# Safferstone v. Tucker > Supreme Court of Arkansas · May 14, 1962 · 235 Ark. 70 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9674625 ## Case - **Full name:** Safferstone v. Tucker - **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas - **Decided:** May 14, 1962 - **Citations:** 235 Ark. 70; 357 S.W.2d 3; 1962 Ark. LEXIS 536 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Johnson - **Judges:** Bohlinger, Johnson, Robinson - **Cited by:** 62 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9674625 ## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction) - stating that every presumption is in favor of a school board's proper exercise of power when its object is "reasonably germane to the purpose of the grant[,]" ## Opinion text Jim Johnson, Associate Justice, (Dissenting). In the famous case of Olmstead v. United States, 277 U. S. 478 , one of the dissenting opinions profoundly acknowledged the following truth: “. . . The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure conditions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized the significance of man’s spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They knew that only a part of the pain, pleasure and satisfactions of life are to be found in material things. They sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let alone — the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men.” As I view the case at bar, appellants are only seeking to preserve their constitutional “right to be let alone. ’ ’ While maintaining this view, certainly I acknowledge as well settled law the school board’s discretionary powers in matters relating to school affairs, including the purchase and sale of school buildings, the assignment and transfer of students, the establishment in certain cases of separate schools for the White and Negro races. However, these powers are not absolute and are subject to judicial review and determination of whether the exercise of discretion has or has not been abused. In 79 C. J. S. “Schools and School Districts”, Section 420, pages 299-300, it is written: “As in suits by tax payers to restrain the activities of school authorities, courts will not interfere with the discretionary powers of school authorities in the selection of a school site, or in the erection, or relocation or removal of a school building, unless they are guilty of fraud or an abuse of discretion.” Viewing the entire case before us as a whole, I am convinced that the admitted and undisputed facts show that the Board by its action in converting the Rights ell Elementary School from White to Negro has abused its discretion. See Nicklaus v. Goodspeed, et al, (Oregon) 108 Pac. 135 ; Taylor v. Robertson, 16 Utah 330 , 52 Pac. 1 ; Fisher et al, v. Birkey, et al, 307 Ill. 625 , 139 N. E. 126 , In 47 Am. Jur., “Schools” § 19, p. 311, it is written, referring to school board’s discretion: “Discretion being exercisable, certain limitations are, of course, imposed. Thus, the authority must act in good faith for the best interest of the people of the districts affected, upon just and equitable terms which do not cause unnecessary hardship. ’ ’ Who is it that can say that this is in the best interest of the people of the districts affected and upon just and equitable terms when the flagrant results of the board’s action shakes the stability of a steadfast community, destroys the property values therein, and compels its patrons to migrate elsewhere. In Bledsoe v. McKeowen (1930) 181 Ark. 584 , 26 S. W. 2d 900 , this Court stated: “The proper interpretation of the language used in the act is that the board may consolidate the proposed territory into a new district if, in the judgment of the board, it would be to the best interest of all parties residing in the district as a whole, meaning, of course, a substantial majority of all the parties residing in the territory. The exercise of a sound discretion on the part of the board in the organization or formation of a new district upon proper petition does not mean that the board may greatly inconvenience, oppress or outrage any parties residing in any part of the territory. The true interpretation of the statute is that the wishes and convenience of a substantial majority in the whole territory should be respected, if, in doing so, it would not greatly harm the other parties affected.” It is undisputed that one of the members of the Board himself recognized that the Board’s action was discriminatory and not in the best interest of the people in the Rights ell area. The Board Member, Mr. Tucker, admitted that, if he were a property owner in the Right-sell area, he would be “mad as hell” about the conversion. What is it about the action of the Board that would prompt one of its members to volunteer the statement that he would be “mad as hell”? Why would he be “mad” and why to that extent? Could there be any other reason than the fact that he recognized that the board’s decision was obviously discriminating against these people? Could it be for any other reason than the fact that the Board’s action was prejudicial, oppressive and burdensome to the property owners and taxpayers of this community? How could he justify his decision to do something to other property owners and taxpayers that he would not want done to himself. I submit that Mr. Tucker’s strong language is a concession that the school board in its unanimous decision to take this hallowed institution away from the White taxpayers and give it to the Negroes acted arbitrarily. For these reasons and the further reason that I am convinced that if the facts were reversed and this was a case of the White patrons taking a school away from Negroes, the Federal Courts as presently constituted would not for an instant hesitate to grant to them the relief which is here by the majority being denied appellants. I respectfully dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9674625. Public record. Not legal advice.