# Doe v. Union Pacific Railroad > Supreme Court of Arkansas · February 5, 1996 · 323 Ark. 237 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9672234 ## Case - **Full name:** Jane DOE v. UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD CO. Et Al. - **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas - **Decided:** February 5, 1996 - **Citations:** 323 Ark. 237; 914 S.W.2d 312; 1996 Ark. LEXIS 68 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Brown - **Judges:** Jesson, Corbin, Brown, Roaf - **Cited by:** 14 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9672234 ## Opinion text Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. I would accept this appeal and decide the issue under the test employed in Omni Farms, Inc. v. Arkansas Power & Light Co., 271 Ark. 61 , 607 S.W.2d 363 (1980) and Gipson v. Brown, 288 Ark. 422 , 706 S.W.2d 369 (1986). What Jane Doe requested in her briefs and at oral argument is that the style of this case, as contained in the permanent record, not reflect her real name. She has made her actual name available to counsel for Dr. Ramone. She is available for discovery and will appear at trial to testify in public. Any enterprising news reporter could ferret out her real name. Her true name may actually be used at trial; that is unclear. Her concern is history and whether the style of this case will permanently reflect her correct name. The majority states the Omni Farms analysis that I would use in this case: At the oral argument counsel for A.P.& L. conceded that if the construction is allowed to proceed, it will be impossible in the event of a reversal for Omni’s land to be restored to its previous condition. We conclude that this is one of the comparatively rare instances, foreseen by some of our earlier opinions, in which an order must be regarded as appealable because otherwise the order would divest a substantial right in such a way as to put it beyond the power of the court to place the party in its former condition. 271 Ark. at 63 , 607 S.W.2d at 364 . Using the Omni standard, we should decide (1) whether a substantial right is involved, and (2) whether it will be lost if we fail to correct the matter before trial. What I take issue with in the majority opinion is that it closes the door to appeals in all instances where going to trial would violate a party’s utmost privacy rights. We should leave the door cracked for such rare appeals, even when a final order has not been rendered in the matter. This case differs from Scheland v. Chilldres, 313 Ark. 165 , 852 S.W.2d 791 (1993). The Scheland case involved taking a blood test to establish paternity. Here, we are concerned with allegations of sexual invasion which are categorically different in terms of privacy considerations. Other jurisdictions have accepted appeals of anonymity issues where utmost privacy was the question to be resolved. See, e.g., James v. Jacobson, 6 F.3d 233 (4th Cir. 1993) (artificial insemination by physician’s sperm — anonymity allowed); Doe v. Frank, 951 F.2d 320 (11th Cir. 1992) (alcoholism — anonymity not allowed); Doe v. Bodwin, 119 Mich. App. 264 , 326 N.W.2d 473 (1982). The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in James v. Jacobson: The decision whether to permit parties to proceed anonymously at trial is one of many involving management of the trial process that for obvious reasons are committed in the first instance to trial court discretion. This implies, among other things, that though the general presumption of openness of judicial proceedings applies to party anonymity as a limited form of closure, see Stegall, 653 F.2d at 185, it operates only as a presumption and not as an absolute, unreviewable license to deny. The rule rather is that under appropriate circumstances anonymity may, as a matter of discretion, be permitted. This simply recognizes that privacy or confidentiality concerns are sometimes sufficiently critical that parties or witnesses should be allowed this rare dispensation. A necessary corollary is that there is a judicial duty to inquire into the circumstances of particular cases to determine whether the dispensation is warranted. 6 F.3d at 238 . In Doe v. Bodwin, the complaint was made that a psychologist had had sexual intercourse with the plaintiff, his patient, during therapy. A complaint was filed and a fictitious name invoked. The trial court ordered the plaintiff to identify herself publicly, but on appeal, the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for reconsideration of whether utmost privacy rights were violated. We should do the same analysis and determine whether a right of utmost privacy would be lost by going to trial rather than merely dismissing the matter for lack of a final order. I respectfully dissent. Corbin and Roaf, JJ., join. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9672234. Public record. Not legal advice.