# Doe v. Central Arkansas Transit > Court of Appeals of Arkansas · June 28, 1995 · 50 Ark. App. 132 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9677473 ## Case - **Full name:** Jane DOE; Local No. 704 of the Amalgamated Transit Union; Paul Mathews, President, Et Al. v. CENTRAL ARKANSAS TRANSIT - **Court:** Court of Appeals of Arkansas - **Decided:** June 28, 1995 - **Citations:** 50 Ark. App. 132; 900 S.W.2d 582; 149 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2899; 1995 Ark. App. LEXIS 369 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Concurrence by Rogers - **Judges:** Mayfield, Rogers, Pittman - **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9677473 ## Opinion text Judith Rogers, Judge, concurring. I concur with the majority decision because I believe the chancellor’s act of vacating the award violated an important and recognized public policy of the state of Arkansas which favors arbitration as an alternative method of resolving disputes. In Arkansas, arbitration is strongly favored by public policy and is looked upon with approval by courts as a less expensive and expeditious means of settling litigation and relieving congestion of court dockets. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Deislinger, 289 Ark. 248, 251 , 711 S.W.2d 771 (1986). After entering into an agreement to arbitrate a dispute, the parties have a moral and legal duty to abide by the award in the absence of a valid reason not to do so; simply being dissatisfied with the results is not a good reason to set aside the award. Id. Judicial review of an arbitration award is more limited than appellate review of a trial court’s decision; whenever possible, a court must construe an award so as to uphold its validity. Chrobak v. Edward D. Jones & Company, 46 Ark. App. 105, 109 , 878 S.W.2d 760 (1994). Every reasonable presumption is in favor of the award, and it should not be vacated unless it clearly appears that it was made without authority or was the result of fraud or mistake, or of misfeasance or malfeasance. Id.; Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Boon, 76 Ark. 153, 157 , 88 S.W. 915 (1905). Accord Kirten v. Spears, 44 Ark. 166, 173 (1884). The United States Supreme Court recognized the courts’ limited role in reviewing arbitration decisions in United Paper-workers International Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987). There, the Court stated that, if courts had the final say on the merits of arbitration awards, the federal policy of settling labor disputes by arbitration would be undermined. The Court also stated: The arbitrator may not ignore the plain language of the contract; but the parties having authorized the arbitrator to give meaning to the language of the agreement, a court should not reject an award on the ground that the arbitrator misread the contract. . . . [T]he arbitrator’s award settling a dispute with respect to the interpretation or application of a labor agreement must draw its essence from the contract and cannot simply reflect the arbitrator’s own notions of industrial justice. But as long as the arbitrator is even arguably construing or applying the contract and acting within the scope of his authority, that a court is convinced he committed serious error does not suffice to overturn his decision. 484 U.S. at 38 . It is clear that the public policy of the state of Arkansas favoring the enforcement of arbitration awards is as strong as that policy recognized by the federal courts. In accordance with this public policy, which limits the courts’ scope of review of arbitration awards, I agree with the majority that the chancellor’s decision must be reversed. I must also stress that I have no doubt that the public policy of this state requires or should require that all bus drivers for agencies providing public transportation not be under the influence of cocaine while at work. I also believe that the safety of the public requires employers’ policies to forbid the drivers’ use of cocaine at any time, even while off duty, if there is even a remote chance that the drug might remain in the drivers’ systems long enough to affect their driving. If there is such a public policy, I believe appellee failed to adequately demonstrate it. At trial, appellee bore the burden of establishing this public policy by reference to the laws and legal precedents, and not from general considerations of supposed public interests. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFL-CIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. at 44 . If appellee had supplied sufficient evidence of a clearly-defined public policy on this issue, then our question on review would be more clearly delineated and we would be faced more clearly with competing public policies. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9677473. Public record. Not legal advice.