# State v. Smith

> Tennessee Supreme Court · June 28, 1993 · 857 S.W.2d 1

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9668874

## Case

- **Full name:** STATE of Tennessee, Appellee, v. Leonard Edward SMITH, Appellant
- **Court:** Tennessee Supreme Court
- **Decided:** June 28, 1993
- **Citations:** 857 S.W.2d 1
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurring in part by Daughtrey
- **Judges:** O'Brien, Drowota, Anderson, Reid, Daughtrey, Opinions
- **Cited by:** 189 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9668874

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- explaining that this issue had been addressed previously and the death penalty statute “ ‘does not in any way constitutionally deprive the sentencer of the discretion mandated by the individualized sentence requirements of the constitution’ ”
- holding that the statute does sufficiently limit exercise of the jury's discretion once matters in aggravation are found, and that the statute is not unconstitutional because it allows the admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing
- holding that by not contesting the trial cou rt's jury selection procedure until after the case was submitted to the jury, rather than contemp oraneous ly objecting, the accu sed waived th at issue on ap peal
- holding that Tennessee's death penalty statutes "do[ ] not in any way constitutionally deprive the sentencer of the discretion mandated by the individualized sentence requirements of the constitution"
- holding that Tennessee’s death penalty statutes “do[] not in any way constitutionally deprive the sentencer of the discretion mandated by the individualized sentence requirements of the constitution”

## Opinion text

DAUGHTREY, Justice,
concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur in the result reached by the majority and in the view expressed by Chief Justice Reid in his dissenting opinion. Because this case has been tried twice previously and must now be tried again, I write separately to emphasize that every *26 effort should be made to avoid further error and thereby invite further litigation.
At this juncture, the principal decision upon rehearing is for the state to make, and that is whether once more to seek the death penalty. If the state does ask for the death penalty and a jury must therefore be selected, several significant issues present themselves. They are matters that I believe cannot be dismissed as merely “discretionary with the trial court,” thereby evading substantive review. Discretion assumes the exercise of a wise choice between (or among) alternatives, based upon developed standards pertaining to the particular question to be determined.
For example, on rehearing, the need for another change of venue ought to be carefully reassessed, as should the need for individual, sequestered voir dire of prospective jurors on such matters as the effect of pre-trial publicity, the existence of individual bias, and the personal convictions of each venireperson about the death penalty. In this as in most cases, group voir dire on preliminary questions may be appropriate, as well as expeditious. On the other hand, there is very little beyond expedition to be gained by group exposure to sensitive questions regarding the formulation of opinion about the defendant’s guilt by any one prospective juror, or concerning his or her ability to follow the law of capital punishment. At the same time, there is much to be lost by not utilizing individual, sequestered voir dire.
Under the circumstances of this case, the goal of making the verdict immune to challenge on the basis of juror contamination prior to trial or during voir dire is surely worth the relatively minor inconvenience of moving the trial to another venue, or the relatively small amount of extra time required by individual questioning. Many of the issues discussed in the lead opinion will not arise at the new sentencing hearing. Others will. Of the others, it seems to me that the most crucial concern the impartiality of the jury and, thus, the integrity of their verdict.
ORDER DENYING PETITION TO REHEAR
The Court has carefully considered the Petition to Rehear filed in this cause and concludes it should be denied.
REID, C.J., and DROWOTA, DAUGHTREY and ANDERSON, JJ., concur.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9668874. Public record. Not legal advice.