# White v. State

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · March 6, 1989 · 298 Ark. 163

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681870

## Case

- **Full name:** Dorsey McRae WHITE v. STATE of Arkansas
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** March 6, 1989
- **Citations:** 298 Ark. 163; 765 S.W.2d 949; 1989 Ark. LEXIS 101
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Holt
- **Judges:** Hickman, Holt, Purtle, Newbern
- **Cited by:** 11 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681870

## Opinion text

Jack Holt, Jr., Chief Justice, dissenting. I do not agree with Justice Purtle that the appellant, Dorsey McRae White, was “entrapped” by law enforcement officials to commit six offenses relating to the sale of marijuana. The defendant was in the drug business and got caught. I do join him, however, in finding that the record is saturated with prejudicial remarks by the prosecutor which were not related to matters of evidence, but were injected into the trial for the obvious purpose of creating prejudice in the minds of the jury. In addition, I feel there is insufficient evidence to convict the defendant on the charge of possession with intent to deliver one-seventh ounce of marijuana since the record is devoid of any proof of intent to deliver.
As noted by Justice Purtle, the conduct of the prosecutor was sufficient to deny the appellant a fair trial. However, I limit my concern to the impact of the prosecutor’s prejudicial remarks to the jury in regard to sentencing of the defendant.
Under our criminal justice system, we call upon the jury to make findings of guilt and to assess punishment in the same proceeding, Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-103 (1987), unless there is an exception which calls for bifurcation. See e.g., Ark. Code Ann. § 5-4-602 (1987) (dealing with capital felony murder cases). In evaluating the remarks made by the prosecutor during the course of the trial, we should view his comments in light of what effect, if any, they may have had upon the jury’s finding of guilt or innocence and also, what effect, if any, they may have had upon the assessment of punishment.
Since the evidence is overwhelming as to the appellant’s overall guilt, except for the sale of one-seventh ounce of marijuana, the comments of the prosecutor, set out in detail in Justice Purtle’s dissent, though prejudicial, should not require us to reverse and remand this case for retrial. However, when I see that the jury assessed the maximum period of confinement on each count of possession of marijuana with intent to deliver, including the charge of possession of one-seventh of an ounce, it is obvious that the remarks of the prosecutor had a telling effect on the jury in assessing punishment.
Although the trial court mitigated the sentences in part by ordering that three of the ten year sentences run concurrently with the other three, I do not feel its actions were sufficient under the circumstances. For this reason, I would order each sentence reduced to the minimum authorized by law. See Dandridge v. State, 292 Ark. 40 , 727 S.W.2d 851 (1987). Cases of prosecutorial abuse should not go untreated.
Newbern, J., joins this dissent.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681870. Public record. Not legal advice.