s analysis.
No one wants a person in Cox’s condition to drive. That means it should be lawful for him to get in his car, run the engine for heat or air-conditioning, and stay put. There is a risk to Cox of carbon monoxide poisoning when he opts to sleep in his ear with the engine running. But that hazard is to him only.
The hazard the legislative change appears intended to avoid is the danger to the public of an intoxicated person actually driving a car. The next time an intoxicated person such as Cox is moved to start a *553 car engine for comfort, perhaps he should then crawl into the back seat for his sobering slumber.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9684330. Public record. Not legal advice.