# Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Byars > Supreme Court of Arkansas · April 27, 1953 · 221 Ark. 845 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681745 ## Case - **Full name:** Arkansas State Highway Commission v. Byars - **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas - **Decided:** April 27, 1953 - **Citations:** 221 Ark. 845; 256 S.W.2d 738 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by McFaddin - **Judges:** Robinson, McFaddin, Holt - **Cited by:** 39 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681745 ## Opinion text Ed. F. McFaddin, Justice (dissenting). I respectfully dissent because — as I see it — the majority opinion of this Court shows that it has invaded the province of the jury. Our Constitution says, in Art. 2, § 7: “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate, and shall extend to all cases at law, without regard to the amount in controversy; . . .” Under this salutary provision, this Court has always held — even in eminent domain proceedings — (a) that the jury’s verdict will not be disturbed on appeal if supported by substantial evidence; and (b) that in viewing tbe evidence — to see if it is substantial — we view it in the light most favorable to the appellee. Texas, etc. Ry. Co. v. Eddy, 42 Ark. 527 ; Springfield, etc. Ry. Co. v. Rhea, 44 Ark. 258 ; Fayetteville, etc. Ry. Co. v. Combs, 51 Ark. 324 , 11 S. W. 418 ; Cloth v. Chicago, etc. Ry. Co., 97 Ark. 86 , 132 S. W. 1005 , Ann. Cas. 1912C, 1115; Stuttgart, etc. Ry. Co. v. Kocourek, 101 Ark. 47 , 141 S. W. 511 ; Griffin v. Searcy County, 150 Ark. 423 , 234 S. W. 270 . Notwithstanding the foregoing well established rules, this,Court, in the present majority opinion, has proceeded to weigh the evidence as though the majority were an appellate jury instead of an appellate court. At least seven witnesses testified as to the value of each condemned tract before the taking and after the taking. The names of these witnesses, their occupations, and the values each gave, are detailed in two paragraphs of the majority opinion, and then immediately follows this paragraph in the majority opinion: ‘ ‘ There is no showing that any of the farm lands involved are suitable for any purpose except the production of livestock and hay. Yet not a single witness, including the owners themselves, gave any testimony whatever as to the number of livestock that the lands will support or the amount of feed that can be grown thereon. In determining the value of a livestock farm, one cannot ignore such material facts and arrive at an intelligent opinion. ’ ’ Thus, the majority acted as a jury in testing the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. And even in acting as a jury, the majority adopted the wrong test for a jury to use: the test of the damages in an eminent domain proceeding is not what the lands are worth for livestock and hay, but the most valuable purpose for which the land can be used. In Ft. Smith, etc. District v. Scott, 103 Ark. 405 , 147 S. W. 440 , we said: “The measure of the owner’s compensation for the land condemned is the market value thereof at the time of the taking for all purposes, comprehending its availability for any use to which it is plainly adapted, as well as the most valuable purpose for which it can be used and will bring most in the market.” Not only did the majority apply the wrong rule for the jury, but the majority also invaded the trial court’s authority. The majority opinion says the witnesses who testified as to the value of the land did not state how much feed the land would grow and how many livestock the land would support. It is “new laiv” for the Supreme Court to pass on such matters. Here is what we have heretofore said regarding the qualifications of witnesses to testify as to values. In Ft. Smith, etc. District v. Scott, supra, we said: “The sole question here was the market value of the land, and the witnesses gave their opinions as to that value, basing them on different facts and reasons in support thereof. It is true, some of them had no knowledge of the sale of lands under like conditions for bridge site purposes, nor information as to the prices realized at such sales, nor were they expert engineers, but all who testified were intelligent men, long familiar with the lands taken and the locality and neighborhood where they were situated, knew their value for some purpose, and in giving their opinion as to the most valuable purpose for which they were adapted and could be used they stated their reasons for so doing. Their knowledge of the facts upon which their opinions were based and the reasons therefor and the value and weight thereof could have been and were ‘readily and satisfactorily tested by cross-examination,’ as said in Texas & St. Louis Rd. v. Kirby, 44 Ark. 103 . “The jury were capable of determining, and it was within their province to determine, the weight that should be accorded to the opinions of the witnesses, and we do not think there was any abuse of the discretion of the trial court in permitting the estimates of the witnesses and the reasons therefor to be submitted to the jury, or that any prejudicial error was committed in the introduction of the testimony. ’ ’ And in McDonough v. Williams, 86 Ark. 600 , 112 S. W. 164 , we said: ‘ ‘ The question whether a witness has shown sufficient knowledge concerning the value of property to give him a definite opinion on the subject is a matter, to some extent, within the sound discretion of the trial judge, and this court will not reverse for alleged error in this respect unless an abuse of such discretion appears. St. Louis, Ark. & Tex. Rd. v. Anderson, 39 Ark. 167 ; 17 Cyc. 30. No abuse of the court’s discretion is shown here.” Here the trial judge held the witnesses to be competent: yet the majority is reweighing all their evidence. I have no desire to prolong this dissent: my purpose is to show that the majority has reversed the jury verdict and thereby substituted the views of the majority for those of the jury on the matter of the weig’ht of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681745. Public record. Not legal advice.