# Adkins v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · November 23, 1988 · 764 S.W.2d 782

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9679533

## Case

- **Full name:** Sammy Joe ADKINS, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** November 23, 1988
- **Citations:** 764 S.W.2d 782; 1988 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 268; 1988 WL 124555
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Clinton
- **Judges:** Davis, Clinton, Teague, Miller, White, Campbell, Duncan
- **Cited by:** 94 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9679533

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that an officer has probable cause to arrest when “at that moment the facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge and of which (he) had reasonably trustworthy information were sufficient to warrant a prudent man in believing that the arrested person had comm…
- holding that art. 14.01 arrests have previously been sanctioned when an individual's conduct, while not overtly criminal by itself, is coupled with an officer's prior knowledge so that the otherwise innocuous conduct reflects that an offense is then occurring

## Opinion text

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
Once again a majority demonstrates it is bound and determined to keep the law to its liking. See, e.g., Beets v. State, (Tex.Cr.App. No. 69,583, delivered September 21, 1988). I dissent.
Considering this cause in one context the Court professes to protect against “another excision of the Fourth Amendment protection against unreasonable searches,” Adkins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 363, at 366 (Tex.Cr.App.1986).
But when it comes to one of our own statutes restricting authority of a peace officer to make a warrantless arrest — and thus a search incident thereto — “when the offense is committed in his presence or within his view,” Article 14.01, V.A.C.C.P., for the clear statutory requisite that an offense actually be “COMMITTED,” the majority substitutes “PROBABLE CAUSE” to believe an offense is being or has been committed, thereby itself making yet “another excision” of protection against warrantless arrests and incidental searches.
To still another judicial assault on plainly expressed will of the Legislature, I dissent.
CAMPBELL and DUNCAN, JJ., join in this opinion.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9679533. Public record. Not legal advice.
