# Hawkins v. State

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · October 19, 1983 · 660 S.W.2d 65

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9668073

## Case

- **Full name:** Samuel Christopher HAWKINS, Appellant, v. the STATE of Texas, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** October 19, 1983
- **Citations:** 660 S.W.2d 65; 1983 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 1205
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Clinton
- **Judges:** Tom G. Davis
- **Cited by:** 303 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9668073

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- concluding that it was error to refuse to empanel a jury when the defendant’s attorneys testified as to his incompetence, since the testimony presented some evidence of incompetence
- concluding that commenting on fact that defendant slept during his trial amounts to little more than directing the jury’s attention to that which jurors had already witnessed
- holding that contentions involving noncompliance with art. 36.27 cannot be reviewed on appeal in the absence of a timely objection

## Opinion text

CLINTON, Judge,
dissenting.
For the reasons expressed in my dissenting opinion in Crawford v. State, 617 S.W.2d 925 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) (Opinion on Appellant's Motion for Rehearing), I dissent to the majority’s overruling the eleventh ground of error advanced by the amicus curiae here for the reason that no objection was voiced to the trial court’s exclusion of seven prospective jurors for cause where the State had failed to meet its burden of establishing their disqualification.
For the reasons discussed in my dissenting opinion in Russell v. State, - S.W.2d - (Tex.Cr.App., No. 66,410, delivered July 6, 1983), I dissent to the majority’s overruling the amicus curiae’s ninth ground of error, which alleges the trial court erred in refusing to define “deliberately” within the meaning of Article 37.071(b)(1), Y.A.C. C.P. in its instructions to the jury at the punishment phase.
With respect to appellant’s fifth ground of error, I would point out that United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 , 96 S.Ct. 2392 , 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976), holds that the duty to disclose is not limited to situations where a request is made by an accused; the contrary statement by the majority is erroneous, and if Iness v. State, 606 S.W.2d 306 (Tex.Cr.App.1980) so held it should be overruled. See Whitchurch v. State, 650 S.W.2d 422 (Tex.Cr.App.1983) (Dissenting Opinion).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9668073. Public record. Not legal advice.