# State v. Gonzalez

> Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas · April 14, 1993 · 855 S.W.2d 692

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666904

## Case

- **Full name:** The STATE of Texas v. Rolando GONZALEZ, Appellee
- **Court:** Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas
- **Decided:** April 14, 1993
- **Citations:** 855 S.W.2d 692; 1993 WL 109439
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Concurrence by Meyers
- **Judges:** Baird, Maloney, Meyers, Campbell, Clinton, McCormick, White
- **Cited by:** 484 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666904

## How later opinions describe it (automated extraction)

- recognizing that “[t]he discretion of the District Court, in granting new trials, is almost the only protection to the citizen against the illegal or oppressive verdicts of prejudiced, careless, or ignorant juries, and we think the District Court should never hesitate to use t…
- holding that both the granting and the denying of a motion for new trial rests within the discretion of the trial court, and appellate courts ordinarily will not reverse those decisions unless the trial court has abused its discretion
- holding that “the accused is required to allege sufficient grounds to apprise the trial judge and the State as to why he believes himself entitled to a new trial”
- stating that a defendant can raise ineffective assistance of counsel by way of a motion for new trial even though that ground was not listed in rule 30(b) [now rule 21.3]

## Opinion text

MEYERS, Judge,
concurring.
Unlike the majority I would reach the matter of whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s order granting the new trials under Jones v. State, 711 S.W.2d 35 (Tex.Crim.App.1986) 1 and under Rule 30(b)(6) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Appellant pled guilty to three separate felony charges of delivery of marihuana. Tex.Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.120. The trial judge assessed punishment at three years confinement for two of the offenses and five years probation for the third offense. Appellant timely filed motion for a new trial on a ground not enumerated in Rule 30(b), namely “in the interest of justice.”
The Court of Appeals held the list set out in Rule 30(b) is not exhaustive and that the movant for a motion for new trial was not required to aver a prima facie case for a trial court to grant the motion. The Court of Appeals stated,
As Jones illustrates, a trial court does not lose its discretion to deny a motion for new trial even if a defendant complies prima facie with rule 30(b). We *698 hold, as a corollary, that a trial court does not lose its discretion to grant a motion for new trial even if a defendant fails to comply with rule 30(b). The rule’s list of circumstances under which the trial court must grant a motion for new trial is not an exclusive one.
Majority opinion at 694-695.
I believe the Court of Appeals reasoning is sound and therefore would decide this issue based on Jones . Furthermore, I believe there is no need to determine whether this is a new ground not enumerated within Rule 30(b). The evidence indicates sufficiently that the real issue before the trial judge was the “new evidence” presented concerning the assessment of punishment. Rule 30(b)(6). Presently it is unclear whether a trial court has the power to grant a new trial for sentencing only or must grant a complete new trial. Bates v. State, 833 S.W.2d 643 (Tex.App.-Eastland 1992, pet. granted). Since appellant plead guilty and the only determination left was sentencing, I believe the only prudent course remaining for this trial judge was to grant a new trial.
While I agree with the dissent’s view “that motions for new trial should be viewed with great caution, and that they should not be granted lightly,” I am equally convinced that when a trial court grants such a motion, the decision should be viewed with great deference. In this case, appellant plead guilty to three felonies. The pleas were accepted absent any plea agreement with the State. Accordingly, the trial judge was left without any guidance for sentencing. If upon hearing evidence during a motion for new trial that trial judge is presented with a competent or expert witness who would have presented “new evidence” that would have assisted in the assessment of punishment the trial judge, should, within the prescriptions of the law, be permitted to adjust the sentencing.
Additionally, I consider the focus by both the majority and dissent on the sufficiency of the evidence for a grant of a new trial as misplaced. The Court of Appeals determined as a factual matter that the evidence was sufficient. Once this Court determines this is “new evidence” as contemplated under Rule 30(b)(6) or that the list contained in Rule 30(b) is not exhaustive, we are bound by that factual decision. Arcila v. State, 834 S.W.2d 357 (Tex.Crim.App.1992). I would only conduct a review of whether the Court of Appeals used the correct legal standard, and upon finding they did, accept their factual finding as binding upon our Court.
Accordingly, I concur in the result of the court.
. Although Jones is a pre-rule case, it appears that at the present time the prima facie requirements set out in Jones may still be applicable where a defendant makes a motion for new trial based on “new evidence." Ramirez v. State, 830 S.W.2d 827, 828 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no pet.); Martinez v. State, 824 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1992, pet. refused); Alford v. State, 807 S.W.2d 840 (Tex.App.-Waco 1991, no pet.).

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666904. Public record. Not legal advice.
