# Carr v. Brasher

> Texas Supreme Court · May 10, 1989 · 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 378

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681256

## Case

- **Full name:** Walter A. CARR and Al Thiel, Petitioners, v. Lynn BRASHER, Respondent
- **Court:** Texas Supreme Court
- **Decided:** May 10, 1989
- **Citations:** 32 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 378; 776 S.W.2d 567; 16 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1942; 1989 Tex. LEXIS 41; 1989 WL 47716
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Ray
- **Judges:** Cook, Gonzalez, Hecht, Mauzy, Phillips, Ray
- **Cited by:** 1,378 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681256

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- holding that defendants’ affidavits and deposition testimony negated actual malice where plaintiff “presented no controverting proof that [the defendants] believed that the statements in question were false or published with reckless disregard for the truth”
- stating that affidavits of defendants in which they stated that they never had any doubts and certainly no serious doubts about the truth of the statements they made were sufficient to support a summary judgment when no controverting proof was submitted
- holding that when trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify ground or grounds relied upon for its ruling, summary judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of theories advanced are meritorious
- holding that, by contrast to false statements of fact injurious to reputation, all assertions of opinion are protected by First Amendment of United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 8 of Texas Constitution
- explaining that when trial court's order granting summary judgment does not specify ground relied upon for its ruling, judgment will be affirmed on appeal if any of theories advanced are meritorious

## Opinion text

RAY, Justice,
dissenting.
I dissent in this cause for the same reason as expressed in my dissenting opinion delivered today in Casso v. Brand, 776 S.W.2d 551 (Tex.1989). As in Casso , I feel that if the majority insists on overturning established Texas summary judgment law, the very least it could do is to remand for a new trial in the interest of justice.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9681256. Public record. Not legal advice.