# Skinner v. R.J. Griffin & Co.

> Supreme Court of Arkansas · June 14, 1993 · 313 Ark. 430

URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666835

## Case

- **Full name:** Billy C. SKINNER v. R.J. GRIFFIN & COMPANY
- **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas
- **Decided:** June 14, 1993
- **Citations:** 313 Ark. 430; 855 S.W.2d 913; 1993 Ark. LEXIS 359
- **Precedential status:** Published
- **Opinion:** Dissent by Brown
- **Judges:** Dudley, Hays, Brown
- **Cited by:** 42 later opinions in the Frix Law Library

## Citator (automated)

- No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases.
- Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666835

## Opinion text

Robert L. Brown, Justice, dissenting. The issue is whether Skinner contributed to his own eye injury by not wearing safety goggles. I view this as a matter for the jury to decide, not for the majority to dictate as a matter of law. With its decision, the majority reverses a jury verdict and cites the trial judge for error in giving the comparative fault instruction. I disagree and would affirm the verdict.
There are two circumstances in this case that should be taken as givens and should not be the subject of disagreement. Unhappily, they are. The first is that when a person operates a backhoe on a construction site without the protection of a cab window, there is always the risk that debris in the form of dust, dirt, rocks, or other foreign matter will enter the cab and afflict the driver.
The second is that goggles offer some protection against foreign matter striking the eye.
The idea that goggles are worn for safety reasons is generally accepted in our society. Witness two definitions of the generic term, goggles, in standard dictionaries:
A pair of large, usually tinted spectacles with shielding sidepieces worn as a protection against wind, dust, or glare.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (1971).
Large spectacles equipped with special lenses, protective rims, etc. to prevent injury to the eyes from strong wind, flying objects, blinding light, etc.
The Random House Dictionary of the English Language (1967).
Thus, it strains belief that the majority concludes that safety goggles, which by common definition include side pieces and rims for protection against flying objects, would not have afforded Skinner some relief. The majority, however, states:
While the question of proximate cause is usually a question for the jury, when the evidence is such that reasonable minds cannot differ, the issue becomes a question of law to be determined by the trial court. Wilson v. Evans, 248 Ark. 101 , 679 S.W.2d 205 (1984). Here, reasonable minds cannot differ: The evidence at trial did not establish a causal connection between the failure to wear safety goggles and the damage to plaintiffs eye, and, accordingly, the trial court erred in giving the instruction.
Is the majority really saying that the fact that goggles protect the eyes must be proven? Do we really need expert testimony to make a case on the point that failure to wear goggles can lead to eye injury? Does that also mean that circumstances such as the fact that shoes protect one’s feet and gloves protect one’s hands must also be proven in a court of law to be considered? I cannot conceive that that is the law. Surely these are facts not subject to reasonable dispute of which judicial notice may be taken. Ark. R. Evid. 201; see, e.g., West v. Searle & Co., 305 Ark. 33 , 806 S.W.2d 608 (1991) (judicial notice of the Physician’s Desk Reference may be taken for some purposes).
This is not a case such as we had in Baker v. Morrison, 309 Ark. 457 , 829 S.W.2d 421 (1992), where we held that proof was necessary to show a causal connection between failure to wear seatbelts and injury to the plaintiffs in a car accident. In Baker we could not determine, short of proof, whether the absence of seatbelts contributed to the plaintiffs injuries in the wreck. In the case before us, there is no doubt that safety goggles would have covered the eyes and thwarted injury, at least to some extent.
Billy Skinner was a subcontractor and his own boss. It was his decision either to wear or not to wear safety goggles on the job. There was testimony that at one job — the Pine Bluff paper mill — backhoe operators did wear goggles. Skinner chose not to do so.
In our society we all take risks on a daily basis. At times we take these risks because to do otherwise is inconvenient and bothersome. For example, a homeowner may mow the grass over rocky terrain without goggles and be hit in the eye with gravel. An adult may ride a moped without a helmet and be injured in a fall. A teenager may weed a garden without gloves and develop poison ivy. We all recognize that we cause our injuries in part in such situations.
As the instruction says, juries are not supposed to set aside common knowledge and everyday experience. AMI 102. Nor should judges. I would acknowledge some causal relationship between Skinner’s conscious decision not to wear goggles and the eye injury and leave the matter to the jury. Because of that, I respectfully dissent.
Hays, J., joins.

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Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666835. Public record. Not legal advice.
