# Matchett v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · November 6, 1996 · 941 S.W.2d 922

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9682158

## Case

- **Full name:** Farley Charles MATCHETT, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** November 6, 1996
- **Citations:** 941 S.W.2d 922; 1996 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 220; 1996 WL 638228
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Mansfield
- **Judges:** Overstreet, Baird, Mansfield, McCormick, Maloney, Meyers
- **Cited by:** 305 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Overruled on other grounds by Cain v. State, 1997 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 54 (1997).
- Negative treatments: 2
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9682158

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding no error in trial court's overruling objection to admission of victim's widow's testimony that she had been married to the victim for twenty-five years, they had five children, and the victim was home alone on the night of his murder, and also identifying her husband i…
- concluding that victim’s widow’s testimony stating that she had been married to him for twenty-five years, that they had five children together, that he was home alone on night of his murder, and identifying him in photograph with friends was not victim-impact testimony
- holding no error in overruling objection to widow’s testimony that she and the victim had been married for twenty- five years, they had five children, and he was home alone on the night of his murder because such testimony was not victim-impact testimony
- holding no victim-impact testimony where widow identified her husband through a photograph of him with friends and testified she was married to victim 25 years, had five children by him, and that victim was alone the night of his murder
- stating "important factor in determining whether appellant has had a jury trial in a capital murder case is that the jury returned a verdict regarding the special issues under Article 37.071"

## Opinion text

MANSFIELD, Judge,
concurring.
I join the opinion of the Court, but concur with respect to the disposition of point of error number one.
As part of his point of error number one, appellant avers the trial court erred in failing to admonish appellant regarding the possible deportation consequences of a guilty plea. Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, article 26.13(a) provides that prior to accepting a plea of guilty or a plea of nolo contendere, the court shall admonish the defendant of:
(4) the fact that if the defendant is not a citizen of the United States of America, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere for the *944 offense charged may result in deportation, the exclusion from admission to this country, or the denial of naturalization under federal law.
The record shows that appellant was bom on November 19, 1962 in Houston, Texas. He has lived his entire life in Texas except for a brief period of time he spent in the Army. It is thus beyond dispute that appellant is a United States citizen and cannot be deported for any reason unless he renounces his citizenship.
In Morales v. State, 872 S.W.2d 753 (Tex.Crim.App.1994), we held that failure to give the article 26.13(a)(4) admonishment was reversible error, even without a showing of harm. The record in Morales was completely silent as to appellant’s citizenship, however, so it is possible to distinguish Morales from the present case where there is no question that appellant is a United States citizen. It is suggested, in Judge Meyers’ concurring opinion in Morales , that in writing article 26.13(a)(4), the Legislature did not intend to require defendants pleading guilty or nolo contendere to litigate the issue of their citizenship at trial so that trial judges could determine whether the article 26.13(a)(4) admonishment had to be given. Therefore, the Legislature mandated that all such defendants receive the admonishment. Morales, at 755. This interpretation of possible legislative intent is logical, and the article 26.13(a)(4) admonishment must be given in every case where the record is silent as to the defendant’s citizenship, as well as, of course, where the defendant is not a U.S. citizen.
Morales , I submit, does not apply to instances, such as the present case, where the record clearly shows the defendant is a United States citizen. As deportation or other immigration consequences are a legal impossibility with respect to appellant — a U.S. citizen — as a result of his guilty plea, article 26.13(a)(4) is inapplicable.
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) provides a framework for statutory analysis. In Boykin , we held that when we interpret a statute, we seek to effectuate the intent of the Legislature which enacted the legislation. “When attempting to discern this collective legislative intent or purpose, we necessarily focus our attention on the literal text of the statute in question and attempt to discern the fair, objective meaning of that text at the time of its enactment.” Boykin, at 785.
There is, of course, a legitimate exception to this plain meaning rule: where application of a statute’s plain language would lead to absurd consequences that the Legislature could not possibly have intended we should not apply the language literally. When used in the proper manner, this narrow exception to the plain meaning rule does not intrude on the lawmaking powers of the legislative branch, but rather demonstrates respect for that branch, which we assume would not act in an absurd way.
Boykin, at 785.
The Legislature, in writing article 26.13(a)(4), expressed its intent that a defendant, before entering a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, be admonished as to the possible immigration consequences of such a plea, consequences applicable only if the defendant is not a U.S. citizen. Our decision in Morales correctly gave due deference to the Legislature’s intent by holding it is reversible error to fail to give the admonishment where the record is silent as to defendant’s citizenship status.
It would be an absurd result — a result the Legislature could not possibly have intended — to allow a defendant’s conviction on a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to be reversed on appeal for failure to give the article 26.13(a)(4) admonishment where the record conclusively shows defendant is a U.S. citizen and thus the admonishment is legally inapplicable to him. Accordingly, I would hold that it was not error for the trial court to fail to give appellant the article 26.13(a)(4) admonishment because — as a U.S. citizen as demonstrated by the record — the admonishment is legally inapplicable to him.
With these comments, I join the opinion of the Court, but concur with respect to its disposition of point of error number one.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9682158. Public record. Not legal advice.
