# Verburgt v. Dorner

> Texas Supreme Court · February 13, 1998 · 959 S.W.2d 615

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9683008

## Case

- **Full name:** John VERBURGT, Individually and A/N/F of Thomas Verburgt, Timothy Verburgt and Joseph Verburgt, Petitioners, v. Patricia M. DORNER and the Methodist Mission Home, Respondents
- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** February 13, 1998
- **Citations:** 959 S.W.2d 615; 1997 WL 746421
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Baker
- **Judges:** Spector, Enoch, Baker, Phillips, Gonzalez, Hecht, Owen, Abbott, Hankinson
- **Cited by:** 2,646 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9683008

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that in civil cases, “a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied” when appellant, acting in good faith, files notice of appeal beyond time permitted by Rule 26.1, but within fifteen-day period in which appellant would be entitled to move to extend filing dea…
- stating that a timely notice of appeal is necessary to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction and that, after the period for granting a motion for extension of time under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3 has passed, a party can no longer invoke the appellate court’s jurisdiction
- explaining that for civil cases “a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith” files notice of appeal “within the fifteen-day period in which the appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline”
- holding that “a motion for extension of time is necessarily implied when an appellant acting in good faith” files notice of appeal “within the fifteen-day period in which the appellant would be entitled to move to extend the filing deadline”
- holding that motion for extension of time is implied when a party, acting in good faith, files an instrument to perfect appeal within the fifteen-day period permitted by the predecessor to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 26.3

## Opinion text

BAKER, Justice,
dissenting.
The court of appeals reached the decision required by applying the plain and unambiguous language of Rule 41(a)(2). See Tex. R.App. P. 41(a)(1) and (2); Davies v. Massey, 561 S.W.2d 799, 801 (Tex.1978); Glidden Co. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 Tex. 591 , 291 S.W.2d 315, 318 (1956); see also Miller v. Miller, 848 S.W.2d 344, 345 (Tex.App. —Texarkana 1993, no writ); El Paso Sharky’s Billiard Parlor, Inc. v. Amparan, 831 S.W.2d 3, 5 (Tex.App.—El Paso 1992, writ denied).
The Court’s opinion dispenses with Rule 41(a)(2)’s requirements, and amends the rule by judicial fiat. The Court’s opinion is contrary to its own precedent. See State Dept. of Highways & Public Transportation v. Payne, 838 S.W.2d 235, 241 (Tex.1992)( “[W]e do not revise our rules by opinion.”); Alvarado v. Farah Mfg. Co., 830 S.W.2d 911, 915 (Tex.1992)(same). I would deny the writ 1 . Because the Court decides otherwise, I dissent.
. I also dissent to Verburgt’s companion cases. See Boyd v. American Indem. Co., 958 S.W.2d 379 (Tex.1997); Harlan v. Howe State Bank, 958 S.W.2d 380 (Tex.1997); Holmes v. Home State County Ins., 958 S.W.2d 381 (Tex.1997).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9683008. Public record. Not legal advice.