# Roberts v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · April 18, 2007 · 220 S.W.3d 521

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9678200

## Case

- **Full name:** Donnie Lee ROBERTS, Jr., Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** April 18, 2007
- **Citations:** 220 S.W.3d 521; 2007 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 429; 2007 WL 1135647
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Meyers
- **Judges:** Keller, Womack, Keasler, Hervey, Holcomb, Cochran, Meyers, Price, Johnson
- **Cited by:** 846 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9678200

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- stating that a party has an obligation to make appropriate citations to the record in support of his argument, and an appellant procedurally defaults error by failing to include a matter in the record necessary to evaluate his claim
- stating that the defendant’s attack on victim impact testimony in general, advanced before any testimony was heard, did not place the trial court on notice that the defendant would find particular testimony objectionable
- finding that an attack on testimony in general, advanced before any testimony was heard, did not place the trial court on notice that the appellant would find particular testimony objectionable
- holding that testimony in sentencing phase of trial by victim of extraneous robbery who described how robbery emotionally affected her is not victim impact evidence
- finding no error in the admission of testimony from the victim of a previous crime because “ ‘[vjictim impact’ evidence is evidence of the effect of an offense on people other than the victim”

## Opinion text

MEYERS, J.,
dissenting,
in which PRICE and JOHNSON, JJ., joined.
In point of error seven, the majority says that Cantu v. State, 939 S.W.2d 627 *536 (Tex.Crim.App.1996), does not apply to appellant’s situation. Because the evidence in question was presented by the victim of an extraneous offense and because the testimony related to the impact that offense had on her life, the majority concludes that it is not victim-impact evidence.
I agree that this evidence is distinguishable from the evidence presented in Cantu . The evidence relating to the extraneous offense in Cantu was presented by the victim’s mother whereas in this case, the evidence was presented by the victim of the extraneous offense herself. And, in Cantu , the victim’s mother testified about how the crime impacted their family and about what kind of person the victim was, while here, the victim of the extraneous offense testified about how the prior offense affected her own life. We stated in Cantu :
The danger of unfair prejudice to a defendant inherent in the introduction of “victim impact” evidence with respect to a victim not named in the indictment on which he is being tried is unacceptably high. The admission of such evidence would open the door to admission of victim impact evidence arising from any extraneous offense committed by a defendant. Extraneous victim impact evidence, if anything, is more prejudicial than the non-extraneous victim impact evidence found by this Court to be inad-missable in Smith [v. State, 919 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)]. We hold that such evidence is irrelevant under Tex. R. Crim. Evid. 401 and therefore irrelevant in the context of the special issues under Art. 37.071.
939 S.W.2d at 637 .
In the case before us, the majority seems to imply that when the mother of a victim of an extraneous offense testifies about the impact a crime had on her family, then that testimony is inadmissible extraneous victim-impact evidence under Cantu . But, when the victim herself testifies about how an extraneous offense affected her own life, it is admissible. However, it should not matter who presented the evidence. Even if we choose not to call evidence presented by the victim of an extraneous offense “victim-impact evidence,” the evidence is still equally prejudicial and should be inadmissible.
While the extraneous offense itself may have been admissible, the effect that the extraneous offense had on the victim of that crime or her family was irrelevant to the matter of future dangerousness. The majority should focus on the real issue in this case-that the evidence is irrelevant and inadmissible-not whether it was “victim-impact evidence” presented by the family of the victim.
Like the evidence in Cantu , this testimony regarding the impact of an extraneous offense was unfairly prejudicial and was not relevant to the special issues. Because it was not relevant to the sentence, the testimony was inadmissible under Rule of Evidence 402. And, unless we can determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the testimony did not contribute to the death sentence, we cannot say that the presentation of this inadmissible testimony was harmless. Therefore, U respectfully dissent.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9678200. Public record. Not legal advice.