# Brown v. Jones

> Michigan Court of Appeals · June 21, 1993 · 200 Mich. App. 212

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9677459

## Case

- **Full name:** Brown v. Jones
- **Court:** Michigan Court of Appeals
- **Decided:** June 21, 1993
- **Citations:** 200 Mich. App. 212; 503 N.W.2d 735
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Connor
- **Judges:** Connor, MacKenzie, Griffin, Con-Nor
- **Cited by:** 8 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9677459

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding where no special relationship exists, passengers did not owe a duty to plaintiff to protect her from the driver

## Opinion text

Connor, J.
(dissenting in part). I would find that error occurred in the lower court by the granting of these three defendants’ motions for summary disposition of plaintiffs cause of action under § 33 of the Liquor Control Act, MCL 436.33; MSA 18.1004.
The Supreme Court held in Longstreth v Gensel, 423 Mich 675 ; 377 NW2d 804 (1985), that the act "involves the public health, safety, and morals,” id. at 683 , and "any person who violates its terms is guilty of a misdemeanor,” id. at 685 . The Court made it clear that the specific provisions within the act should be broadly construed, including the definitions of terms used in the act. Id. at 683 .
It was held in the lower court that § 33 did not *220 apply to minors who furnish alcohol to other minors. Although this finding was not addressed by the majority opinion, it is clearly erroneous in light of Longstreth . The Supreme Court held that the act was meant to apply to any and all persons who violate its terms. Id. at 683 . Clearly, an individual under the age of twenty-one fits within this broad definition.
It was also found in the lower court, and the majority opinion agrees, that the minor defendants did not "furnish” alcohol within the meaning of that term as used in the statute. I believe this finding is also clearly erroneous.
Under the act, the term "sale” is defined as including "exchange, barter or traffic, or the furnishing or giving away of any alcoholic liquor.” Id. at 683 (emphasis added); see MCL 436.2n; MSA 18.972(14). All persons who furnish or give alcohol to minors are subject to liability for resulting harm.
According to the evidence, the minor defendants formed a joint venture to purchase alcoholic beverages. In effect, each furnished alcohol to the others, and did so illegally, because all were minors. Furthermore, each minor defendant aided and abetted the adult defendant Lyle in the commission of a misdemeanor by contributing a portion of the total amount necessary to purchase the liquor, in violation of the statute. By obtaining alcoholic beverages and sharing it among themselves, the minors were civil conspirators in violation of the act. If the trier of fact is satisfied from the evidence that the accident was proximately caused by a diminution in Burton’s physical faculties by reason of alcohol consumption to which each minor defendant contributed, each could be held liable for plaintiff’s injuries, and the purpose of the statute would be served.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9677459. Public record. Not legal advice.