# Guinn Ex Rel. Guinn v. Millard Truck Lines, Inc.

> Supreme Court of Iowa · April 6, 1965 · 257 Iowa 671

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669361

## Case

- **Full name:** Mildred Guinn, Shirley Guinn, a Minor, by Douglas Guinn Individually and as Next Friend, Appellees, v. Millard Truck Lines, Inc., and Jack Coleman, Appellants
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** April 6, 1965
- **Citations:** 257 Iowa 671; 134 N.W.2d 549; 1965 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 619
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Stuart
- **Judges:** Garfield, Hays, Larson, Moore, Peterson, Snell, Stuart, Thompson, Thornton
- **Cited by:** 12 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669361

## Opinion text

*686 Stuart, J. —
'I respectfully dissent from Divisions VI and VII of the majority opinion. As therein stated, two lines of authorities directly in point reach opposite results. The majority prefer to follow the decisions in Florida and California explained in their opinion. I believe the reasoning expressed by the courts of Tennessee and several eastern states to be more sound.
The three separate cases consolidated for trial below grew out of the same automobile accident. Thé driver and passenger brought actions for personal injuries. The husband of the driver (father of the passenger) sued for property damage and medical expenses. The jury returned verdicts for the driver and passenger and against the husband. Under this record these verdicts are totally inconsistent and wholly irreconcilable.
If the jury properly found for plaintiffs in the first two cases, they must have found defendant negligent. Because of the derivative nature of the husband’s action, this finding must necessarily carry over to his case. The husband was not in the car at the time of the accident and there is no claim of contributory negligence on his part. Therefore, these verdicts can be reconciled only if the record is such that the jury could properly find the husband had failed to prove damages. Clayton v. Blair, 255 Iowa 700 , 123 N.W.2d 896 .
The majority do not'turn the case upon this point and.in' fact state: “Mr. Guinn’s claim was liquidated and admitted in regard to medical expense and personal property damage.” -
The jury could not properly have found the husband had not been damaged. Therefore they could not, under the May, do what they did do in this case. If the driver and passenger were entitled to recover,, so was the husband. If the husband was not entitled to recover neither was the driver nor passenger. The majority opinion does not recognize the second possibility.
The majority say the verdicts are not irreconcilable “if it can be fairly said that the jury’s sole error was in failing to award him damages.” They seem to have satisfied themselves that this was the sole error. To reach this conclusion they must take the position that the jury found negligence. (which was seriously disputed) in all three cases, and refused to award damages that were liquidated and admitted.
*687 ■ In view of the serious question on negligence and the liquidated and admitted damages, I do not believe it can fairly be said the failure to award damages was the jury’s sole error. It is just as logical to conclude they erred in awarding damages to the driver and passenger when they failed to find defendants negligent! The jury’s obvious confusion is illustrated by the fact that they signed five of the.six forms of verdict submitted to. them. They also awarded the driver substantially less money than was awarded the passenger, although her injuries were far more serious. "
I do not believe it is the prerogative of this court to deter'mine, at least on such an inconclusive récord, into which error the jury fell in reaching inconsistent and irreconcilable vetdicts. It is not for us to decide what the jury intended. I would reverse and remand for new trial to allow another finder of fact to resolve these inconsistencies.
Thompson, J., joins in this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669361. Public record. Not legal advice.