# Racing Ass'n of Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald

> Supreme Court of Iowa · September 6, 2002 · 648 N.W.2d 555

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669352

## Case

- **Full name:** RACING ASSOCIATION OF CENTRAL IOWA, Iowa Greyhound Association, Dubuque Racing Association, Ltd., and Iowa West Racing Association, Appellants, v. Michael FITZGERALD, Treasurer, State of Iowa, Appellee
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Iowa
- **Decided:** September 6, 2002
- **Citations:** 648 N.W.2d 555; 2002 WL 1286029
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Neuman
- **Judges:** Cady, Carter, Neuman, Streit
- **Cited by:** 18 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- **Red flag:** Reversed on other grounds by Fitzgerald v. Racing Assn. of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (2003).
- Negative treatments: 1
- Distinguished by: 0
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669352

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- finding racetracks and river boats similarly situated, and no rational basis for the differential tax at issue
- reversing district court’s summary judgment for the State

## Opinion text

NEUMAN, Justice
(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. One slot machine may be the same as the next. But the legislature was looking at the bigger picture, and so must we.
Under the guise of entertainment and economic development, the State permits gaming corporations to lawfully part their customers from their money. Quite a lot of that money — thankfully—returns to the State in the form of tax receipts. The question is whether that taxing scheme, which differentiates between gaming on riverboats and gaming at racetracks, bears a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. I think it does. At least the challengers here have not convinced me beyond a reasonable doubt that it does not.
Riverboats are not the same as racetracks. From an entertainment perspective, they speak to different cultural traditions — river lore versus agriculture. The majority questions these distinctions once gaming is attached to the enterprise. But there is no constitutional impediment to a legislature favoring diversity in cultural attractions for its citizens and tourists. And, rightly or wrongly, a legislative majority could rationally determine that a riverboat casino holds more romantic tourist appeal than a casino stuck in a dog track.
To advance these policy decisions, a reasonable legislature would also want to recognize a very pragmatic distinction between the two gambling venues: riverboats are mobile, racetracks are not. If the economic climate turns unfavorable here, a riverboat merely unties its lines and sails elsewhere. So it is not unreasonable for the legislature to create economic incentives to develop or retain riverboat gambling while maintaining the status quo with respect to other forms of the sport.
*564 In short, there are a number of rational reasons why the legislature might tax land-based casinos differently from river-based ones. They are different enterprises. We might not agree with the legislature’s rationale; we might think the tracks should enjoy a more competitive playing field or that gambling is a bad idea all the way around. But our views on the matter are irrelevant. Our concern is limited to finding a rational basis for the taxing scheme that passes constitutional muster. Because such a rational basis exists here, I would affirm the district court’s rejection of the appellants’ constitutional challenge.
CARTER and CADY, JJ., join this dissent.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669352. Public record. Not legal advice.