# Skinner v. R.J. Griffin & Co. > Supreme Court of Arkansas · June 14, 1993 · 313 Ark. 430 URL: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666834 ## Case - **Full name:** Billy C. SKINNER v. R.J. GRIFFIN & COMPANY - **Court:** Supreme Court of Arkansas - **Decided:** June 14, 1993 - **Citations:** 313 Ark. 430; 855 S.W.2d 913; 1993 Ark. LEXIS 359 - **Precedential status:** Published - **Opinion:** Dissent by Hays - **Judges:** Dudley, Hays, Brown - **Cited by:** 42 later opinions in the Frix Law Library ## Citator (automated) - No negative treatment found by the automated citator. That is not the same as a confirmation that the case is good law; read the citing cases. - Full citator and citing cases: https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666834 ## Opinion text Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. The majority holds that the defendant must present specific evidence of negligence by the plaintiff in order to be entitled to an instruction on comparative negligence. I respectfully disagree and suggest that approach seriously undermines the purpose and intent of comparative negligence. The statute itself is couched in the broadest possible language: In all actions for damages for personal injuries or wrongful death or injury to property in which recovery is predicated upon fault, liability shall be determined by comparing the fault chargeable to a claiming party with the fault chargeable to the party or parties from whom the claiming party seeks to recover damages. See Ark. Code Ann. § 16-64-122 (1987). Comparative negligence is the successor by statute to contributory negligence, defined as “Contributory negligence” is the doing of something by plaintiff which a person of ordinary care and prudence would not have done under the same or similar circumstances, or failure of plaintiff to do something which a person of ordinary care and prudence would have done under same or similar circumstances, and which conduct on part of plaintiff contributed, however slightly, in whole or in part, to occurrence and damages, and without which damages would not have been sustained. Dempsey v. United States, 176 F. Supp. 75 (D.C. Ark. 1959). Certainly, comparative negligence is an affirmative defense which must be pled, and the burden of proof is on the defendant to prove comparative negligence, but those are issues for the jury. Wasson v. Warren, 245 Ark. 719 , 434 S.W.2d 51 (1968). And that proof can, and often does, arise by reasonable inference from the circumstances of the case. Headrick v. H.D. Cooperage Co., 97 Ark. 553 , 134 S.W. 957 (1911). Only when it can be said with certainty that reasonable minds could come to no other conclusion should the issue be taken from the jury. The dynamics of this incident are that Skinner alone set in motion the forces that resulted in his injury. In that setting, especially, the defendant is entitled to the comparative negligence instruction. The majority asserts that there is no evidence that Skinner failed to keep a lookout for lines of string. But direct evidence of that issue is not required, as there was ample evidence that lines were strung all around the job site and Skinner was well aware of it. That is sufficient. Richison v. Boatright, 238 Ark. 579 , 383 S.W.2d 287 (1964), is illustrative. The plaintiff was injured when he stepped through a piece of unsupported roofing felt and fell against the ceiling joists. Plaintiff appealed a verdict for the defendant, arguing the jury should not have been instructed on contributory negligence because there was no evidence to justify the instructions. Justice George Rose Smith wrote: On the issue of negligence the jury could have found that Richison was at fault. He had assisted in putting down the decking and must have known that the ends of the boards were staggered. The jury could have found that he was careless in walking too close to the edge, even if the protective board referred to by McKinney had somehow been removed. On this point the case is similar to Headrick v. H.D. Cooperage Co., 97 Ark. 553 , 134 S.W. 957 , where the plaintiff stepped into a hole in the floor of a sawmill. He knew that the hole was there, but its exact location had been obscured by an accumulation of sawdust. We held that his contributory negligence was a matter for the jury. It seems clear that this is a case where reasonable minds could readily infer from the circumstances that Skinner could have contributed to his own injury in a variety of ways: by not wearing goggles, by not closing the rear window of his backhoe, which he chose to leave open, by not keeping a better lookout, or not exercising reasonable care for his own safety. Even the means by which he positioned and operated his backhoe were factors the jury could have considered. Only if it could be said that under no conceivable circumstances could Skinner have contributed to his own injury would it have been proper to refuse the comparative negligence instruction. I believe the trial court was correct and should be affirmed. Brown, J., joins in this dissent. --- Source: Frix Law Library, https://www.frixlaw.com/law-library/cases/9666834. Public record. Not legal advice.