# Morf v. Ingels

> District Court, S.D. California · May 5, 1936 · 14 F. Supp. 922

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9675260

## Case

- **Full name:** MORF v. INGELS, Director of Motor Vehicle Department of California, Et Al.
- **Court:** District Court, S.D. California
- **Decided:** May 5, 1936
- **Citations:** 14 F. Supp. 922; 1936 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1414
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Yankwich
- **Judges:** Mathews, Stephens, Yankwich
- **Cited by:** 7 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9675260

## Opinion text

YANKWICH, District Judge.
I dissent.
The main opinion admits that caravaning of automobiles from other states to California has become so extensive as to create a problem. But it denies validity to the California Caravan Act (Statutes of 1935, c. 402, p. 1453, California Vehicle Code, pp. 174-176) for three reasons: (1) That the classification is arbitrary, in that it does not apply to what is strictly speaking caravaning, i. e., fleet movements of cars on their own wheels, but includes a single car transported from without the state of California (as the enactment provides) “on its own wheels, or in tow of another motor vehicle * * * for sale” (St.Cal.1935, p. 1453, § 1); (2) that it is, in reality,- a protective tariff against automobiles transported for sale from without the state of California, and thus violative of the commerce clause of the Constitution of the United States (Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 8) ; and (3) that the amount of the fee charged for each caravaned automobile is excessive and arbitrary and has no relation to the cost of the added burden upon the state traffic, which might justify the regulation, and is thus violative of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution. Constitution of the United States, Fourteenth Amendment, § 1. Because of the importance of the matter, I state the reasons for my dissent fully. Of necessity, the questions are interrelated. So to a certain extent the principles involved must be treated together.
The power of the Congress to regulate commerce between the states is exclusive and plenary, and is not subject to any state restrictions, burdens, or limitations. Gibbons v. Ogden (1825) 9 Wheat. 1, 70 , 6 L.Ed. 23 ; Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. United States (1933) 289 U.S. 48 , 53 S.Ct. 509 , 77 L.Ed. 1025 . No state may, through the exercise of the taxing or police powers, establish an economic barrier between the states. Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc. (1935) 294 U.S. 511 , 55 S.Ct. 497 , 79 L.Ed. 1032 , 101 A.L.R. 55 ; Bingaman v. Golden Eagle Western Lines, Inc. (1936) 56 S.Ct. 624 , 80 L.Ed. -. However, a state may, in the exercise of its reserved power to regulate intrastate commerce, adopt measures and regulations which affect interstate commerce indirectly and incidentally only, or the persons engaged in it. If such regulations do not impede the free flow of commerce, they will be given validity. See Boston & Maine Railroad v. Armburg (1932) 285 U.S. 234 , 52 S.Ct. 336 , 76 L.Ed. 729 ; Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama (1935) 296 U.S. 261 , 56 S.Ct. 194 , 80 L.Ed. -. So statutes which impose a charge for the use of the highways and facilities of a state by residents of other states or interstate carriers have been sustained. The limits of the exercise of this power have been stated by Mr. Justice Brandéis in Interstate Transit v. Lindsey (1931) 283 U.S. 183, 185 , 51 S.Ct. 380, 381 , 75 L.Ed. 953 :
“While a state may not lay a tax on the privilege of engaging in interstate commerce, Sprout v. South Bend, 277 U.S. 163 , 48 S.Ct. 502 , 72 L.Ed. 833 , 62 A.L.R. 45 , it may impose even upon motor vehicles engaged exclusively in interstate commerce a charge, as compensation for the use of the public highways, which is a fair contribution to the cost of constructing and maintaining them and of regulating the traffic thereon. Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160, 168, 169 , 37 S.Ct. 30 , 61 L.Ed. 222 [227, 228]; Clark v. Poor, 274 U.S. 554 , 47 S.Ct. 702 , 71 L.Ed. 1199 ; Sprout v. South Bend, supra, 277 U.S. [163], 169, 170, 48 S.Ct. 502 [ 72 L.Ed. 833, 836, 837 , 62 A.L.R. 45 ]. As such a charge is a direct burden on interstate commerce, the tax cannot be sustained unless it appears affirmatively, in some way, that .it is levied only as convpensation for iise of the highways or to defray the expense of regulating motor traffic. This may be indicated by the nature of the imposition, such as a mileage tax directly proportioned to the use, Interstate Busses Corp. v. Blodgett, 276 U.S. 245 , 48 S.Ct. 230 , 72 L.Ed. 551 , or by the express allocation of the proceeds of *929 the tax to highway purposes, as in Clark v. Poor, supra [ 274 U.S. 554 , 47 S.Ct. 702 , 71 L.Ed. 1199 ], or otherwise. Where it is shown that the tax is so imposed, it will be sustained unless the taxpayer shows that it bears no reasonable relation to the privilege of using the highways or is discriminatory." (Italics added.)
Some cases intimate that the tax is considered as mere compensation for the damage done to the roads by the driving of automobiles and is based primarily upon the amount of destruction caused by them. Kane v. State of New Jersey (1911) 81 N.J.Law, 594 , 80 A. 453 , L.R.A.1917B, 553, Ann.Cas.1912D, 237. Notwithstanding this, courts have left it to the Legislatures of the various states to determine the form which the exaction should take. Thus (even in the case of interstate commerce carriers) it may take the form of a fee (Kane v. State of New Jersey [1916] 242 U.S. 160 , 37 S.Ct. 30 , 61 L.Ed. 222 ) or of a mileage tax, despite the fact that by the law of the particular state carriers of intrastate commerce are taxed upon the basis of gross receipts. See Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett (1928) 276 U.S. 245 , 48 S.Ct. 230 , 72 L.Ed. 551 . Nor does the fact that such a tax imposed directly upon an interstate carrier may be in addition to an annual license fee demanded of all persons using automobiles make the fee a discriminatory exaction violative of the commerce clause. See Clark v. Poor (1927) 274 U.S. 554 , 47 S.Ct. 702 , 71 L.Ed. 1199 ; Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, supra; American Motor Coach System v. City of Philadelphia (C.C.A.3, 1928) 28 F.(2d) 736 ; Liberty Highway Company v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission (D.C.1923) 294 F. 703 . Indicative of the recent trend of the Supreme Court to sustain local impositions or regulations despite their incidental effect upon interstate commerce is Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama (1935) 296 U.S. 261 , 56 S.Ct. 194, 197 , 80 L.Ed. -. Despite the constitutional inhibition against the laying of duties on tonnage by the states (Constitution of the United States, art. 1, § 10, cl. 3), the court there sustained a flat harbor fee of $7.50 for vessels of 500 tons and over entering the harbor at Mobile, saying: “And charges levied by state authority to defray the cost of regulation or of facilities afforded in aid of interstate or foreign commerce have consistently been held to be permissible.” Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, supra, 296 U.S. 261 , at page 267, 56 S.Ct. 194 , 80 L.Ed. —
In the realm of control of highways, the basis and limit of allowable legislative power is given in Clark v. Poor, supra, 274 U.S. 554 , at page 557, 47 S.Ct. 702, 703 , 71 L.Ed. 1199 :
“The highways are public property. Users of them> although engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, are subject to regtilation by the state to ensure safety and convenience and the conservation of the highways. Morris v. Duby (No. 372), 274 U.S. 135 , 47 S.Ct. 548 , 71 L.Ed. 966 , decided April 18, 1927; Hess v. Pawloski (No. 263), 274 U.S. 352 [353], 47 S.Ct. 632 , 71 L.Ed. 1091 , decided May 16, 1927. Users of them, although engaged exclusively in interstate commerce, may be required to contribute to their cost and upkeep. Common carriers for hire, who make the highways their place of business, may properly be charged an extra tax for such use. Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 , 35 S.Ct. 140 , 59 L.Ed. 385 ; Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 , 37 S.Ct. 30 , 61 L.Ed. 222 . Compare Packard v. Banton, 264 U.S. 140, 144 , 44 S.Ct. 257 , 68 L.Ed. 596 .
“There is no suggestion that the tax discriminates against interstate commerce. Nor is it suggested that the tax is so large as to obstruct interstate commerce. It is said that all of the tax is not used for maintenance and repair of the highways; that some of it is used for defraying the expenses of the commission in the administration or enforcement of the act, and some for other purposes. This, if true, is immaterial. Since the tax is assessed for a proper purpose and is not objectionable in amount, the use to which the proceeds are put is not a matter which concerns the plaintiffs." (Italics added.)
Similar language is found in Liberty Highway Company v. Michigan Public Utilities Commission, supra, 294 F. 703 , at page 708. In the light of these principles, the imposition of a license tax for the use of the highways of California for caravaning purposes, as defined in the act, is not a restriction upon interstate commerce. The act does not attempt to regulate the sale of automobiles from outside of the state or to impose restrictions upon the manner of their sale—restrictions of the type which Judge Wilbuf, *930 Judge Stephens, and the writer declared invalid in Asher & Ponder v. Ingels (D.C. 1936) 13 F.Supp. 654 . Nor is it an attempt to compel the acquisition of a license for carrying on an interstate business. It is true that caravaning of automobiles within the state is not prohibited. But there is no evidence before us to justify the conclusion that the practice obtains to any considerable degree in any case except in the case of automobiles originating outside of the state. And, even if it were shown that caravaning is carried on, without restriction, with automobiles originating within the state, I do not think that the enactment would, for that reason alone, be invalid. We would merely have a case of a special restriction applicable to persons who seek to make the highways of the state the locale for carrying on business enterprises and no more unconstitutionally objectionable than the additional exactions sustained in Clark v. Poor, supra, and Interstate Busses Corporation v. Blodgett, supra. The more so as the act specifically provides (in section 5 of St.Cal.1935, p. 1454) that the fee shall be in lieu of all other registration fees and license fees for the use of the public highways during the 90-day period for which the permits are granted. Clearly a state may, without violating the interstate commerce clause, exact a fee for the use of its highways for commercial purposes by owners 'of automobiles originating outside of the state in lieu of other exactions which it imposes upon automobiles within the state.
Nor is there, to my mind, any arbitrariness violative of due process involved in the size of the fee.
The cases in which the size of a fee has been held unreasonable have been cases in which the fee demanded was so out of proportion to the avowed purpose for which it was being collected as to shock, as was the case in Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, supra, and Prouty v. Coyne (D.C.S.D.1932) 55 F.(2d) 289 ; and see Young’s Market Co. v. State Board of Equalization (D.C.Cal.1935) 12 F.Supp. 140 , 1 and it was clear to the court that the enactments were, in reality, revenue statutes aiming to tax the right to carry on interstate business. But these very cases speak for the validity of a reasonable exaction, without requiring demonstration that the amount is just what is necessary to compensate the state for the use and upkeep of the highways. See Gundling v. Chicago (1900) 177 U.S. 183 , 20 S.Ct. 633 , 44 L.Ed. 725 . As is said in Interstate Transit v. Lindsey, supra, 283 U.S. 183 , at page 190, 51 S.Ct. 380, 382 , 75 L.Ed. 953 : “Being free to levy occupation taxes, states may tax the privilege of doing an intrastate bus business without regard to whether the charge imposed represents merely a fair compensation for the use of their highways." (Italics added.)
The services of the state in allowing its highways to be used and in policing them are none the less a service which benefits all (including the plaintiff), because, in certain instances, the benefit may be greater to other persons than to him. See Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, supra, 296 U.S. 261 , 56 S.Ct. 194 , 80 L.Ed. -; Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Georgia Commission (1935) 295 U.S. 285 , 55 S.Ct. 709 , 79 L.Ed. 1439 . Few cases exist where the exercise of valid power has been nullified by the mere excessiveness of an impost. As said in A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton (1934) 292 U.S. 40 , at page 47, 54 S.Ct. 599, 602 , 78 L.Ed. 1109 : “If the tax imposed had been 5 cents instead of 15 cents per pound, no one, probably, would have thought of challenging its constitutionality or of suggesting that under the guise of imposing a tax another and different power had in fact been exercised. If a contrary conclusion were reached in the present case, it could rest upon nothing more than the single premise that the amount of the tax is so excessive that it will bring about the destruction of appellant 1 s business, a premise which, standing alone, this court heretofore has uniformly rejected as furnishing no juridicial ground for striking down a taxing act.” (Italics added.)
In dealing with the subject of classification, in the exercise of the police power, it is well to bear in mind that it is impossible to achieve absolute equality. Nor is such equality necessary in order to insure constitutional validity under the due process and equal protection of law clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution. As said by Mr. Justice Holmes, in Patsone v. Pennsylvania (1914) 232 U.S. 138 , 34 S.Ct. 281, 282 , 58 L.Ed. 539 , in an oft-quoted passage: “A lack of abstract symmetry does not matter. *931 The question is a practical one, dependent upon experience. The demand for symmetry ignores the specific difference that experience is supposed to have shown to mark the class. It is not enough to invalidate the law that others may do the same thing cmd go unpunished, if, as a matter of fact, it is found that the danger is characteristic of the class named.” (Italics added.)
See, also, Radice v. New York (1924) 264 U.S. 292 , 44 S.Ct. 325 , 68 L.Ed. 690 ; McCrary v. United States (1904) 195 U.S. 27 , 24 S.Ct. 769 , 49 L.Ed. 78 , 1 Ann.Cas. 561; Rast v. Van Deman & Lewis Co. (1916) 240 U.S. 342, 343, 357 , 36 S.Ct. 370 , 60 L.Ed. 679 , L.R.A.1917A, 421, Ann. Cas.l917B, 455; Miller v. Wilson (1915) 236 U.S. 373, 383 , 35 S.Ct. 342 , 59 L.Ed. 628 , L.R.A.1915F, 829; Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co. (1922) 260 U.S. 245 , 43 S.Ct. 83 , 67 L.Ed. 237 ; Quaker City Cab Company v. Pennsylvania (1928) 277 U.S. 389 , 48 S.Ct. 553 , 72 L.Ed. 927 ; People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman (1928) 278 U.S. 63, 64 , 49 S.Ct. 61 , 73 L.Ed. 184 , 62 A.L.R. 785 ; Fox v. Standard Oil Company (1935) 294 U.S. 87 , 55 S.Ct. 333 , 79 L.Ed. 780 ; A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton (1934) 292 U.S. 40 , 54 S.Ct. 599 , 78 L.Ed. 1109 ; In re Miller (1912) 162 Cal. 687 , 124 P. 427 ; Miller v. Board of Public-Works (1925) 195 Cal. 477 , 234 P. 381 , 38 A.L.R. 1479 ; Graham v. Kingwell (1933) 218 Cal. 658 , 24 P.(2d) 488. These cases show that, in interpreting the exercise of the police or taxing powers, courts have not sought to bind legislative bodies to an abstract or unrealizable ideal of equality. They have insisted merely that there be a reasonable foundation for the classification. When satisfied of its existence, they have sustained it. See St. Louis R. Co. v. Paul (1899) 173 U.S. 404 , 19 S.Ct. 419 , 43 L.Ed. 746 ; Petit v. Minnesota (1900) 177 U.S. 164, 168 , 20 S.Ct. 666 , 44 L.Ed. 716 ; Williams v. Fears (1900) 179 U.S. 270, 275 , 21 S.Ct. 128 , 45 L.Ed. 186 ; Knoxville Iron Co. v. Harbison (1901) 183 U.S. 13, 14 , 22 S.Ct. 1 , 46 L.Ed. 55 ; Bosley v. McLaughlin (1915) 236 U.S. 385 , 35 S.Ct. 345 , 59 L.Ed. 632 ; Gregg Dyeing Co. v. Query (1932) 286 U.S. 472 , 52 S.Ct. 631 , 76 L.Ed. 1232 , 84 A.L.R. 831 ; Hicklin v. Coney (1933) 290 U.S. 169 , 54 S.Ct. 142 , 78 L.Ed. 247 ; Nebbia v. New York (1935) 291 U.S. 502 , 54 S.Ct. 505 , 78 L.Ed. 940 , 89 A.L.R.
1469; Borden’s Farm Products v. Ten Eyck (1936) 56 S.Ct. 453 , 80 L.Ed. -. A study of these and other cases warrants the following conclusion: If a Legislature may, for regulatory purposes, distinguish between barbershop employment and other kinds of labor (Petit v. Minnesota, supra), or between “immigrant agents” engaged in hiring labbrers to be employed beyond the limits of a state and persons engaged in the business of hiring for labor within the state (Williams v. Fears, supra), or exclude chambermaids in rooming and lodging houses or women performers in certain places from the provisions of laws regulating the hours of labor of women (Miller v. Wilson, supra; Radice v. New York, supra; In re Miller, supra), or regulate the hours of labor of pharmacists and student nurses and exclude graduate nurses (Bosley v. McLaughlin, supra), or the manner of payment of wages of employees in certain industries only (St. Louis R. Co. v. Paul, supra), if a product, like oleomargarine, may be selected for special taxation so as to discourage its use, in favor of butter (A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, supra), if a Legislature may require disclosure of the by-laws and membership of one group of oath-requiring associations (like the 'Ku-Klux Klan), and not require it of others (like labor unions or other fraternal organizations) (People of State of New York ex rel. Bryant v. ' Zimmerman, supra), if an automobile licensing and tax' scheme may exclude- automobiles of farmers or others from the exaction (Aero, Mayflower Transit Company v. Georgia Commission [1935] 295 U.S. 285 , 55 S.Ct. 709 , 79 L.Ed. 1439 ; Hicklin v. Coney, supra), if, in the enforcement of an industrial regulatory measure, an administrative body may apply different rules as to price as between well-advertised dealers and independents, giving a differential to one group and not to the other (Borden’s Farm Products v. Ten Eyck, supra), a classification which, so far as known, includes the whole class, should not be stricken down, merely because of the possibility that it might result in inequality in some individual case. There is no evidence in the record that there is any caravaning within the state. And, while it is true that, occasionally, a car may be moved on its own wheels for the purpose of sale within the state, this fact does not militate against the valid *932 ity of the classification. Such car, of necessity, would have a California registration and would be moved by employees of the owner or of the buyer and would present none of the dangers of out-of-state transportation. So we have a reasonable factual basis for the classification. See Piper v. Bingaman (D.C.N.M. 1935) 12 F.Supp. 755 .
“Of course, the mere fact of classification is not enough to put a statute beyond the reach of the equality provision of the Fourteenth Amendment. Such classification must not be ‘purely arbitrary, oppressive or capricious.’ American Sugar Refining Co. v. Louisiana, 179 U.S. 89, 92 , 21 S.Ct. 43 , 45 L.Ed. 102 . But the mere production of inequality is not enough. Every selection of persons for regulation so results, in some degree. The inequality produced, in order to encounter the challenge of the Constitution, must be ‘actually and palpably unreasonable and arbitrary.’ Arkansas Natural Gas Co. v. Arkansas Railroad Commission, 261 U.S. 379, 384 , 43 S.Ct. 387 , 67 L.Ed. 705 , and cases cited.” Radice v. New York, supra, 264 U.S. 292 , at page 296, 44 S.Ct. 325, 327 , 68 L.Ed. 690 . (Italics added.)
In assaying the classification under discussion, it is well to advert to some of the facts testified to at the hearing which were also before the legislators during the deliberations on the bill. The practice has grown 'up in the last few years of moving automobiles on their own wheels over the public highways of California to their place of sale. The movement is accomplished by fleets of cars of from eight to thirty or more cars, most of them joined in tandem with two cars driven by one driver. California is a large state with great distances. The caravaning of automobiles has increased traffic hazards and resulted in many law violations and abuses. The abuses were found to exist only among persons who moved cars on their own wheels from without the state for the purpose of sale. To particularize the conditions and some of the abuses: The automobiles are moved in fleets by the tandem-towing method. Usually, there is no taillight on the towed car. The control of the two cars comes from the brakes of the first car. So the towed car may swing or skid or fail to follow the towed car on curves. The driver of the towing car has- no clear back vision. The movement in fleets makes it difficult to pass caravans moving on the highway. When, as one officer testified, there is trouble and the- caravan is halted, a traffic hazard arises. Many stolen and cars with fraudulent registrations are brought in in this manner. The type of drivers employed complicates the problem. They are usually persons without any permanent residence or visible means of support, driving the car, not as an occupation, but merely for the purpose of obtaining transportation to California. They do not know the traffic laws of California. Conformance means nothing to them, because, once the state is reached, their objective has been attained—the El Dorado has been reached. Because these persons have no permanent residence, giving them a summons to appear means nothing. In many instances, as the testimony showed, the persons cannot later be found. The only other alternative, that of arresting them for violation, makes confusion worse confounded. The officer must leave his place on the highway and take the offender before a magistrate. They drive long hours. Many of them have no places to sleep other than in the cars. They become fatigued and careless. All these facts are very important factors in the happening of accidents. Many of the cars so moved have foreign license plates. Without the Caravan Act, they could move over the highways of the state without registration and without identification. These facts present a serious evil with which the California Legislature sought to deal. The evil was of recent origin. There were no legislative precedents for any other method of combating it. The Legislature sought to remedy it by making a charge for the use of its highways for commercial purposes by persons caravaning automobiles. It defined caravaning as “the transportation from without the State of any motor vehicle operated on its own wheels, or in tow of another motor vehicle, for the purpose of selling or offering the same for sale to or by any agent, dealer, manufacturers’ representative, purchaser or prospective purchaser, whether such agent, dealer, manufacturers’ representative, purchaser or prospective purchaser may be located within or without this State.” Section 1, Statutes 1935, c. 402, p. 1453, California Vehicle Code (1935), pp. 174, 175. Had the Legislature sought to exclude single cars op *933 erated ■ on their own wheels or units of one towed car, and confined the enactment to fleets of cars, such a classification might have been more difficult to defend than the present one. This because it might have been shown that all these cars originating out of the state caused the same difficulties, irrespective of the size of the caravan. So the Legislature included the whole class which experience had shown brought on the particular evil.
Ours is the duty to stay arbitrary action in the realm of legislation. This duty, however, we must perform in the light of the doctrine laid down by Mr. Justice Roberts in Borden’s Farm Products v. Ten Eyck, supra, 56 S.Ct. 453, 456 , 80 L.Ed. -: “Judicial inquiry does not concern itself with the accuracy of the legislative finding, but only with the question whether it so lacks any reasonable basis as to be arbitrary.” (Italics added.)
In dealing with the exercise of the police power, fairly debatable questions as to “its reasonableness, wisdom, and propriety are not for the determination of courts.” Standard Oil Company v. Marysville (1929) 279 U.S. 582 , at page 584, 49 S.Ct. 430 , 73 L.Ed. 856 . Granted that the operation of the enactment may work to the advantage of the dealers in secondhand automobiles who purchase automobiles within the state, it is not a constitutional objection to the exercise of the police power of a state that it may foster the development of one form of business and restrict another. Fox v. Standard Oil Co. (1935) 294 U.S. 87 , 55 S.Ct. 333 , 79 L.Ed. 780 ; Sproles v. Binford (1932) 286 U.S. 374 , 52 S.Ct. 581 , 76 L.Ed. 1167 ; Aero Mayflower Interstate Co. v. Georgia Commission, supra; Hicklin v. Coney, supra.
To my way of thinking, the act contains no discrimination between interstate and intrastate commerce; nor between persons engaged in the same business and operating the same or similar types of vehicles. The act aims to cover only one group shown to exist—a group residing within the state, endeavoring to use the highways of the state for the purpose of caravaning vehicles originating out of the state for sale. There is no evidence to show there are any caravans originating within the state operating either between various points within the state or going out of the state. The only caravaning within the state testified to at the trial was caravaning of automobiles originating outside of the state, in their course, between various points within the state, to their destination. The fee charged is a flat fee, and its size is not such as to warrant the conclusion that it is unreasonable. I am thus unable to see in the enactment the violation of either the commerce or the due process or equal protection clauses of the United States Constitution.
Hence my dissent from my brethren.
The Supreme Court has granted a hearing in the ease. 56 S.Ct. 751 , 80 L. Ed. —.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9675260. Public record. Not legal advice.