# Bosnick v. Lockhart

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · July 16, 1984 · 283 Ark. 206

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669181

## Case

- **Full name:** David BOSNICK v. A. L. LOCKHART, Director, Arkansas Department of Correction & Arkansas Board of Pardons and Paroles
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** July 16, 1984
- **Citations:** 283 Ark. 206; 672 S.W.2d 52; 1984 Ark. LEXIS 1758
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** On rehearing by Hollingsworth
- **Judges:** Hollingsworth, Dudley
- **Cited by:** 29 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669181

## Opinion text

Supplemental Opinion on Denial of Rehearing
P. A. Hollingsworth, Justice. In their petition for rehearing, the appellee argues that it is unclear from our opinion whether parole eligibility is determined under the parole law existing at the time of a defendant’s sentencing or that existing when the crime was committed. Furthermore, the appellee states that our opinion is unclear as to the proper method for determining parole eligibility when, as in this appellant’s case, consecutive sentences are imposed at different times. The petition for rehearing is denied because we are affirming our earlier holding. However, because the appellee’s points have merit, we offer the following clarification.
Our decisions in Davis v. Mabry, Director, 266 Ark. 487 , 585 S.W.2d 949 (1979) and Poe v. Housewright, Comm’ner, 271 Ark. 771 , 610 S.W.2d 577 (1981) both provide that the parole law in effect when an appellant is sentenced is the statute to be applied to that appellant’s application for parole. However, both the Legislature in Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2829 (Repl. 1977) and the United States Supreme Court in Weaver v. Graham, 450 U.S. 24 (1981) have indicated that parole status is more properly governed by the parole statute in effect at the time the crime was committed. We think that the latter is the law and to the extent that they are inconsistent with this viewpoint, we overrule both Davis and Poe. As we said in our original opinion, a parole statute less favorable to those sentenced prior to its passage than the law in effect at the time of sentencing is unconstitutional as an ex post facto law. Central to this argument is the lack of fair notice to a defendant of what parole law will govern his situation. By applying the law in effect when the crime was committed, any possible lack of notice to a defendant is eliminated. Therefore, that is the rule we adopt.
As to the determination of parole eligibility when consecutive sentences are involved, Ark. Stat. Ann. § 43-2829 (E) provides that “For parole eligibility purposes, consecutive sentences by one or more courts, or for one or more counts, shall be considered as a single commitment reflecting the cumulative sentence to be served.” In treating consecutive sentences as a single commitment, we hold that the parole eligibility statute governing the original sentence is the one that should control the cumulative sentence. Support for this position can be found in Davis, where we held that when a life sentence is commuted to a term of years, the parole statute in effect when the sentence was imposed governs rather than that in effect at the time of commutation. Again, this finding is consistent with the concept of fair notice to a criminal defendant.
Rehearing denied.

---

Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9669181. Public record. Not legal advice.